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ARTICLES
THE PATHOLOGY OF PROPERTY
NORMS: LIVING WITHIN
NATURE'S BOUNDARIES
LYNDAL. BUTLER•

INTRODUCTION

For centuries property rights have played a critical role in defining a
society's fundamental relationship with its foundation ecosystem. 1 In
colonial America, for example, the expectation of property rights in land
contributed to the development of America's capitalist economy, private
property system, republican political structure, and exploitative attitude

* Professor of Law and Director of the Environmental Science & Policy Cluster, College of
William & Mary. B.S., College of William & Mary; J.D., University of Virginia. I would like to thank
the College of William & Mary and the School of Law for financially supporting this article. I also
would like to thank Eric Freyfogle, Charles Koch, Alan Meese, Mark Sagoff, and Cynthia Ward for
their insightful comments on earlier drafts of the article, as well as Sari Benmeir, Allison Chock, Kyle
Jones, John Liethen, Patrick O'Leary, and Beth Silverman for their able research assistance. Finally, I
would like to express my gratitude to Della Harris and Felicia Burton for their dedication and hard wodc
in providing hours of word processing support.
I. See generally BEIJER INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EcOLOGICAL ECONOMICS, THE ROYAL
SWEDISH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, RIGHTS TO NATURE (Susan S. Hanna et al. eds., 1996) (discussing
the relationship between property rights regimes and the natural environment). For a discussion of the
importance of private property to ancient and modern civilizations, see RICHARD SCHLATIER, PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1951).
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toward natural resources. 2 On a more global scale, the quest for water
resources and rights has had similarly profound effects. 3 Scholars have
explained how mathematics and engineering were developed in part to
design irrigation systems,4 astronomy was used to predict seasonal and
climatic changes affecting the availability of water,5 civil engineering was
developed to deal with flooding and water supply projects,6 and legal and
political systems were needed to impose water allocation rules.7 What
these linkages often ignore is the importance of water and soil to ecological
systems, and the impact of urbanization and land development on
watersheds and ecosystems.
This failure to give serious consideration to the connections between
land development, water use, and ecosystem health reflects a fundamental
problem within American property law and current ecosystem and resource
management practices. The problem is adherence to a value system that
poses serious obstacles to effective management of ecosystems and natural
resources. The obstacles raised by property norms are especially evident in
the core justifications, fundamental principles, and key policies of
American property law, and in the legal principles governing allocation and
management of natural resources. For the most part, disputes over natural
resources are resolved by determining who has the right to conduct a
2. The abundance ofland in colonial America apparently created expectations in immigrants of
becoming private landowners. Almost from the beginning, colonists settling in Virginia expected to be
able to acquire land from the colony's seemingly inexhaustible supply. Efforts by the Crown and royal
governors to assert royal prerogatives over colonial lands "never were successful in convincing the
Virginia colonists that land grants were a matter of royal grace and generosity.'' LYNDA LEE BUTLER &
MARGITLMNGSTON, VIRGINIA TIDAL AND COASTAL LAW§ 8.1, at 266 (1988). See also FREDERICK
JACKSON TuRNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 168-69 (1920) (maintaining that frontier
conditions, and not the character of the earlier settlers, primarily influenced the development of
American democracy). See generally JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT
(1992) (discussing the role of property in shaping the American constitutional order).
3. See generally LUDWIK A. TEcl.AFF, WATER LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 1-4 (1985)
(discussing the impact of water on the past development of civilization).
4. See ROBERT BRITTAIN, RIVERs, MAN AND MYTHS: FROM FISH SPEARS TO WATER MILLS
83-84, 92-96, 108-10, 183-84 (1967). See also After the Warming: Episode One (PBS Television
Broadcast, Nov. 21, 1990) (discussing the ecological evolution of the world and its effect on the
development of civilization).
S. See BRITTAIN, supra note 4, at 77-79. See also After the Warming, supra note 4 (discussing
the importance of water to ancient cultures and the development of mathematical systems to predict
weather changes).
6. See LUDWIKA. TEcl.AFF, THERIVERBASININHISTORY AND LAW 16-17 (1967).
7. See id. at 24. See generally MORTON J. HORWI1Z, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW, 1780-1860, at 31-62 (1977) (discussing the great impact of water law on the transfonnation of
property law into a pro-development body oflaw).
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use-that is, by engaging in "rights talk."8 Although issues relating to
ecosystem health and resource conservation also may arise in disputes,
these issues generally do not control resolution of the disputes.9 Rather
private property norms tend to drive allocation of interests in natural
resources, particularly water resources, and management of natural
systems. 10
Although the precise meanings and expectations attributed to private
property norms may vary from group to group or person to person, the
norms generally involve a belief in the existence or necessity of certain key
attributes of property, particularly land ownership. Basic characteristics of
property include: 11 a preference for private ownership; 12 exclusivity, or the
power and right to exclude others;13 free transferability, or the right to
8. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGIITS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POUTICAL DISCOURSE
3-4 (1991); Eric T. Freyfogle, Ownership and Ecology, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1269, 1286-87
(1993).
9. The obstacles raised by property nonns are especially evident in the legal principles
governing water resources. For a discussion of the evolution of watershed protection laws and
programs, see BARRIERS AND BRIDGES TO THE RENEWAL OF EcOSYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS {Lance
H. Gunderson et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter BARRIERS AND BRIDGES]. See also Robert \V. Adler,
Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 2S ENVTL. L. 973 (1995).
10. See infra Part I.
11. For hundreds of years scholars have debated and discussed the key characteristics of
property. According to Honore, for example, property has eleven key characteristics: the right to
possess, the right to use, the right to manage, the right to the derivative income, the right to the capital,
the right to security, the power of transmissibility, the absence of tenn, the prohibition of hannful use,
liability to execution, and residuary character. See LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGIITS:
PmLOSOPmc FOUNDATIONS 18-20 (1977) (discussing Honore's concept of ownership). Richard
Posner, on the other hand, identifies four characteristics that are, in his view, necessary for the efficient
use of resources and therefore are critical traits of property. According to Posner, property must be: 1)
valuable ("scarce as well as desired"); 2) owned by someone (or as Posner states, subject to ''the
criterion of universality"); 3) exclusive (giving the owner the power to exclude others from using a
resource); and 4) freely alienable or transferable. RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
§ 3.1, at 36-38 (5th ed. 1998).
12. See 2 SIR \VILIJAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 3-5
(Dawsons of Pall Mall ed. 1966) (1766); POSNER, supra note 11, § 3.2. See also Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972) (developing a legal framework, based on the concept of entitlement, for
analyzing various aspects of the pollution problem).
13. See POSNER, supra note 11, § 3.1. The Supreme Court has, in various cases, recognized the
importance of exclusivity. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (deciding
that government could not, without payment of just compensation, condition the approval of a
rebuilding permit on the landowners' transfer to the public of lateral access across their beachfront
property); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (deciding that a law
requiring landlords to permit cable companies to install cable facilities on rental property was an
unlawful taking); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (holding that government could
not, without payment of just compensation, require owners of a marina to open the marina to the
public). CJ. JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 48-49, 73-77, 142-44 (1988)
(discussing different kinds of property falling along a spectrum of exclusivity).
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alienate property; 14 and a reasonable expectation of gain, including the
right to conduct an economically viable use free from unfair government or
private interference. 15
The phrase ''unfair government or private
interference" is intended to capture a variety of legal standards defining
when government or private interference with property rights is unlawful.
The phrase, for example, would include government interference that
denies a landowner a reasonable return, 16 or singles out a landowner "to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole." 17 It also would include private action that directly
interferes with a property owner's lawful attempt to make a gain from her
own property 18 or engages in unfair competition or unfair trade practices to
reap the benefits of another property owner's investment and labor. 19 The
key attributes of property reflect an image of private ownership that
separates the owner from the owned resource and that gives the owner
general control over the property as against all others.20 Though some
legal restrictions on land use exist, stringent restrictions are the exception
rather than the rule. That is, a property owner "can, for the most part, do as
she likes."21
14. See POSNER, supra note 11, § 3.1. Restraints on alienation have been disfavored for
hundreds of years. See generally 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY§§ 26.1-.4 (1952) (discussing the
long-standing policy favoring freedom of alienation).
15. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (recognizing a property
owner's right to be free from government action that denies all economically beneficial or productive
use ofland); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31, 136 (1978) (focusing on
permitted uses to determine whether the challenged government law allowed the landowner to receive a
reasonable return); International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918) (recognizing
the right to acquire property by honest labor and the right to a reasonable opportunity to reap the
benefits of one's skill, labor, or stock in trade free from unfair competition); Keeble v. Hickeringill, 103
Eng. Rep. 1127 (Q.B. 1707) (recognizing the right to make a livelihood from one's property free from
unlawful interference). During certain periods in the development of American legal thought, the
expectation of freedom from government interference with property rights has been expressed in
absolutist terms even by jurists. See G. EDWARD WHITE, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism:
Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, in PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
LEGAL 'IHOUGHT 99, 102 (1978).
16. See Penn Cent.• 438 U.S. at 130-31, 136.
17. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960).
18. See Keeble, 103 Eng. Rep. at 1128.
19. See International News Serv., 248 U.S. at 236.
20. See Freyfogle, supra note 8, at 1274-75.
21. /d. at 1275. See also Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 55,55 (1987) ("Whoever is allocated an ownership right .•• is largely free to do with it as he sees
fit •..."); WHITE, supra note 15, at 100-02 (discussing the late nineteenth century notion of absolute
property rights). Statements that property rights are absolute can have different meanings. See JOHN
CHRISTMAN, THEMYrHOFPROPERTY29-31 {1994).
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This article will demonstrate the pervasive and pathological effects of
property norms on land and water use, natural resource allocation, and
ecosystem management. Those norms have played a significant role in the
development of water and other resource allocation systems, affecting the
rules, standards, and criteria guiding allocation of rights and resolution of
use conflicts.22 The norms also have significantly affected the focus,
scope, and stringency of watershed and land use management programs in
ways that detrimentally impact the effectiveness of the programs and the
health of ecosystems.23 Land ownership norms, in particular, have
contributed to the development of a pathology of escalating land and water
use, and of ineffective watershed or ecosystem management over the long
term. Land norms have controlled the development of principles governing
water allocation and use, producing water allocation systems that generally
ignore ecological values, cumulative and ecosystem-wide impacts of water
use, and mounting evidence of the need for stronger water conservation and
growth control measures. 24 In addition, while some ecosystem or
watershed management programs have achieved success over the short
term,25 land norms have had pathological effects on management programs
over the long term. These effects have contributed to the development of
less resilient ecosystems that are more prone to becoming persistently
degraded by disturbances once absorbed by the ecosystem.26
To demonstrate the pervasive and pathological influence of property
norms on ecosystem health, the article first discusses the inherent conflict
between traditional private property norms and effective ecosystem
management, and then explores the pathological effects of property norms
on resource allocation systems and ecosystem management programs.
Part I examines the rights-based nature of resource allocation and
management systems. The discussion will demonstrate that even when
allocation and management decisions are based on scientific evidence and
See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part II.A.
25. For example, Virginia's ban on phosphate detergents produced surprisingly quick results.
Effective January 1, 1988, the ban reduced the concentration of phosphorus discharged from secondary
treatment plants by about 50% in only one year. See CHESAPEAKE EXECUI1VE COUNCIL, THE FiRST
PROGRESS REPORT UNDER THE 1987 CHESAPEAKE BAY AGREEMENT 21 (Jan. 1989) [hereinafter 1989
CHESAPEAKE EXECUI1VE COUNCIL PROGRESS REPORT].
26. See infra Part II.B. Traditional forest management policies, for example, have placed a high
priority on preventing forest fires and minimizing the occurrence of insect infestation. This priority has
led to greater contiguity of forest areas and therefore to greater devastation once fires or defoliating
insects disturb an area. Disturbances of forests having more contiguous area tend to result in more
extensive damage. See generally Gordon L. Baskerville, The Forestry Problem: Adaptive Lurches of
Renewal, in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES, supra note 9, at 37-102.
22.
23.
24.
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principles, the decisions reflect the inflnence of land ownership nonns.
Part II then explores the pathological effects of property nonns on land and
water use choices and on watershed and ecosystem management programs.
These pathological effects will be studied in the use context through a
narrative of conflict over water, and in the management context through an
examination of studied managed ecosystems. Particular emphasis in the
watershed management context will be placed on the Chesapeake Bay
management program, one of the world's most watched programs.
Finally, in Part m, the article offers some thoughts on how to stop the
pathologies of escalating land and water use and of ineffective ecosystem
management over the long tenn. Three principal solutions will be
proposed: first, an internal solution that calls for the reexamination of
property nonns shaping the behavioral incentives of land use
decisionmakers; 27 second, an external solution that advocates the adoption
of an adaptive approach to watershed and ecosystem management to guide
the reexamination of property nonns and, when necessary, apply pressure
on the private property system to account for the ecological costs of land
use; 28 and third, a bridge-building and fairness-enhancing solution that
recommends more effective monitoring of ecosystems for surprise in order
to gauge ecological integrity and ensure rough proportionality between
redefmed property rights and the scales of private use.29 All of the
proposed solutions recognize that humans must continually reassess their
impact on the foundation ecosystem in defining their nonns, rules, and
standards.

I. THE INHERENT CONFLICT BETWEEN 1RADITIONAL
PROPERTY NORMS AND ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT
Many of the nonns, principles, and policies of traditional American
property law inherently conflict with the goal of effective ecosystem
management over the long tenn.30 These key norms, principles, and
27. See infra Part lilA.
28. See infra Part III.B.
29. See infra Part III.C.
30. The tenn "ecosystem" has been defined in a variety of ways to include different levels of
complexity and scale. See Anthony W. King, Considerations of Scale and Hierarchy, in EcoLOGICAL
INTEGRITY AND THE MANAGEMENT OF EcOSYSTEMS 19, 20 (Stephen Woodley et al. eds., 1993)
[hereinafter EcoLOGICAL INTEGRITY]. One widely used definition describes an ecosystem as "[t]he
organisms living in a particular environment ..• and the physical part of the environment that impinges
on them. The organisms alone are called the community." EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF
LIFE 396 (1992) (glossary). As Oliver Houck has noted, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
has used this definition to conclude that "an ecosystem can be anything from 'a drop of water' to 'the
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policies reflect a strong "societal preference for individualism and
autonomy"31 that has thwarted efforts to develop effective ecosystem-based
management. Captured in some of the basic attributes of private property,
this social preference has shaped the development of resource allocation
systems and management programs. Standards and rules governing
resource allocation, management, and use all have been affected by the
private-rights-based thinking of traditional property law.32
The strong ties between private property norms and resource
allocation and management systems necessarily limit the systems' ability to
recognize and account for ecological interests. As numerous scholars have
explained, the private property system does not effectively account for
ecological values that are not easily measured, particularly values that
reflect intangible interests or have long-term implications.33 The private
property system also does not effectively include environmental resources
that are too plenteous to make creation of a private property system
worthwhile,34 or that are public goods involving either economies of scale
entire biosphere."' Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81
MINN. L. REV. 869, 874 n.l3 (1997) (quoting U.S. FlSH & Wn.DLIFE SERVICE, AN EcOSYSTEM
APPROACH TO FlSH AND WilDLIFE CONSERVATION 6 (1994)). The ecosystem concept implicitly
includes the concepts of ecosystem function and ecosystem structure. Ecosystem function refers to the
"functioning or opemtion of the ecosystem, its integmted holistic dynamics, and not the role or job of
the ecosystem." King, supra, at 20. Ecosystem structure genemlly means the "disttibution of matter
and energy among system components." ld. The tenn "watershed" tmditionally has been defined from
a hydrological perspective to mean "a unit of natural or disturbed land on which all the water that falls
(or emanates from springs) collects by gravity and fails to evapomte and runs off via a common outlet"
Pim:R E. BLACK, WATERSHED HYDROLOGY 278 (2d ed. 1996).
31. Sterk, supra note 21, at 90. For a discussion of colonial laws governing land disttibution and
use, see Bun.ER& LMNGSTON, supra note 2, §§ 8.1-.5, at 245-303; ELY, supra note 2, at 10-25; John
F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modem Takings Doctrine, I 09 HARV. L. REV.
1252, 1259-81 (1996).
32. For examples, see infra Parts I.A & I.B.
33. See, e.g., STEVEN C. HACKETI, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL REsOURCES EcONOMICS
42-59 (1998) (explaining why markets fail to protect environmental quality); MARK SAGOFF, THE
EcONOMY OF TilE EARTH 24-49, 74-98 (1988) (discussing issues relating to valuation of environmental
interests). For a discussion of some of the issues raised by economic perspectives to environmental
values, see Lynda L. Butler, Private Land Use, Changing Public Values, and Notions of Relativity,
1992 BYU L. REV. 629, 641-44, 648-51. For provocative discussions of the services provided by
ecosystems and of the value of those services to society, see NATURE'S SERVICES (Gretchen C. Daily
ed., 1997) and Robert Costanza, Ralph d' Arge, Rudolf de Groot, Stephen Farber, Monica Grasso, Bruce
Hannon, Karin Limburg, Shahid Naeem, Robert V. O'Neill, Jose Paruelo, Robert G. Raskin, Paul
Sutton & Mrujan van den Belt, The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, 387
NATURE 253 (1997).
34. Two resources typically given as examples of plenteous resources are the oceans and air. See
Lynda L. Butler, Environmental Water Rights: An Evolving Concept of Public Property, 9 VA. ENVTI..
LJ. 323, 358 (1990). The costs of implementing a private allocation system for such resources would
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or high but diffused public demand.35
Resource allocation and
management systems accordingly favor consumptive uses and private
interests over ecological uses and public interests.36 While current thinking
on water allocation and watershed management recognizes and attempts to
correct the limitations of traditional approaches, current systems still are
limited in many ways by the norms underlying property rights, particularly
land ownership. Parts I.A and I.B examine the rights-based nature of
resource allocation systems and ecosystem management programs.

A. THE RIGHTS-BASED NATURE OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION SYSTEMS
In the United States, traditional resource allocation systems are largely
based on private property principles and policies that defme and allocate
private rights of use, control, exchange, and expectation of gain.37 This
focus on private rights exists not only in fundamental principles defining
original acquisition of property rights and key theories, policies, and
instrumental ends of property law, but also in the basic principles
governing allocation of specific natural resources. A comparison of some
of the principles, policies, and allocation rules governing private property
generally and natural resources specifically will demonstrate the rightsbased nature of resource allocation systems. Because of their rights-based
focus, resource allocation systems inherently conflict with effective
ecosystem management over the long term.

1. Key Principles, Policies, and Rules Defining the Private Property
Concept
The fundamental principles governing original acquisition of property
rights reward the first laborer, first discoverer, and first captor. Preference
basically is given to those who have controlled, cultivated, developed, or
otherwise conquered nature.38 The common law doctrines used to promote
this preference "presuppose[] ... an agrarian or a commercial people" who
outweigh the benefits, and the resources thus are generally treated as exceptions to the private property
approach. See id. at 358-59.
35. The "public goods exception" typically occurs when the private market system "predictably
fails to produce socially optimal uses." /d. at 353. Government control arguably is needed in the public
goods situation to correct the market's failure and achieve proper allocation of resources. See id.
36. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Water Rights and the Common Wealth, 26 ENVTL. L. 27, 28-30
(1996).
37.

For a discussion of whether property norms include the profit motive, see infra notes 241243 and accompanying text
38. See Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 87-83

(1985).
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value "lasting control" of resources for purposes of promoting commerce
and trade. 39 By awarding property rights to the first possessor, the common
law of property is giving "significance and form to what might seem the
quintessentially individualistic act: the claim that one has, by 'possession,'
separated for oneself property from the great commons of unowned
things.' 740 People who want to live in harmony with the land, without
controlling and developing it, generally are not protected by the principles
governing original acquisition ofproperty.41
Consider also the fundamental legal conception of property as a
preference-satisfying device-a commodity that allows individuals to
satisfy their preferences through market exchanges.42 As Gregory
Alexander explains in his thoughtful work Commodity & Propriety: ''Legal
writing, especially scholarly writing and judicial opinions, has increasingly
come to reflect the idea that the basic, if not the sole, purpose of property is
the satisfaction of individual preferences through market transactions.' 743
Although the commodity view of property has influenced America since its
colonization, this view has gained strength in the last twenty-five years as
the law and economics movement has grown.44 Adherence to the market
view of property has meant the development of market-oriented policies of
property law. Those policies have affected natural resource allocation and
management systems in ways that undermine ecological integrity.
One key policy is the promotion of present use and development,
particularly short-term productive use. The central importance of this
policy to property law can be seen in its incorporation into a wide variety
of property law doctrines. The present use and development policy, for
example, is reflected in the theory of economic takings developed by the
Supreme Court to protect economically beneficial use of land,45 the present
39. !d. at 87.
40. !d. at 88.
41. See id. at 87. This point is implicitly reflected in Justice Marshall's opinion in Johnson v.
M'lntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543, 590 (1823). See generally HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 32-34
(discussing the evolution of the first-in-time priority rule from an agrarian, natural use doctrine to "an
offensive doctrine justified by its power to promote economic development''); Christopher Vecsey,
American Indian Environmental Religions, in AMERICAN INDIAN ENVIRONMENTS 1, 1-37 (Christopher
Vecsey & Robert W. Venables eds., 1980) (discussing the relationship between American Indians and
nature).
42. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIE1Y 1-17 (1997) (introducing the
commodity, or market, and the propriety, or public good, conceptions of property).
43. /d. at 379.
44. See id. at 8-9, 379-84. See generally HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 31-62 (discussing the
transformation of property law from a system based on an agrarian vision of absolute dominion and use
to a utilitarian vision of productive development and use).
45. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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use orientation of water allocation laws,46 and the mechanical settlement
and use requirements of colonial and early statehood land distribution
laws.47 In other words, from its fundamental constitutional context to its
mechanical allocation rules, the traditional property system has been
designed to promote short-term productive use-"to ensure prompt and
tangible financial retums.'"' 8 This goal generally conflicts with the
"lengthy observation periods and managerial forbearance" required for
effective ecological management.49
Another key policy of property law, the promotion of certainty and
stability, also conflicts with some basic components of effective ecosystem
management. As many have already explained, property law needs to
promote certainty and stability in order to encourage investment and use,
reduce transaction costs, facilitate the administration of property regimes
and the resolution of property conflicts, and clarify the deterrents and
incentives faced by property owners.50 The importance to property law of
promoting certainty is evidenced by its impact on a wide range of laws
affecting natural resources, including wild animals,51 oil and gas,52 water,53
and land.54 Because ecosystems are ever changing and unpredictable,
protection of ecosystems will require policies that conflict with the
certainty goal underlying many property law principles.55

2. Private Property's Domination of Resource Allocation Systems
The fundamental principles, values, and policies defining the private
property concept have controlled the development of America's natural
resource allocation systems. Two of those systems-land distribution laws
46. See infra notes 67-69, 75-88, 91-95 and accompanying text.
47. Throughout Virginia's colonial and early statehood periods, for example, its land distribution
system was used to promote various economic, political, and social goals. See generally BlJil.ER &
LIVINGSTON, supra note 2, §§ 8.1-.5, at 245-303 (discussing Virginia's colonial and early statehood
land laws).
48. Robert B. Keiter, Ecosystems and the Law: Toward an Integrated Approach, 8 EcoLOGICAL
APPUCATIONS 332, 332 (May 1998).
49. Id.
SO. See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805) (discussing the importance of certainty
and stability to wild animal law).

51.

See, e.g., id.

52. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Central Ky. Nat. Gas Co., 75 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1934) (applying the
wild animal escape rule to terminate ownership rights over gas when the gas escapes), overruled by
Texas Arner. Energy Corp. v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 736 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1987).
53. See infra notes 81,90 and accompanying text (discussing the flfSt-in-time rule governing use
of surface waters in western states).
54. See, e.g., Tapscott v. Cobbs, 52 Va. (II Gratt.) 172 (1854) (protecting the flfSt possessor).
55. See Keiter, supra note 48, at 332.
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and water allocation systems-are discussed briefly to highlight the
pervasive influence of the private property concept.
The land laws used to distribute interests in real property in the
colonial and early statehood periods demonstrate the influence of core
values underlying property law: individualism, self-autonomy, and
certainty. Although a communal system of landholding initially was tried
in Jamestown, the first permanent settlement in America, it was abandoned
seven years after its adoption. In granting power to a group of investors to
establish the Virginia colony, King James I authorized the distribution of
land to private parties upon nomination and approval by the King.56
Eventually known as the London Company, the group of investors decided
initially to hold land in the colony for the common use and benefit of the
settlers.57 The investors apparently feared that immediate distribution of
private land rights would leave them with insufficient funds to cover the
costs of colonization. One of the London Company's pamphlets explained
that a party interested in purchasing land in the Virginia colony would need
to buy stock in the Company and hold it for a seven-year period. At the
end of the period, the purchaser would receive land from the Company.58
When the first seven-year period ended in 1616, the Company carried out
its promised land distribution, abandoning its communal (or plantation)
system.59 The Company apparently realized that the communal system was
thwarting development60 and replaced it with a land distribution system
that favored greater distribution to private parties.61
American land laws generally distributed geometrically distinct tracts
of land to individuals who met land settlement requirements designed to
promote land use and development for various social, political, and
56. See Letters Patent to Sir Thomas Gate, Sir George Somers, and others, for two several
Colonies and Plantations, to be made in Virginia, and other parts and Territories of America, 4 Jam.Stith's App. No. 1. pa. 1 (Apr. 10, 1606), reprinted in 1 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATIJTES AT
LARGE 57-66 (1823); The Second Charter to the Treasurer and Company, for Virginia, erecting them
into a Corporation and Body Politic, and for the further enlargement and explanation of the privileges of
the said Company and FlfSt Colony of Virginia, 7 Jam.-Stith's App. No.2 (May 23, 1609), reprinted
in HENING, supra, at 80-98.
57. See NOVA BRITANNIA: OfFERING MOSTEXCELLENI'FRUITES BYPLANilNG IN VIRGINIA 2324 (1609), reprinted in I TRAcrs AND OTHER PAPERS VI (Peter Smith ed. 1947) (Peter Force coli.
1835) (advertisement pamphlet to entice settlers to Virginia colony).
58. See id. The pamphlet indicated that shareholders would receive land dividends at a rate of at
least 500 acres per share. See id. at 24.
59. See Bun.ER & LIVINGSTON, supra note 2, § 8.1, at 245.
60. See id. at 245.
61. See Instructions to Governor Yeardley, 1618, reprinted in 2 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY
154 (1894).
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economic purposes.62 Some sort of use-for example, pasturing and
clearing-typically was required to acquire title. 63 Other requirements
might include payment of consideration, surveying and locating the
specified amount of land, returning a completed plat, and defeating
objections to the issuance of a grant.64 All of the requirements were part of
a lengthy process of separating not only the purchased land from the waste
and unappropriated lands still available for entry and grant, but also the
purchaser from his neighbors.65 Property rights in land, in other words,
reflected notions of separateness and boundedness that are at odds with the
principles of connectedness and fluidity at the core of ecosystem science.
The traditional American systems of law governing water use in both
the water-rich East and the water-poor West also have reflected the
preferences for individualism, autonomy, separateness, and economic
development promoted by American land laws and underlying the private
property concept. 66 Water allocation and management systems are
especially important to effective ecosystem management goals because of
the importance of water to ecosystems and land use. From a physical
perspective, water both constrains and enables land development. Despite
the two-sidedness of this link between water resources and land use,
American water allocation systems generally only focus on the enabling
role of water. That is, the traditional water allocation systems generally
encourage out-of-stream, consumptive uses of water designed to enable
land development and do not allow ecosystem characteristics and needs to
dominate water use decisions.67 This clear preference for consumptive use
62. See Bun.ER & LIVINGSTON, supra note 2, § 8.1, at 262-68; Sterk, supra note 21, at 55. For
a discussion of the land settlement and land grant process in Virginia, see Bun.ER & LIVINGSTON,
supra note 2, §§ 8.1-5, at 245-303. See generally PAUL W. GATES, HiSTORY OF PuBUC LAND LAW
DEVELOPMENT 33-74 (1968) (discussing colonial land systems, state cessions of western land claims,
and the development of public land laws and policies); HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 101-08 (discussing
the relationship between property rights and individualism); PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK, TilE LEGACY
OF CONQUEST: ntE UNBROKEN PAST OF TilE AMERICAN WEST (1987) (discussing the role of the
federal government in promoting and regulating land development in the American West).
63. See Bun.ER & LIVINGSTON, supra note 2, § 8.1, at 262-63.
64. See id. § 8.3, at 279-81.
65. See Sterk, supra note 21, at 90 ("The geometric-box allocation generally pennits landowners
to avoid interaction with others, including neighbors, unless both the landowner and the other provide
for interaction by explicit agreement."). See generally AlEXANDER, supra note 42, at 97-126
(discussing the revision of land law during the Jacksonian era to promote the economic conception of
property); Bun.ER & LIVINGSTON, supra note 2 (discussing the colonial and early statehood land
distribution Jaws in Virginia).
66. See HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 34.
67. See Butler, supra note 34, at 326-30; Freyfogle, supra note 36, at 27-30.
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is reflected in the alienability of traditional water rights68 and in the
traditional systems' treatment of water as a commodity to be used and
transported to meet human ends.69 A brief discussion of the traditional
systems will demonstrate their enabling effect on land development and
use, as well as their unsuccessful constraining effect.
Under the system traditionally governing the water-rich East, rights in
a watercourse arise as an incidence of owning land adjoining the
watercourse. 70 Owners of such riparian land generally have the right to
make reasonable use of the water in the watercourse for the benefit of their
riparian land.71 Because other riparians along the watercourse have a
similar right, each riparian's right to reasonable use is subject to the
correlative rights of other riparians.72
Two key aspects of the riparian doctrine define the scope of water use
rights. First, the water use must be tied to riparian land; a riparian
proprietor can only exercise her rights for the benefit of riparian landP
Second, the riparian use must, in most traditional riparian jurisdictions, be
reasonable. 74 Both requirements incorporate land ownership norms. The
riparian land requirement restricts the land that can benefit from the use of
a watercourse by recognizing that riparian rights inhere in the ownership
rights of riparian landowners. The reasonable use requirement defines the
quantitative use rights of riparian owners.75 In developing this standard,
the courts traditionally have assumed that the riparian user is a private
agrarian who supplies all his or her consumptive water needs.76
68. See A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND REsOURCES§ 5.17 (11th ed. 1999). See
also Lynda L. Butler, Allocating Consumptive Water Rights in a Riparian Jurisdiction: Defining the
Relationship Between Public and Private Interests, 41 U. Prrr. L. REV. 95, 137-56 (1985) (discussing
the transferability of consumptive and nonconsumptive water rights in a riparian jurisdiction); infra note
80 and accompanying text (discussing the transferability of riparian rights).
69. See Freyfogle, supra note 36, at 35.
70. See Butler, supra note 34, at 327.
71. See Butler, supra note 68, at 105. In the nineteenth century most courts followed the natural
flow theory, which generally gave each riparian the right to receive the natural flow of the watercourse.
Under this approach a downstream riparian could enjoin a use by an upstream riparian if the use
diminished the quality or quantity of water, regardless of whether the downstream riparian was injured.
See TARLOCK, supra note 68, § 3.12[1].
72. See Butler, supra note 68, at 106-07. A riparian is entitled to the use of the flow of a
watercourse after reasonable use by upstream riparians but may not unduly interfere with the correlative
rights of downstream riparians. See id.
73. See id. at 107-25.
74. See id. at 125-30.
75. See id. at 125-26.
76. See id. at 125.
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The riparian doctrine incorporates private property nonns in a number
of ways. Besides reflecting a preference for private ownership of water
rights, the doctrine treats riparian rights as vested property rights whose
allocation is tied to the ownership of riparian land-not to the jurisdiction,
the needs of political units, or the interests of the public. Additionally, the
traditional riparian system prefers consumptive riparian uses through the
reasonable use requirement and through the principles and rules governing
resolution of water use conflicts. Riparians along a watercourse know that
upstream riparians have the right, and therefore the opportunity, to conduct
their reasonable uses before the water reaches the downstream users.77
Under certain circumstances this right entitles "an upstream riparian to
exhaust the water in the watercourse."78 Further, when an unlawful
riparian use has been conducted, typically only riparian landowners who
can establish injury are entitled to relief from the courts.7 9 Finally, like
other property interests associated with ownership, riparian rights are
transferable and sometimes even severable.80
Under the system traditionally governing the water-poor West,
allocation of water rights is based upon priority in time: a water user who
diverts water from a watercourse and uses it for a beneficial purpose
acquires rights superior to subsequent users.81 Although the prior
appropriation doctrine does not require holders of water rights to own
riparian land,82 the doctrine clearly encourages the actual, present, and
consumptive use of water. To perfect their right, appropriators must
physically divert water from the watercourse.83 Through this requirement
the courts have ensured that a party must have physical control of the
claimed water before the party may successfully assert an appropriative
77. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
78. Butler, supra note 68, at 126-27.
79. See id. at 136-37. In a riparian jurisdiction, the injury requirement means that the
complaining riparian must own riparian land that is downstream from the point of diversion. See id. at
136 n.l12.
80. Courts have allowed riparian rights to be transferred in one of two ways. A riparian
landowner generally has the right to transfer his or her water rights along with the riparian land, much
as easements transfer as incidents to the benefited land when the land is conveyed. See TARLOCK,
supra note 68, § 3.18. See generally id. § 3.04 (discussing the nature of riparian rights, which resemble
a number of different property interests). Alternatively, a riparian can, in some riparian jurisdictions,
sever the riparian rights from the land to which they are appurtenant and separately transfer the rights.
See Butler, supra note 68, at 139-42. Though the extent of this sevembility rule is not clear, the rule
does implicitly recognize the importance of redistribution and reallocation of water rights. See Butler,
supra note 68, at 138-39.
81. See TARLOCK, supra note 68, §§ 5.05[2], 5.10; Butler, supra note 34, at 329.
82. See TARLOCK, supra note 68, § 5.07[1].
83. See id. § 5.15.
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right. 84 Further, courts traditionally have interpreted the beneficial use
requirement of the prior appropriation doctrine to include uses that provide
economic or commercial benefits regardless of the environmental
consequences or the foreseeability of a water shortage. 85 Courts following
this interpretation view instream uses as inherently wasteful because they
leave water in place in the stream and thus reduce the water available for
consumptive use. 86 Actual, present use is also encouraged by the prior
appropriation rule that nonuse can result in loss of appropriative rights;
appropriators should regularly use a definite quantity of water to avoid this
possibility.87 Finally, once an appropriative right is perfected, it generally
is transferable. 88
Like the riparian doctrine, traditional prior appropriation law
incorporates private property perspectives into its requirements. In
addition to treating appropriative rights as a form of property,89 prior
appropriation law is based on a basic principle of property law: priority in
time, priority in right.9 Furthermore, the prior appropriation doctrine
encourages private parties to divert water from a watercourse and use it for
beneficial purposes.91 Traditional definitions of beneficial use include
almost any type of consumptive use of water "without regard for
environmental consequences or foreseeable shortages";92 as "long as a
single drop remained in the stream or aquifer," users could continue to
appropriate the water. 93 The "dominant message" of the traditional prior
appropriation doctrine is that "water is a commodity, an object that exists
for humans to move and manipulate, a thing that exists primarily to serve
human needs.'o94 Like other objects of property rights, water is treated as a
"tool for one person-the owner-to use to gain economic advantage over
other persons.'o95

°

84. See Butler, supra note 34, at 330.
85. See Freyfogle, supra note 36, at 42.
86. See Butler, supra note 34, at 329.
87. See TARLOCK, supra note 68, § 5.18[1].
88. See id. § 5.17[1].
89. See Freyfogle, supra note 36, at 28.
90. See TARLOCK, supra note 68, § 5.08[1]. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the
Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REv. 1221 (1979) (discussing the justifications for first possession systems);
Rose, supra note 38 (discussing the meaning of the first possession rule).
91. See TARLOCK, supra note 68, § 5.08[1].
92. Freyfogle, supra note 36, at 42.
93. !d. at 28.
94. !d. at 35.
95. ld.
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Although the courts and legislatures of many states have modified
their traditional system to provide for protection of ecological and other
instream uses, the reforms generally suffer from numerous problems and
limitations.96 Like the traditional common law systems, the reforms tend to
treat instream water use as another category of water use rather than as a
responsibility of the holders of traditionally recognized water rights. Thus,
consumptive water users generally are not held accountable for some of
their significant external use costs.97
Resource allocation systems developed for land and water resources
traditionally have relied on private property norms to define the scope and
nature of interests allocated under the systems. Because those norms
include preferences for consumptive use, separate and discrete privately
held interests, transferability of interests, private control, and freedom to
seek economic advantage from the interests, resource allocation systems
conflict in a number of ways with ecosystem management goals. Property
norms have had a similar, but less direct, impact on natural resource and
ecosystem management programs.
B. THE RIGHTS-SENSITIVE NATURE OF RESOURCE
AND ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS

Resource and ecosystem management efforts also reflect the influence
of property rights and land ownership norms. 98 A brief discussion of the
nature and scope of property's influence will reveal how responsive natural
resource and ecosystem management programs are to property norms. That
influence then will be contrasted with an approach recommended by
experts-an ecosystem-based approach to management. The contrast will
highlight even more the rights-sensitive nature of current management
programs.
96. See Butler, supra note 34, at 330-56 (discussing these modifications and their resultant
problems and limitations).
97. See Freyfogle, supra note 36, at 30-31,50.
98. Resource management programs developed separately from environmental management
programs. Years before concerns about air and water quality led to the development of environmental
programs, resource management programs had been formulated and implemented to manage renewable
natural resources (like forests, water, and wildlife) and nonrenewable resources (like soil and minerals).
See generally WILLIAM R. MANGUN & DANIEL H. HENNING, MANAGING Till! ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS
1-19, 111-82 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing environmental and natural resource administrntion, and
renewable and nonrenewable resource management). Environmental programs, in comparison,
developed much later in response to widespread concern for environmental degradation. Because of
their focus on specific pollution or degradation preblems, environmental laws generally do not provide
comprehensive management and use systems for natural resources. See id. at 111.
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1. Property's Influence on Resource and Ecosystem Management
Programs
Several key aspects of the property system have influenced natural
resource and ecosystem management programs. These characteristics
include the property system's preference for private ownership,99 the
system's tendency to allow severability or divisibility of interests in
resources, 100 its rights basis, 101 its focus on present use, 102 its protection of
reasonable expectations of gain, 103 and its presumption of transferability .104
Consistent with these traits, tangible natural resources generally are divided
into separate, discrete categories for purposes of ownership, management,
and use. The underlying assumption appears to be that natural resources
are materials to be exploited by humans. 105
Consider the basic approaches to management and use of land and
water resources. For centuries the primary focus of land programs has been
the allocation of ownership rights in surface land. That allocation has
involved the "division of surface area into discrete parcels separated by
rigid boundary lines." 106 Often the boundaries used to define those
categories reflect human values rather than ecological concerns or scientific
99. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
100. See Freyfogle, supra note 8, at 1274-75. For an example of this tendency, see ROGER A.
CUNNINGHAM, WIWAM B. STOEBUCK, DALE A. WffiTMAN, 'nm LAW OF PROPERTY§§ 8.9, 8.11 (2d
ed. 1993) (discussing the scope, divisibility, and apportionability of easements and profits).
101. See Freyfogle, supra note 8, at 1275-76, 1286-88.
102. See Butler, supra note 33, at 632-40 (discussing private land use expectations); Lynton Keith
Caldwell, Land and the Law: Problems in Legal Philosophy, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 319, 323-25
(discussing the extent to which land use systems based on individual rights and social rights consider
present and future consequences of use decisions).
103. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. See also ALEXANDER, supra note 42, at 127-33,
138-49 (discussing the commodification and marketability of property).
105. See Vecsey, supra note 41, at 33. Sometimes this assumption has resulted in the transfer of
ownership of natural resources to private parties; other times it has led to the creation or protection of
private interests in resource use. See, e.g., MANGUN & HENNING, supra note 98, at 114 (discussing the
transfer of forests to private ownership); id. at 126-31 (discussing private grazing interests). It has also
led to the creation of public resource management programs that stress human use over environmental
quality and ecosystem health. Public land management, for example, has stressed timber production,
grazing, and oil and mineral extraction over environmental quality. "Beaver populations are controlled
to maximize timber revenue, while net wetlands loss continues; riparian habitat is stripped by livestock,
lowering water tables and degrading water quality; careless lumbering clogs the streams with silt."
ALICE OUTWATER, WATER 183 (1996). Although many resource managers now claim to "use
ecological approaches in management activities[, i]n reality, this orientation may be confined to
superficial treatment and short-range planning." MANGUN & HENNING, supra note 98, at 3.
106. Sterk, supra note 21, at 55.
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understandings. 107 This "geometric-box allocation is generally well
adapted to a society whose members highly value individualism and
autonomy." 108 Water management programs similarly have drawn boxes
around different types of waters, separating surface water from
groundwater despite principles of hydrology. 109
The approaches of land and water programs reflect the rights basis and
present use orientation of the American property system, which have
encouraged the development of a homocentric approach to resource and
ecosystem management. The rights basis and present use orientation have
caused the focus of management efforts to shift from the managed system
or resource to "the relative interests of humans." 110 As a result, traditional
management programs sometimes have serious gaps in coverage, focusing
primarily on those ecological resources widely valued or recognized as
needing immediate action, and often exempting or even ignoring other
resources that are either not as degraded or valued, or that are privately
owned.lll
Additionally, the property rights of transferability and
reasonable expectation of gain have infused management programs with an
economic perspective that affects the scope and implementation of the
programs.
The influence of the economic perspective can be seen in the atomistic
approach of traditional watershed management programs, which tend to
ignore the system as a whole and focus instead on individual elements or
resources within the system in ways that are consistent with property law
107. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 9, at 991-93 (discussing the political fragmentation of water
programs); Reed F. Noss, Some Principles of Conservation Biology, as They Apply to Environmental
Law, 69 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 893, 905-06 (1994) (discussing the need to detennine ecosystem
boundaries by ecological principles, not politics).
108. Sterk, supra note 21, at 90.
109. See TARLOCK, supra note 68, §§ 4.03, 6.06. This approach still is well embedded in the law.
In a 1997 decision, a federal district court held that discharges to groundwater from an unlined pond did
not qualify as a point source discharge subject to the Clean Water Act despite a hydrological link to the
surface water. The court explained that, according to legislative history, Congress did not intend to
regulate even hydrologically connected groundwater. See Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass'n v.
Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1312, 1318-19 (D. Or. 1997).
110. Freyfogle, supra note 8, at 1276. See also Noss, supra note 107, at 894 (noting the utilitarian
approach of traditional natural resource management policies). For examples of the private
rights/human use approach, see MANGUN & HENNING, supra note 98, at 114-26 (discussing the use
orientation offorest policy); id. at 126-31 (describing the overuse of rangeland and the ineffectiveness
of range policy in protecting rangeland); id. at 131-45 (discussing the use orientation of water policy).
111. See Lynda L. Butler, State Environmental Programs: A Study in Political Influence and
Regulatory Failure, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823, 881-92 (1990) (discussing the scope of state
environmental legislation).
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policies and land ownership norms. 112 The influence of the economic
perspective also can be seen in the targeting of specific ecological
resources for regulatory action designed to promote economic interests. 113
Other examples of the atomistic and targeting perspectives include:
wetlands regulations that focus on selected land use changes and ignore
other activities in wetlands (like soil removal, drainage, and destruction of
plant life) that affect their health; 114 fishery management plans that focus
on the adequacy of fish populations for economic purposes, and ignore
factors affecting the health of the population;115 water flow protection plans
that maintain flow because of its value for consumptive or out-of-stream
uses, not because of its instream value; 116 and forest ecosystem programs
that stress the continuous production of goods and services from the forest
over other policy goals. 117
112. For examples of this approach, see supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing water
management programs that separate surface waters from groundwater); infra note 113 and
accompanying text (discussing estuarine watershed programs). See generally Robert B. Keiter,
Conse111ation Biology and the lilw: Assessing the Challenges Ahead, 69 CHJ.-KENT L. REV. 911, 91320 (1994) (discussing the domination of the consumptive use ethic and utilitarian considerations over
biological concerns). Some scholars attribute the development of an atomistic approach to the
neoclassical economic view of ecology. See Ernest Partridge, Holes in the Cornucopia, in THE
BUSINESS OF CONSUMPTION 247, 263-64 (Laura Westra & Patricia H. Werhane eds., 1998). This
economic view is replicated in the libertarian concept of property. See id. at 264.
113. FIShery management programs often reflect this economic perspective. See, e.g.• Geraldine
McCormick-Ray, A Watershed Perspective for Chesapeake Bay Management, in TOWARD A
SUSTAINABLE COASTAL WATERSHED: THE CHESAPEAKE EXPERIMENT, PROCEEDINGS OF A
CONFERENCE 235, 2~1 (Paula Hill & Steve Nelson eds., 1994) [hereinafter SUSTAINABLE COASTAL
WATERSHED] (discussing the effects of targeting oyster production in the Chesapeake Bay). Cf. Noss,
supra note 107, at 894-97 (discussing the emergence of conservation biology in reaction to the
utilitarian focus of management programs). See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 42 (discussing the
economic, or commodity, and the public good, or propriety, conceptions of property).
Protection of estuarine watersheds traditionally has included both the atomistic and targeting
perspectives. In the Chesapeake Bay, for example, management efforts have focused on oyster
production and have ignored the ecological functions of oyster reefs and the processes that sustain
oysters. See McCormick-Ray, supra, at 241. Management efforts also have stressed the productivity of
Bay species over the role of freshwater in maintaining the habitats on which those species depend. See
id. at 236-40.
114. See THE CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, THE FINAL REPORT OF TIIE NATIONAL WETLANDS
POUCY FORUM, PROTECilNG AMERICA'S WETLANDS: AN ACTION AGENDA 44-47 (1988) (discussing
regulatory gaps in wetlands programs); WILLIAM L. WANT, LAW OF WETLANDS REGULATION §§
4.06[3]-[6] (May 1999) (discussing activities that may not be regulated by federal wetlands laws even
though they destroy wetlands).
115. See, e.g., McCormick-Ray, supra note 113, at 236-40.
116. See Freyfogle, supra note 36, at 41-42.
117. See MANGUN & HENNING, supra note 98, at 114-23. See also Keiter, supra note 112, at
913 (noting that "Congress historically has subsidized commodity production activities ... at such
disproportionately high levels that biological considerations have all but been forgotten" in the
management of public lands).
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Further, even when watershed management efforts rely on scientific
principles, they often do so with a twist-a property or land ownership
norm twist. For example, riverine watershed management programs
traditionally have focused on the hydrologic functions of watersheds to
ensure the return of water to the waterway for future use by riparian
owners. 118 From a hydrologic perspective, a watershed serves the functions
of water collection, storage, and discharge. 119 An ecological perspective, in
comparison, recognizes that a watershed also provides a habitat for flora
and fauna, and serves as a pathway for the processing of environmental
chemicals. 12
Consistent with the hydrologic perspective, traditional
riverine management programs have promoted the rehabilitation of abused
or naturally altered lands for the purpose of controlling rnnoff and
enhancing water flow, 121 the protection of sensitive areas to minimize the
need for rehabilitative measures, 122 and the enhancement or manipulation
of the water resource characteristics that influence hydrologic functions. 123
These traditional programs tend to ignore the ecological functions of
watersheds, and concentrate instead on improving or maintaining water
flow through the control of runoff, erosion, and other disturbances to water
flow. 124

°

A good example of the traditional perspective is the federal
government's channelization policy, which promotes the straightening of
rivers or streams to produce a swifter and more efficient water flow.
Although the policy enhances water flow for consumptive use and prevents
some natural flooding of adjoining private lands, its ecological costs are
significant. Besides increasing runoff and erosion, the policy results in the
removal of vegetative land cover and in increased flooding of downstream
118. Courts use the same reasoning to explain why they restrict riparian land to land within the
watershed. See, e.g., Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 88 P. 978, 980 (Cal. 1907); Town of
Gordonsville v. Zinn, 106 S.E. 508, 511 (Va 1921). For a discussion of the watershed restriction, see
Butler, supra note 68, at 111-17. For a discussion of the physical processes and charncteristics of
rivers, see LUNA B. LEOPOlD, A VIEW OF THE RIVER (1994). See generally JEFFREY F. MOUNT,
CALIFORNIA RIVERS AND S1REAMS (1995) (providing an overview of the physical and biological
processes shaping California's rivers and discussing the interaction of land use practices with those
processes).
119. See BLACK, supra note 30, at 300.
120. See id. at 301.
121. See id. at 322-23. Examples include removal or restriction of the cause of disturbances to
water flow and manipulation of vegetative cover to minimize runoff and augment flow. See id. at 323.
For a discussion of methods for rehabilitation, see id. at 323-28.
122. See id. at 322. For a discussion of protection techniques, see id. at 329-34.
123. See id. at 312-13, 322. For a discussion of enhancement techniques, see id. at 334-38.
124. See MOUNr, supra note 118, at xiii (describing the different perspectives to riverine
watersheds taken by geologists, biologists, hydrologists, and engineers).
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areas. 125 Government agencies implementing the channelization policy
ignore these ecological costs and focus instead on maximization of
hydrologic functions.
2. Ecosystem-Based Approaches to Management
For years experts have called for the development of ecosystem-based
approaches to watershed management that would differ markedly from
traditional programs influenced by property norms. 126 According to current
thinking, an ecosystem-based approach to watershed management
recognizes the importance of the natural processes affecting the
watershed's health, the spatial and temporal dimensions of the ecosystem,
the system's inputs, the need for a top-down ecological approach to
management, the dynamic nature of the watershed, and the
interdependencies and interactions within the watershed. 127 The ecological
characteristics of coastal ecosystems, for instance, suggest the need for a
holistic, ecosystem-based approach to watershed management. Coastal
ecosystems are characterized by complex interactions occurring between
the land and water resources of the watershed over time. 128 Because of the
complex interactions, management efforts that focus solely or primarily on
localized areas, individual resources, or particular sources of pollution
generally fail to halt, much less reverse, ecosystem degradation. Indeed,
despite years of point source regulation, the health of species in many
125. See MANGUN & HENNING, supra note 98, at 140.
126. See Adler, supra note 9, at 974-78.
127. See McConnick-Ray, supra note 113, at 235-40, 242-44. See also COUNCIL ON
ENVIRONMENfAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENfAL QUALITY: THE TwENfY-FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 20610 (1993) (federal agency report discussing principles and guidelines for ecosYstem management);
Keiter, supra note 112, at 927-33 (discussing the ecosystem management concept). For further
discussion of the need for an integrated and dynamic or adaptive approach to ecosystem management,
see BARRIERS AND BRIDGES, supra note 9; EcOLOGICAL INfEGRITY, supra note 30; Carl J. Walters &
Ray Hilborn, Ecological Optimization and Adaptive Management, 9 ANN. REV. EcOLOGY &
SYSTEMATICS 157 (1978). For a discussion of changes in thinking on ecosystem functioning, see
BARRIERS AND BRIDGES, supra note 9, at 20-23; C.S. Holling, The Resilience of Terrestrial
Ecosystems: Local Surprise and Global Change, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENf OF THE BIOSPHERE
292, 29&-300, 306-08 (W.C. Clark & R.E. Munn eds., 1986).
128. See Adler, supra note 9, at 981-86. See also David L. Correll, Thomas E. Jordan, & Donald
E. Weller, The Chesapeake Bay Watershed: Effects of Lond Use and Geology on Dissolved Nitrogen
Concentrations, in SUSTAINABLE CoASTAL WATERSHED, supra note 113, at 639 (discussing the effects
ofland use and geology on nutrient dynamics); S. Diane Eckles, Toward a Sustainable Watershed: The
Wetlands Londscape Analysis Project, in SUSTAINABLE COASTAL WATERSHED, supra note 113, at 259
(discussing a project to assess the impact of changes in landscape structure on ecosystem functioning);
Leonard Shabman, Sustainable Development for the Chesapeake: Lond Settlement Connection, in
SUSTAINABLE COASTAL WATERSHED, supra note 113, at 3 (discussing the impact of land settlement
policy on the Chesapeake Bay).
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watersheds has continued to decline. 129 Many experts now attribute this
continued decline, at least in part, to nonpoint sources of pollution. 130
Controlling those sources of pollution requires a broader approach.
One key element of an ecosystem-based approach to watershed and
ecosystem management is recognizing the importance of natural
processes-in particular, interactions between the biological, physical, and
chemical processes affecting the health of watersheds. 131 Although a single
product or resource within a watershed still may be important to a
management plan, and especially to efforts to gain public support, key
structuring processes must be the primary focus of watershed management
efforts. 132 According to experts, such a focus results in more effective
protection of ecosystems. 133
For example, management efforts that understand the essential role of
freshwater flow in the Chesapeake Bay watershed system will, in the long
run, provide more effective protection of target species and their habitats
than product-oriented efforts. 134
Freshwater flow serves as an
135
"environmental connector" in the Chesapeake Bay system, connecting
"the habitats and species to the dynamics of the watershed system[,] ...
deliver[ing] energy, particles, and chemicals that mix with saline water" to
affect the topography, shoreline, species distribution, chemical
composition, and habitats of the system. 136 Without an appreciation of the
impact of freshwater flow on the quality and quantity of suitable habitats
for target species, watershed management efforts would not adequately
protect the habitats; such management efforts would ignore the paramount
See Adler, supra note 9, at 987-88.
See id. at 989-91.
See Alan Brandt, Physical Processes in the Chesapeake Bay and Their Bio-Chemical Effects,
in SUSTAINABLE COASTAL WATERSHED, supra note 113, at 99; Eckles, supra note 128, at 261;
McConnick-Ray, supra note 113, at 235, 240.
132. See McConnick-Ray, supra note 113, at 235, 240. See also C.S. Holling, What Barriers?
What Bridges?, in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES, supra note 9, at 3, 26-28 [hereinafter Holling, What
Barriers? What Bridges?] (discussing the key structuring variables and processes that affect ecological
organization); C.S. Holling, Cross-Scale Morphology, Geometry, and Dynamics of Ecosystems, 62
EcOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS 447, 451-52 (Dec. 1992) [hereinafter Holling, Cross-Scale Morphology]
(discussing the extended keystone and entrainment hypotheses).
133. See Holling, What Barriers? What Bridges?, supra note 132, at 28-34. See generally Lance
H. Gunderson, C.S. Holling, & Stephen S. Light, Barriers Broken and Bridges Built: A Synthesis, in
BARRIERS AND BRIDGES, supra note 9, at 489, 489-532; McConnick-Ray, supra note 113, at 235, 240.
134. See McConnick-Ray, supra note 113, at 235, 236-40.
135. Id. at 239.
136. /d. at 239-40.
129.
130.
131.
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importance of "[e]stuarine connectivity" to "maintenance and restoration of
ecosystem function." 137
A second key element of an ecosystem-based approach recognizes the
importance of considering ecologically appropriate spatial and temporal
scales in making management decisions. 138 In a riverine watershed, for
instance, spatial and temporal dimensions include not only the longitudinal
or upstream/downstream dimension of the river, but also the lateral or
upland/floodplain dimension, the vertical or groundwater/surface water
dimension, and the temporal dimension. 139 The longitudinal dimension
recognizes that the activities and conditions existing in upstream areas
cannot be isolated from downstream conditions and uses. 140 The lateral
dimension reflects the notion that watershed management cannot focus
solely on the water body, but rather must also include connections between
the water body and the surrounding land and ecosystems. 141 The vertical
dimension reinforces the hydrologic principle of interconnectedness
between surface water and groundwater. 142 The temporal dimension
suggests that management take into account changes in the other
dimensions over time. 143
Another key element of an ecosystem-based approach recognizes the
importance of focusing on system inputs that sustain productivity, rather
than on system outputs. 144 A management approach that focuses primarily
or solely on the products of an ecosystem ultimately isolates the managed
products and the decisionmaking process from the ecosystem, creating a
more vulnerable ecosystem. 145 Consideration of system inputs at the
137. /d. at 240.
138. See Adler, supra note 9, at 982; Keiter, supra note 112, at 929; King, supra note 30, at 2224, 28-30, 35-39; Robert V. Thomann, The Significance of Resource Scale in Water Quality and
Ecosystem Modeling and Decision Making, in SUSTAINABLE COASTAL WATERSHED, supra note 113, at
20.
139. See Adler, supra note 9, at 982. See generally MOUNT, supra note 118, at 12-15 (discussing
a model river system and the dependent and independent variables affecting it).
140. See Adler, supra note 9, at 982. See also MOUNT, supra note 118, at 134-42 (discussing the
longitudinal profile of a river).
141. See Adler, supra note 9, at 982. See also Correll et al., supra note 128 (discussing the effects
of land use and geology on the nutrient dynamics of the Bay watershed); James A. Lynch & Edward S.
Corbett, Nitrate Export from Managed and Unmanaged Forested Watersheds in the Chesapeake Bay
Watershed, in SUSTAINABLE COASTAL WATERSHED, supra note 113, at 656 (discussing changes in
stream chemistty due to timber harvesting).
142. See Adler, supra note 9, at 982. See also MOUNT, supra note 118, at 83-99 (discussing the
relationship between river flow and groundwater).
143. See Adler, supra note 9, at 982.
144. See McCormick-Ray, supra note 113, at 244.
145. See Holling, What Barriers? What Bridges?, supra note 132, at 25, 28-34; McCormick-Ray,
supra note 113, at 240.
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watershed scale provides a more complete view of ecosystem structures
and functions, which can lead to more effective management decisions. 146
For instance, consideration of nutrient-loading activities-instead of just
particular products or resources-can result in more effective protection of
the Chesapeake Bay system and its species. 147 Restricting nutrients
(nitrogen and phosphorous) that enter the Bay improves water quality and
protects submerged aquatic vegetation beds that provide nursery grounds
for juvenile species. 148
The remaining elements of an ecosystem-based approach to
management recognize the need for a top-down, biocentric approach that
reflects the dynamic nature of ecosystems and the interconnectedness of
their components. Such an approach requires monitoring and managing
species and other variables that play a central role in the health of the
ecosystem, regardless of their economic importance; it also requires
maintenance of system integrity to ensure habitat continuity, including
protection of the ecosystem's ability to rebuild habitats in response to
change. 149 To be scientifically sound, a management program must
respond to the dynamic nature of ecosystems and their hierarchies. 150 In
addition, it must recognize the principle of vertical and horizontal
interconnectedness. Under this principle an ecosystem or watershed is
greater than the sum of its parts because of the interactions,
interdependencies, and feedbacks that relate the parts horizontally and
vertically. 151 Due to these complex connections, a disturbance in one small
part of an ecosystem or watershed can affect the whole system. 152
See McCormick-Ray, supra note 113, at 244-45.
See id.
See McCormick-Ray, supra note 113, at 236, 244; James T.B. Tripp & Michael
Oppenheimer, Restoration of the Chesapeake Bay: A Multi-state Institutional Challenge, 47 Mo. L.
REv. 425,428-38 (1988). See generally SUSTAINABLE COASTAL WATERSHED, supra note 113, at 397146.
147.
148.

504 (discussing long-term trends in the Bay's water quality and living resources).
149. See Holling, What Barriers? What Bridges?, supra note 132, at 32-33; McCormick-Ray,
supra note 113, at 235-36, 240. System integrity "implies the integrity of both system structure and
function, a maintenance of system components, interactions among them, and the resultant behaviour or
dynamic of the system." King, supra note 30, at 25. "Assessment of ecosystem integrity is strongly
dependent upon the perspective from which observations are organized." Id. at 27. One way to
counteract this problem of perspective is to include indicators of integrity from ns many different
perspectives ns practical. See id.
150. See Judy L. Meyer, The Dance of Nature: New Concepts in Ecology, 69 Cm.-KENT L. REV.
875, 875-83 (1994). Estuarine ecosystems, for example, are constantly changing in reaction to coastal
erosion and accretion, climate, and salinity flux. See McCormick-Ray, supra note 113, at 242-44.
151. See Freyfogle, supra note 36, at 35-38; Holling, What Barriers? What Bridge.v?, supra note
132, at 24-25; King, supra note 30, at 30-39; McCormick-Ray, supra note 113, at 235.
152. See Robert Costanza & Jack Greer, The Chesapeake Bay and Its Watershed: A Model for
Sustainable Ecosystem Management?, in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES, supra note 9, at 169, 178-80, For
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Modem mapping techniques have provided compelling evidence of
the need for a holistic approach to watershed and ecosystem management
that considers time and space scales as well as human and ecological
systems. Until space satellites allowed us to see the entire Chesapeake Bay
system all at once, maps of the Bay system typically just portrayed the
Chesapeake Bay as a great body of water with numerous coastal
communities located on outlying areas. 153 Mapping by satellite imagery,
however, has given us the ability to see the Bay system as one tremendous
drainage basin with the Bay proper at the receiving end of the land use
activities of almost fifteen million people. 154 That drainage basin includes
more than forty significant rivers and one thousand streams, and stretches
from Vermont, west into West Virginia, and south almost to North
Carolina. 155
Until landowners become responsible in a cumulative, temporal, and
spatial sense for the impact of their land uses on the health of a watershed,
land development and water use will continue to increase virtually without
restraint. Lawmakers and landowners alike must realize that the impact of
a land use occurring early in the development of an ecosystem probably
will not be the same as the impact of a similar land use occurring later.
They must realize that the impact of a residential development project
occurring at the same time as two other residential projects is probably not
as detrimental as the impact of a similar residential development project
occurring simultaneously with fifty other such projects. The ability of an
ecosystem to absorb adverse ecological impacts often decreases as the
ecosystem becomes increasingly stressed and tightly connected. 156 Equally
as important to ecosystem integrity, the ability of human systems to
respond to adverse ecological change tends to decrease as the management
example, the cumulative effect of land use activities in the Chesapeake Bay watershed, which have
increased runoff, and overfishing of the oyster population, which had filtered the water during feeding,
led to greater sedimentation in Bay waters. Because of the resulting cloudier waters, the amount of
algae and phytoplankton has increased. This increase has reduced the available light in the waters. As
the available light decreases, the quantity of aquatic grasses decreases. The decline in aquatic grasses,
in turn, means less food or shelter for ducks, crabs, and other wildlife. See id. at 179-80.
!53. See VIRGINIA MARINE REsOURCES COMM'N, TIDEWATER VIRGINIA A 1LAS I (I st ed. 1977).
154. The most famous map using modern technology is probably the 1987 map that the
Chesapeake Bay Foundation distributed in poster form. The map is based on landsat data gathered and
distributed by the Earth Observation Satellite Company located in Lanham, Maryland.
155. See Tom Horton, Chesapeake Bay-Hanging in the Balance, 183 NAT'L GEOGRAPlllC, June
1993, at 16.
156. As an ecosystem stores nutrients and accumulates biomass, it becomes more connected in its
organizational structure and competitive interactions. Eventually competitors are prevented from using
accumulated energy and materials, and some organisms are destroyed. See Holling, supra note 127, at
299-300, 306-09.
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unit becomes more localized and product-oriented. 157 The right to use and
develop land, in other words, cannot be frozen in time; it cannot have the
same meaning for all landowners over time and space. Effective watershed
and ecosystem management requires the consideration of temporal and
spatial scales as well as ecological hierarchies in defining land rights,
especially the right to use and develop land.
Recent thinking on ecological systems views those systems as
complex, nonlinear systems that normally involve discontinuous behavior
and structural change. Traditional thinking viewed ecosystems as highly
ordered systems evolving along a linear path leading toward a sustained
equilibrium point. 158 Today experts recognize that ecological succession is
much more chaotic and subject to chance, with unpredicted events (for
example, a new business innovation or new institution) causing moves to
unexpectedly different systems. 159 Even with their more random, chaotic
nature, ecological systems still can have their evolutionary paths readjusted
and new opportunities for renewal created. 160 That is, ecosystems still can
be positively affected by management if the pathological effects of
property norms on management efforts are recognized and addressed.
ll. THE PATHOLOGY OF PROPERTY NORMS
Property norms have contributed to the development of a pathology of
escalating land and water use, and of ineffective watershed and ecosystem
management over the long term. These pathologies result, in part, from the
influence of property norms on the allocation and use of land and water
resources, and on the rights-based focus of watershed and ecosystem
management programs-even initially successful programs. Property
norms have contributed to the legal system's treatment of water as a
discrete resource to be exploited and allocated to individual private users.
Property norms also have encouraged landowners to develop linearly along
waterfronts, despite the ecological significance of undisturbed riparian
habitats and the adverse effects of sprawling, linear development. Further,
even when a holistic approach to watershed or ecosystem management is
157. See Holling, What Barriers? What Bridges?, supra note 132, at 28-34.
158. See id. at 19-20; Holling, Cross·Scale Morphology, supra note 132, at 466.
159. See DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW EcOLOGY FOR TilE TwENTYFiRST CENTIJRY 6-13 (1990); Gunderson et al., supra note 133, at 511; Holling, What Barriers? What
Bridges?, supra note 132, at 21; Holling, Cross·Scale Morphology, supra note 132, at 466-67. For a
discussion of the development of the science of ecology, see Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tnrlock, The
Influence ofEcological Science on American Law: An Introduction, 69 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 847 (1994).
160. See Gunderson et al., supra note 133, at 509-11.
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adopted, property norms tend to affect the focus, scope, and stringency of
the program, as well as its future direction, in ways that detrimentally
impact the effectiveness of the program and the health of ecosystems. The
pathologies of escalating land and water use and of ineffective watershed
management are discussed in Parts II.A and II.B.
A. THE PATIIOLOGY OF EsCALATING LAND AND WA1ER USE

The pathological effects of land ownership norms on allocation and
use of land and water resources are pervasive and profound. In addition to
failing to consider the cumulative impact of private use in defining the
scope and nature of individual rights, property owners and decisionmakers
generally have preferred consumptive uses over the preservation,
conservation, or maintenance of natural resources. Decisionmakers also
have been unwilling to ban or even seriously restrict land use to protect the
ecological health of a watershed, and have tended to find no significant
environmental impact even when projects involve diversions and transfers
of significant amounts of water from a watercourse. 161 Many land use
planners and policymakers are reluctant to adopt growth controls that
reflect sound science and ecosystem management principles or that
recognize moral or ethical bases for imposing some responsibility for
ecosystem integrity on property owners. The land ownership norms
producing these pathological effects may have been appropriate when
natural resources were more plentiful, ecological degradation was minimal,
land ownership was the main source of wealth, and land development
generally occurred in compact urban areas. The norms, however, do not
reflect the current ecological conditions found in stressed ecosystems, the
sprawling land settlement patterns of modem, developed societies, or the
powerful economic incentives now captured in a landowner• s power to
subdivide, transfer, and profit from land development.
Land development and use continue to escalate in America• s coastal
areas. Although the size of America•s heartland is significantly larger than
the size of its coastal areas, the population of the coastal areas outuumbers
the population of the vast heartland by more than 16 million. 162 America•s
coastal areas now are home to about one-half of the nation•s population,
but account for only 20% of the total land area of the United States if
161. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Hudson, 665 F. Supp. 428, 432 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (discussing the
Army Corps of Engineers' finding of no significant impact in a water supply project involving the City
of Virginia Beach, Virginia).
162. See Thomas J. Culliton, Population: Distribution, Density and Growth-National Picture
(visited May 25, 1999) <http://state_o(_coast.noaa.gov/buUetinslhtmllpop_Ollnational.html>.
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Alaska is included and only 11% if Alaska is excluded. 163 Experts predict
that the population of America's coastal areas will increase by an average
of 3,600 people per day, a rate of growth that exceeds the national rate. 164
By 2015 the coastal population is expected to reach 165 million, 165 an
increase of over 100% since 1960.166 Not surprisingly, the population
density of America's coastal areas (excluding Alaska) has "increased
dramatically since 1960,"167 rising from an average of 275 to nearly 400
people per square kilometer by 1990.168 The significant increase in coastal
population and development is now imposing serious pressure on coastal
ecosystems. 169
Although a desire to live in coastal areas may be the primary cause of
the population increase in those areas, property norms have had a
significant impact on the land settlement patterns of the population. Until
the middle of the nineteenth century, settlement and growth occurred
primarily in urban areas. Beginning in the 1950s, Americans began
spreading out into rural areas, including less protected, more open coastal
areas. 170 By the 1960 census, the population of suburban areas exceeded
the population of central cities for the first time. 171 In coastal areas
development related to population growth has been particularly intense.
Though comprising only 11% of the nation's land area (excluding Alaska),
coastal areas accounted for about one-half of all residential and
163. See THOMAS J. CULUTON, MAUREEN A. WARREN, nMomY R. GOODSPEED, DAVIDA G.
REMER, CAROL M. BLACKWElL, & JOHN J. MCDONOUGH, III, U.S. DEP'T OF CoMMERCE, FIFTY
YEARS OF POPULATION CHANGE ALONG THE NATION'S COASTS: 1960-2010, at 3 (1990) [hereinafter
CULUTON, FIFTY YEARS]; Thomas J. Culliton, Population: Distribution, Density and GrowthIntroduction (visited May 25, 1999) <http:state_of_coast.noaa.govlbulletins/htmUpop_O 1/intro.html>
[hereinafter Culliton, Coastal Population]. Although Virginia's coastal areas have only 22% of the
state's land area, they are predicted to have 63% of its population by 2000. See CUl.UTON, FIFTY
YEARS, supra, at 8. The same imbalance in population distribution exists worldwide. Over 50% of the
world's population lives within 200 kilometers of the coast on only about 10% of the earth's nonpolar
land space. See DON HINRICHSEN, CoASTAL WATERS OF THE WORlD I (1998).
I 64. See Culliton, Coastal Population, supra note 163.
165. See id.
166. See CUl.UTON, FIFTY YEARS, supra note 163, at 3. By 2025 almost 75% of Americans arc
expected to live in America's coastal areas. See HINRICHSEN, supra note 163, at 14.
167. CULUTON, FIFTY YEARS, supra note 163, at 6.
168. See HINRICHSEN, supra note 163, at 14.
169. See CUl.UTON, FIFTY YEARS, supra note 163, at I. Globally, "[m]orc than half of the
world's coastlines suffer from severo development pressures." HINRICHSEN, supra note 163, nt 7.
170. See Jeffrey A. Zinn, Coastal Demographics and Development Patterns (visited Mar. 10,
1999) <http://www.cnie.org/nle/mar-20/j.html>.
171. See Rt.rrHERFORD H. PLATT, LAND USE AND SOCIETY 393 (1996). In 1980 an estimated 68
million people lived in central cities compared to 101 million in suburbs. See id. at 22 fig.I-5.
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nonresidential construction between 1970 and 1989. 172 During that period
an average of 384,000 new single-family homes were authorized for
construction in coastal areas each year, while the early 1970s saw almost
700,000 new multi-family homes authorized for construction in coastal
areas each year. 173 The demographic shift away from urban areas thus has
led to more sprawling, linear development of land and greater
fragmentation of local government power as new local governments have
been formed. 174 At the core of the problem of sprawling development is
America's preference for low-density, single-family 'residential
development-detached homes separated from neighbors' homes by
adequately sized lots and situated in a rnral setting. 175
These land settlement patterns are due in part to the incentives that
private property norms and changing economic conditions have created.
The private property attributes of transferability, severability, divisibility,
and a reasonable expectation of gain have combined with the diminishing
supply of undeveloped land and the changing role of land as a source of
wealth to create powerful economic incentives to subdivide tracts of land
and develop linearly. For centuries land was not only the main source of
wealth and power, but also the main basis for survival. Alexis de
Tocqueville once observed that although the "laws of the United States are
extremely favorable to the division of property ... [,] a cause more
powerful than the laws prevents property from being divided to excess." 176
He explained how estates in land were rarely divided, because the eldest
son usually took the estate intact to provide a parcel sufficiently large to
support his family. 177 Today survivorship and support of families no
longer depend on owning land, and wealth no longer is derived primarily
from landholdings; property rights now involve far more than property in
land. 178 The constraints on the division of land that Alexis de Tocqueville
172. See THOMAS J. CULUTON, JOHN J. MCDONOUGH, III, DAVIDA G. REMER, & DAVID M.
LoiT, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Bt.niDING ALoNG AMERICA'S COASTS 5, 8 (1992) [hereinafter
CULUTON, COASTALBI.niDING].
173. See id. at 8-9.
174. SeePl.AIT,supranote 17l,at393.
175. Coastal areas have experienced an increase in both lot and house size since 1970. See
CULLITON, COASTAL Bt.niDING, supra note 172, at 8. See also Doug Porter, Reinventing Growth
Management for the Twenty-First Century, 23 WM. & MARY ENVIL. L. & PoL'Y REv. 705 (1999)
(discussing Americans' fixation with single-family homes in the suburbs).
176. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 293 (Phillips Bradley ed., Vintage
Classics 1990) (1835).
177. See id. at 293-94. Siblings of the eldest son usually went out into the wilderness "to seek
their fortune." Id. at 293.
178. See ALExANDER, supra note 42, at 259-61 (discussing the decreasing economic importance
of land and the emergence of the property-as-value concept).
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once recognized are gone. When this change is combined with a
decreasing supply of undeveloped land, an increasing population, and a
landowner's power to transfer, subdivide, and profit from land use, a recipe
for sprawling development and environmental degradation is created.
Though private property norms may not be the sole cause of the sprawling
development or ecological degradation, the norms nevertheless are an
important part of the problem.
Another equally dramatic story of escalating land use concerns
America's loss of wetlands. Since the late 1700s, over half of the
approximately 220 million acres of wetlands in the continental United
States have been drained and converted to various uses. 179 Twenty-two
states have lost at least 50% of their original wetlands, while seven have
lost over 80%. 180 Although the rate of loss has decreased since the 1970s
due to government regulation, acquisition of environmentally sensitive
lands, and other factors, estimates of losses on nonfederal lands indicate
that between 70,000 and 90,000 acres of wetlands still are lost annually. 181
Escalating land use has also taken a significant toll on America's
forests. A recent study of 11.4 million acres within the Chesapeake Bay
watershed-roughly one quarter of the watershed-revealed that average
tree cover declined from 51% in 1973 to 39% in 1997.182 Once covering
95% of the watershed, Chesapeake Bay forests are becoming increasingly
fragmented even in unanticipated places. In the study region, rapid tree
loss occurred not only in expected locations around urban areas but also in
unanticipated areas throughout the region. 183 The widespread tree loss
indicates that forests are being cut down not only in urban areas but also in
agricultural areas. 184 One expert disheartened by the results noted that the
rapid and extensive tree loss ''nearly forecloses any hope of preserving
large, unfragmented forest tracts" in the region. 185 Explaining the
magnitude of the tree loss in more concrete terms, the expert noted that the
flood control benefits that would have been provided by the lost tree cover
in just the Baltimore-Washington corridor of the study region were
179. See WILLIAM]. MITsCH &JAMES G. GoSSEUNK, WE'lLANDS 45-47 (2d ed. 1993).
180. See id. at46-47 fig.3-4.
181. See U.S. ENVrL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA843-K-95-001, AMERICA'S WE'lLANDS (Dec.
1995). See generally MITSCH & GOSSEUNK, supra note 179, at 565-75 (discussing legnl protection of
wetlands in the United States).
182. See Karl Blankenship, Forests closest to Bay losing ground to development, BAY J., May
1999, at 1.
183. See id. at 6.
184. See id.
185. /d.

HeinOnline -- 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 956 1999-2000

2000]

THE PATHOWGY OF PROPERTY NORMS

957

estimated to be about $1.08 billion, while the benefits in annual air
pollution control for the same corridor would have totaled about $88
million. 186 Other benefits that could no longer be provided by the lost tree
cover include water pollution control, wildlife habitat, and energy
savings.187
Virginia Beach, a coastal city in Virginia, demonstrates well the
pathological effects of property norms on land and water use. For years the
city has been attempting to secure a permanent water supply that would
meet its. present and future needs. The saga of Virginia Beach's
unwavering quest for water reveals that land ownership norms, economic
development goals, and individual rights-based thinking all have
contributed to escalating land and water use.
Located on the Atlantic Ocean in the lower Chesapeake Bay
watershed, Virginia Beach is a resort city of approximately 430,000
inhabitants188 that has been without an adequate water supply since the
1970s.189 Tired of being dependent on other localities for water, 190 the city
began searching for an alternative water supply to protect it even in times
of drought. 191 To alleviate some of its immediate water needs, the city
186. Seeid.at6-1.
187. See id. at 7. See generally Forests Offer Tree·mendous Benefits, BAY J., May 1999, at 7
(describing the many quantifiable benefits provided by trees).
188. See BUREAU OF TilE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1997, at47 (117th ed. 1997) [hereinafter 1997 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT).
189. See FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT: NONPROJECT USE OF PROJECT LANDS AND WATER FOR THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH
WATER SUPPLY PROJECT, BRUNSWICK COUNTY, VIRGINIA, FERC No. 2009·003, at xvii (1995)
[hereinafter FERC FEIS ON GASTON).
190. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, WATER SUPPLY STUDY HAMPTON ROADS, VIRGINIA
1-8 (1984) [hereinafter ACE WATER SUPPLY STUDY). Two other localities, Norfolk and Portsmouth,
own the major water storage reservoirs and treatment facilities in southeastern Virginia. See Jan Harris,
Build It and the Water Might Come, PROGRESSIVE ENGINEER, Nov .-Dec. 1997, at 11.
191. Virginia Beach had relied on Norfolk to meet its non-emergency water needs. When drought
conditions existed, Virginia Beach also received some water from wells owned by Isle of Wight
County, Suffolk, and Southhampton. See ACE WATER SUPPLY STUDY, supra note 190, at 1-8, 1-9;
VIRGINIA DEP'T OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUAUTY, HAMPTON ROADS WATER SUPPLY UPDATE, at 11-5
(1993) [hereinafter DEQ WATER SUPPLY UPDATE). Drought conditions, for example, existed in 1917,
1980, 1981, 1986, and 1991. See id. at 11-8, 11-9. In 1992 the City of Norfolk limited Virginia Beach's
supply of water to 30 million gallons of water per day during wet weather and 15 million gallons per
day during droughts. See id. at 11-9; Harris, supra note 190. Estimates by the Federal Energy
Regulatoxy Commission, however, indicate that Virginia Beach's demand for water will reach 54
million gallons per day by the year 2030. See North Carolina v. Federal Energy Regulatoxy Comm'n,
112 F.3d 1175, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1036 (1998). The Army Corps of
Engineers concluded that the Virginia Beach area would need 60 million gallons per day by 2030. See
id. at 1181.
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adopted water conservation measures. 192 The conservation measures
included requiring the installation of low-use plumbing fixtures in new
construction, offering incentives for retrofitting existing plumbing with
low-use fixtures, holding public education programs, promoting water
recycling programs, and maintaining low water line pressure. 193 Although
the conservation measures produced a low per capita water demand (about
82 gallons per day per person), they did not solve the city's long-term
water supply problems} 94 Further, according to the city, the adverse
economic impact of the water restrictions was significant, costing between
eight and ten thousand jobs and about $2 billion in capital
improvements. 195 .The city considered a number of other alternatives,
including waste water reuse, desalinization, groundwater use, and
withdrawal from lakes and rivers, before deciding on a plan to divert and
pipe water from Lake Gaston in the Roanoke River Basin. 196
The Roanoke River flows from the mountains of Virginia, near the
City of Roanoke, southeasterly to the coast of North Carolina. 197 Dams
have been constructed on the River in several places to control flooding
and facilitate power production. 198 Many lakes have been created by the
dams, including Gaston, Kerr (mostly in Virginia), and Roanoke Rapids (in
North Carolina). 199 The Virginia Power Company200 has a license from the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("PERC") to operate one of the
dams on the Roanoke River. 201 The reservoir formed by this dam, Lake
Gaston, is located partly in Virginia but primarily in North Carolina.
Under Virginia Beach's plan, the city proposed to construct a 60-inch
pipeline to carry 60 million gallons of water per day from Lake Gaston
some 84.5 miles across southern Virginia to the city.202 Virginia Beach
192. See DEQWATERSUPPLYUPDATE,supranote 191 atll-17.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 11-18.
195. See Katrice Franklin, Plug Pulled o111Ast Water limit, Beach Hopes Move Will Bring a
Steady Flow of Economic Opportunity, VmGJNIAN PILOT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk, Va.), Sept. 2,
1998, at Bl, available in 1998 WL 15062283. The city lifted the last of the conservation measures in
September 1998 after its alternative water supply project finally was completed. The City Council
ultimately reserved 38% of the new water supply provided by the project for economic development
initiatives. About forty thousand new homes could be served by the additional water. /d.
196. See North Carolina v. Hudson, 665 F. Supp. 428,432 (E.D.N.C. 1987).
197. See id. at432;FERC FEIS ON GASTON, supra note 189, at3-3.
198. See FERC FEIS ON GASTON, supra note 189, at 3-4.
199. See id. at3-17, 3-18.
200. Virginia Power was formerly known as the Virginia Electric & Power Company (VEPCO).
See North Carolina v. City of Virginia Beach, 951 F.2d 596,599 (4th Cir. 1991).
201. See id.
202. See North Carolina v. Hudson, 665 F. Supp. 428,432 (E.D.N.C. 1987).
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would receive 80% of the water, while nearby Virginia localities would get
the remaining portion.203 The pipeline project required the permission of
the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps,) because the project affected
navigable waters of the United States.204 The pipeline project also required
the permission of FERC because certain hydropower lands and waters
would be involved.205 Both EPA and FERC ultimately decided that a full
203. The pipeline project included plans to allocate 48 of the 60 million gallons per day (mgd) to
Virginia Beach, 10 mgd to Chesapeake, and 1 mgd each to Franklin and Isle ofWight County. See id.
204. On July 15, 1983, Virginia Beach applied to the Corps for two permits needed to begin the
project. One permit would allow construction of the pipeline itself, as well as a water intake system at
Lake Gaston. The second permit would allow execution of a water storage reallocation contract for
Kerr Reservoir pursuant to the Water Supply Act of 1958,43 U.S.C. § 390b (1994). See North Carolina
v. Hudson, 665 F. Supp. 428,432-33 (E.D.N.C. 1987). In January 1984, after holding public hearings
on the environmental assessment, the Corps issued a final environmental assessment and granted
Virginia Beach a construction permit. See id. at 432. After the Corps' permit decision was made,
several lawsuits were filed. One suit involved the state of North Carolina, which sued to prevent
construction of the pipeline. See id. at 433. The Roanoke River Basin Association subsequently
intervened as plaintiffs. See id. The challenge to the permit was based primarily on the project's
detrimental environmental impact on the basin, on the need for a full environmental impact statement,
and on the water needs of Virginia Beach as compared to localities actually situated in the basin. See
id. at 436. In another case, Virginia Beach sued to obtain a declaratory judgment that the permit was
valid. See City of Virginia Beach v. Roanoke River Basin Ass'n, 776 F.2d 484, 486 (4th Cir. 1985).
The court refused to grant the city relief, holding that the original court had no jurisdiction over the
North Carolina defendant. See id. at 488. The court, however, allowed the city to join the case filed in
the Eastern District of North Carolina, which involved the same issues. See id. The city accordingly
transferred its action to the federal district court in North Carolina. See Hudson, 665 F. Supp. at 433.
Ultimately, after years of litigation, the issuance of the permit was upheld. See Roanoke River Basin
Ass'n v. Hudson, 940 F.2d 58,66 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1092 (1992).
205. Virginia Power filed an application with FERC, asking it to approve the withdrawal of water
from Lake Gaston, the construction and operation of a water intake facility, and the transfer of
necessary easements. This application was made in February 1991-some seven years after Virginia
Beach obtained its construction permit from the Corps. See In re City of Virginia Beach, 42 F.3d 881,
883 (4th Cir. 1994). FERC is the licensor of the hydropower facility at Lake Gaston and the
immediately surrounding land that is included in the project. See North Carolina v. City of Virginia
Beach, 951 F.2d 596,598 (4th Cir. 1991). Virginia Power sought permission from FERC to grant the
necessary easements to Virginia Beach and to amend its license from FERC to allow the withdrawals.
See id. at 599; North Carolina v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 112 F.3d 1175, 1181-82 (D.C.
Cir. 1997); Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, Order Approving Non-Project Use of Lands and
Waters and Amending License, Project No. 2009-003, 72 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH)
'][61,075 (July 26, 1995) [hereinafter FERC Gaston Order]. For 22 miles, the pipeline follows a utility
easement held by Virginia Power. See Harris, supra note 190, at 13.
For almost two years, FERC waited while the Department of Commerce considered North
Carolina's argument that the project was inconsistent with the North Carolina Coastal Zone
Management ("CZM") plan. See City of Virginia Beach v. Brown, 858 F. Supp. 585, 587 (E.D. Va.
1994). Under the Coastal Zone Management Act ("CZMA"), no federal agency can issue or alter a
permit for a project that a state has determined will interfere with its CZM plan unless the project is
approved by the Secretary of Commerce. See Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1456(c)(3)(A) (1994). The Department of Commerce and the Justice Department (which was called
in for legal advice) considered and changed their positions on the question of whether the CZMA
allowed North Carolina to object to the pipeline project even though the project would be located
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environmental impact statement (''EIS") was needed, despite earlier
findings to the contrary. Becoming impatient with the bureaucratic delays,
Virginia Beach brought suit against FERC to compel it to enter a fmal
decision on the application for approval of the pipeline. Although the court
denied the petition because of the extraordinary remedy it would have
required, the court expressed concern about the administrative burdens
imposed on Virginia Beach: "[W]hile we cannot be happy about the overall
time elapsed, we confirm that there are rational explanations for the length
of each time segment."206 Finally, in July 1995, some four and one-half
years after FERC received Virginia Power's application, FERC issued a
fmal EIS,207 and approved the application.2°8
The long and highly contested regulatory review process ultimately
produced a number of findings and conclusions in Virginia Beach's favor.
For example, in issuing a final environmental assessment and granting
Virginia Beach a construction permit, the Corps found that the proposed
withdrawal would have no significant environmental impact on Lake
Gaston itself or on downstream areas.209 More specifically, the Corps
relied heavily on Virginia Beach studies to conclude that, even in a worstcase scenario, downstream wildlife populations would not be affected by
the proposed pipeline project.210 Proponents of the pipeline maintained
that the water withdrawals would have minimal effect. Minimum
downstream fiows apparently could be maintained even in times of drought
by withdrawing water from the Kerr Reservoir. Furthermore, proponents
stressed that the water level in Lake Gaston would not decrease because of
the pipeline withdrawals, though the level in Kerr could fall about three
inches during a serious drought.211 FERC reached similar conclusions in
issuing a final environmental impact statement and approving the use of
entirely in Virginia. See Brown, 858 F. Supp. at 587. Eventually, this legal question became moot in
May 1994, when the Department of Commerce overruled North Carolina's objection to the project. See
id. at590.
206. In re City of Virginia Beach, 42 F.3d 881, 886 (4th Cir. 1994).
207. See FERC FElS ON GASTON, supra note 189, at 6-11.
208. See FERC Gaston Order, supra note 205, at 61,389 & 61,400-01.
209. See North Carolina v. Hudson, 665 F. Supp. 428,437-38 (E.D.N.C. 1987).
210. See id. at 442. The federal district court found the Corps' worst-case scenario analysis to be
unreliable and directed the Corps to conduct analysis that was independent of the Virginia Beach
studies. The court concluded that, without this independent analysis, the Corps' decision was arbitrnry
and capricious. See id. at 443. After conducting its independent analysis, the Corps issued a second
environmental assessment, which came to the same conclusions as the fii'St. The court subsequently
upheld the conclusions of the second assessment See North Carolina v. Hudson, 731 F. Supp. 1261,
1273 (E.D.N.C. 1990), alfd sub nom. Roanoke River Basin Ass'n v. Hudson, 940 F.2d 58 (4th Cir.
1991).
211. See Harris, supra note 190, at 13.
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hydropower lands and waters. It concluded that the pipeline project would
relieve Virginia Beach of "serious water supply problems that have
severely constrained the life style of its citizens and clouded its economic
future." 212 The Commission also noted that the downstream effects of the
withdrawals could be sufficiently mitigated by upstream water release
measures.213
Despite all of Virginia Beach's regulatory and judicial victories, North
Carolina has not yet given up its fight to stop the project214 and appears to
212. FERC Gaston Order, supra note 205, at 61,399.
213. See FERC FEIS ON GASTON, supra note 189, at 6-11, 6-12.
214. Despite receiving FERC approval, Virginia Beach has experienced a number of setbacks. In
April 1995, Virginia Beach and North Carolina agreed to a mediated settlement that provided a way to
end their eleven-year dispute. See Agreement on the Gaston Pipeline: Go with the Flow, VIRGINIANPn.OT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk, Va), Apr. 29, 1995, at AS. Among other provisions, the negotiated
settlement proposed to limit the City of Norfolk's ability to sell water outside southeastern Virginia. See
Karen Weintraub & Alex Marshall, Lake Gaston Deal Irks Noifolk, VIRGINIAN-Pn.OT & LEDGER STAR
(Norfolk, Va), May 11, 1995, at Al. It also proposed to give certain North Carolina cities the right to
drain up to 20 million gallons of water per day without Vrrginia localities being able to object. See
W.W. ''Ted" Bennett Jr., The Lake Gaston Pipeline: Let's Have Fair Play for all Virginians,
VIRGINIAN-Pn.oT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk, Va), June 8, 1995, at A 10. Due to partisan posturing, and
to the objections of Norfolk delegates, the Virginia General Assembly failed to approve the settlement
See Ken Stolle, Denwcrats Blocked Special Session, VIRGINIAN-Pn.OT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk, Va),
July 1, 1995, at A12.
Other setbacks include difficulties between Virginia Beach and several Virginia localities, as well
as new challenges raised by North Carolina See, e.g., Toni Guagenti, Pipeline Fight's Not over Til It's
Over In Victory's Wake, Beach Awaits N.C.'s Next Shot, VIRGINIAN-Pn.OT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk,
Va.), May 11, 1997, at A1 (discussing the costly legal battles waged in Virginia and North Carolina
over the pipeline). One Virginia locality, Isle of Wight, had refused to approve Virginia Beach's
request to lay pipe through the county. See JoAnn Frohman, lW Jilts Beach on Water Proposal: City
Says '87 Deal with County Moot, DAILY PREsS (Newport News, Va.), Dec. 13, 1995, at B1. After over
a year of arguing and threats, the dispute was resolved in May 1996, when Virginia Beach agreed to pay
Isle of Wight $3 million for pennission to have the pipeline discharge water into Ennis Mill Channel in
the county. See JoAnn Frohman, lW Board Approves Lake Gaston Pipeline: County to Receive
$3 Million Payment, DAILY PREss (Newport News, Va), May 17, 1996, at Cl. A similar dispute
occurred in 1989 when Brunswick County threatened to deny Virginia Beach pennission to construct
the intake portion of the pipeline in the county. See Gaston Pipeline Warning Issued, DAll..Y PREss
(Newport News, Va.), Feb. 23, 1989, at B3. After another $3 million payment, tbe city received the
necessary pennission. See Water Project Pact Reached, DAILY PREss (Newport News, Va.), Aug. 18,
1989, at B7. In addition, a dispute recently arose between Virginia Beach and the City of Suffolk over
the expansion of a pumping station needed to treat Lake Gaston water being piped to Virginia Beach.
The City of Suffolk had placed strict limitations on tbe expansion of the Norfolk water treatment plant,
which will treat the Gaston water. Norfolk, Virginia Beach, and the City of Chesapeake jointly brought
suit against Suffolk to challenge the limitations. In addition, Virginia Beach sought damages for the
expense of delaying completion of the projeet. See City of Suffolk v. City of Norfolk, No. 97-85 (Va
5th Cir. 1998) (order granting joint motion for dismissal); John Murphy, Cities Hope to Settle Local
Gaston Lawsuit, VIRGINIAN-Pn.OT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk, Va), July 10, 1997, at Al. In October
1997, the cities settled the dispute; Suffolk agreed to allow the expansion in exchange for more than $4
million. See City of Suffolk v. City of Norfolk, No. 97-85 (Va 5th Cir. 1998); Katrice Franklin &
Karen Weintraub, Suffolk Makes Regional Peace in Long Water War, VIRGINIAN-Pn.OT & LEDGER
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be willing to play what it regards as its "trump card"-a challenge to the
renewal of Virginia Power's fifty-year license to operate the hydroelectric
dam which created Lake Gaston.215 That license expires in 2001.216 In a
January 1997 press release, James Gilmore, the Virginia Attorney General
at the time and currently the Governor of Virginia, described North
Carolina's battle against Virginia as an attack on Virginia's "sovereign
rights."217
To date, what has Virginia Beach's Lake Gaston project produced? In
addition to actual construction of the pipeline,2 18 the project has involved a
tremendous amount of judicial and legal resources, producing at least 13
published court opinions through May 1997.219 The record for one 1990
STAR (Norfolk, Va.), Oct. 16, 1997, at B13. Finally, in July 1995, North Carolina challenged FERC's
issuance of licenses allowing Virginia Beach to complete the pipeline. See North Carolina v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 112 F.3d 1175, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1997). On May 9, 1997, a three-judge
panel of the D.C. Circuit denied North Carolina's petition for review, concluding that the FERC order
was not arbitrary or capricious. See id. at 1194. In November 1997, North Carolina appealed the
decision to the Supreme Court, which allowed the prior rulings to stand without comment. See id., cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 1108 (1998).
215. See Guagenti, supra note 214, at AI. On January 28, 1999, Virginia Power filed a license
application for the Gaston hydropower project. See Virginia Power & Electric Co., Notice of
Application Tendered for Filing With the Commission and Soliciting Additional Study Requests, Project
No. 2009·018 (Feb. 22, 1999) <http://cips.ferc.fed.us/hydro/p/p-2009.00n.txt>.
216. See Guagenti, supra note 214, at AI.
217. VA Attorney General News Release, Attorney General Gilmore Files Brief ln Support Of
Lake Gaston Pipeline: Vows to Continue Fight (Jan. 10, 1997) (on file with author).
218. Despite ongoing legal challenges, the Lake Gaston pipeline began pumping water on August
5, 1997. See Lake Gaston Pipeline is Running Despite Ongoing Fight in the Courts, WINSTON-SALEM
JOURNAL. Aug. 8, 1997, at B7. The first water pumped from Lake Gaston took 15 days to reach the
Hampton Roads region. See Lake Gaston Water Finally Reaches Hampton Roads, DAILY PRESS
(Newport News, Va.), Aug. 22, 1997, at CS. Construction was completed in November 1997, and the
pipeline became operational in January 1998. See Interview with Tom Leahy, Water Resources
Division Manager, Dep't of Public Utilities, City of Virginia Beach, Virginia (July 17, 1998); Local
Update, VIRGINIAN·PILOT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk, Va.), Jan. 7, 1998, at B3.
219. The legal issues raised by those lawsuits have covered a wide range of topics. See generally
North Carolina v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 112 F.3d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (challenging
FERC approval of the pipeline project as arbitrary and capricious); ln re City of Virginia Beach, 42
F.3d 881 (4th Cir. 1994) (seeking a writ of mandamus to compel FERC to render a decision on the
city's pipeline application); Roanoke River Basin Ass'n v. Hudson, 991 F.2d 132 (4th Cir. 1993)
(challenging the disposition oflawyer's fees); North Carolina v. City of Virginia Beach, 951 F.2d 596
(4th Cir. 1991) (considering whether Virginia Beach could continue construction of portions of the
pipeline that were outside FERC's jurisdiction prior to completion ofFERC's review); City of Virginia
Beach v. Roanoke River Basin Ass'n, 776 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1985) (seeking a declaratory judgment
that the Corps' permits were properly issued and raising a personal jurisdiction issue); City of Virginia
Beach v. Brown, 858 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Va. 1994) (questioning North Carolina's authority to review
the water withdrawal project under its Coastal Management Plan); City of Virginia Beach v. United
States Dep't of Commerce, 805 F. Supp. 1323 (E.D. Va. 1992) (challenging the refusal to release
information requested under the Freedom oflnformation Act), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 995 F.2d
1247 (4th Cir. 1993); North Carolina v. Hudson, 731 F. Supp. 1261 (E.D.N.C. 1990) (upholding
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decision alone consists of 23 volumes of material.220 In addition, as of
May 1997, the City of Virginia Beach had paid $8.6 million in legal fees. 221
Countless federal, state, and local governmental units have been involved
in the dispute, and some have even changed their position more than once
on the project's desirability.222
Will the legal system ultimately allow the most populated city in
Virginia and geographically one of the largest cities in the United States223
to obtain an adequate water supply? Certainly. Like many states in the
water-rich East, Virginia's water allocation laws link water use to
ownership of riparian land, but seem to allow creation of public water
supplies as long as the necessary property rights, defined according to
traditional norms, and the consent of affected local jurisdictions are
obtained.224
Furthermore, American property law historically has
recognized a landowner's right to use his land.225 One of the most
important ways to exercise that right is to develop the land; development
requires water. When the property right of use and enjoyment is coupled
issuance of the pennits despite the alleged significant impact of the project on the striped bass
population), ajfd sub nom. Roanoke River Basin Ass'n v. Hudson, 940 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1991)
(upholding issuance of the pennits despite concerns about the striped bass population, water quality,
and the future water needs of North Carolina); North Carolina v. Hudson, 665 F. Supp. 428 (E.D.N.C.
1987) (challenging the Corps' issuance of pennits under NEPA, the Water Supply Act, and the Clean
Water Act); City of Virginia Beach v. Board of Supervisors of Mecklenburg County, 246 Va. 233
(1993) (challenging Virginia Beach's ability to use water stored in a reservoir located in two counties
without the consent of those counties); Tidewater Ass'n of Homebuilders, Inc. v. City of Virginia
Beach, 241 Va. 114 (1991) (challenging the constitutionality of a fee imposed by Virginia Beach on
new and expanding water users to fund the pipeline project).
220. See North Carolina v. Hudson, 731 F. Supp. 1261, 1263 n.2 (E.D.N.C. 1990), ajfd sub nom.
Roanoke River Basin Ass'n v. Hudson, 940 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1991).
221. See Guagenti, supra note 214, at A1.
222. See City of Virginia Beach v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 805 F. Supp. 1323 (E.D.
Va. 1992), ajfd in part & rev'd in part, 995 F.2d 1247 (4th Cir. 1993).
223. Virginia Beach ranked 17th in land area out of 77 United States cities having a 1992
population of 200,000 or more. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COUNTY
AND CITY DATA BOOK 1994, at xxvii (12th ed. 1994) [hereinafter 1994 COUNTY AND CITY DATA
BOOK].
224. See Butler, supra note 68, at 156-79 (discussing public consumptive water rights under the
riparian doctrine). See generally Tarlock, supra note 68, §§ 3.12, 3.20 (discussing the allocation of
riparian rights under the common law and under statutory modifications of the common law).
225. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16 (1992)
(declaring that a regulation denying a landowner all economically viable or productive use of his land is
a compensable taking); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-16 (1922) (recognizing
that government action can go too far under the Constitution in restricting private land use); I GEORGE
\V. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § I, at 3-5, § 5, at 25-31
(1980 rep!.) (discussing the meaning of ownership and property). See generally 6A AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY§ 28.1 (1954) (discussing a possessor's right to "exclusive use and enjoyment of his estate").
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with recent takings caselaw,226 it is difficult to envision a locality or state
prohibiting or significantly restricting private land development to control
water use and protect a watershed.227 Yet without such a prohibition or
restriction, private property owners will continue to develop their land, and
water use will continue to rise.
From an ecological perspective, it is difficult to understand how the
social and legal systems could allow a city without an adequate freshwater
supply to continue to grow and develop its land virtually without restraint.
During the period from 1980 to 1990, Virginia Beach experienced almost a
60% increase in households228 and saw its population grow almost 131,000
(from 262,199 to 393,089).229 By the year 2010, Virginia Beach's
population is expected to reach approximately 580,000, an increase of over
185,000 persons from the 1990 population.23 From 1980 to 1986, Virginia
Beach authorized 45,195 building permits for new private housing units.231
These permits represented 49.1% of the 1980 housing stock of Virginia
Beach. 232 In comparison, during the same time period, the entire state of
Virginia approved building permits for new private housing units that
represented only 17.2% of its 1980 housing stock.233 Statistics for the
United States reveal that building permits issued during the 1980-1986
period represented 11.3% of the 1980 housing stock.234

°

226. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (invalidating, under the Takings
aause, a city's decision to condition the issuance of a building pennit on the dedication of a portion of
the applicant's private property for a public greenway and for a bicycle/pedestrian pathway); Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (invalidating, under the Takings Clause, a state
law that prevented construction of a pennanent habitable structure on private beachfront property and
that deprived the landowner of all economically viable use); NoUan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825 (1987) (deciding that a state could uot, without payment of just compensation, condition
issuance of a permit to rebuild a house located on privately owned beachfront property on the transfer
of an easement allowing public access through the property).
227. For an analysis of recent Supreme Court takings cases, see TAKJNGS (David L. CnUies ed.,
1996).
228. See 1994 COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK, supra note 223, at 608.
229. See id. at 606.
230. See id.; CENTER FOR PuBUC SERVICE, UNIV. OF VA., VIRGINIA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 598
(1994-1995).
231. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK
1988, at 566 (1988). This figure excludes mobile homes, motels, hotels, group residential structures
(e.g., college dormitories and nursing homes), and conversions of or altemtions to existing buildings.
See id. app.G, at G-8. A housing unit is defined as "a house, apartment, mobile home or tmiler, group
of rooms, or single room occupied or, if vacant, intended for occupancy as sepamte living quurters." !d.
232. See id. at 566.
233. See id. at 540.
234. See id. at 6.
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Although property norms may not be the primary or even key reason
for Virginia Beach's significant increase in population, property norms
have had a significant impact on how Virginia Beach is handling its
growth. Efforts by Virginia Beach to control development have produced
In 1986 Virginia Beach attempted to control its
mixed results.
"leapfrogging" development by downzoning 3,500 acres of land from unit
development to agricultural use.235
The Virginia Supreme Court
invalidated the city's attempt as "piecemeal" (as opposed to
comprehensive) downzoning that was not justified by a change in
circumstances or prior mistake affecting the public health, welfare, or
safety.236 Because other neighboring properties were not similarly
downzoned, the city's action did not appear to promote its goal of
promoting orderly growth and discouraging leapfrog development.237
Since that decision, the commitment of Virginia Beach to controlling
growth and development has been questionable and unpredictable. One of
the city's main tools for controlling growth, the Green Line created in the
city's 1979 Comprehensive Plan, has been violated by developers and city
officials alike. The Green Line establishes a boundary beyond which no
city services are to be offered.238 As recently as 1997, the Virginia Beach
Planning Commission approved housing projects that were located beyond
the Green Line and included services provided by the city .239 In an effort
to attract tourism, the city also approved a golf course to be located in an
area beyond the Green Line.240
Some might question whether the private property concept is actually
responsible for the escalating development and environmental degradation,
or whether the real culprit is the profit motive. This line of inquiry would
distinguish the private property concept from the profit motive, and ask
whether environmental degradation would exist even in the absence of a
private property rights regime. Because private property rights help to
internalize externalities, it is tempting to respond that degradation probably
would occur more rapidly when private property rights did not exist and
235. See City of Virginia Beach v. Virginia Land Investment Ass'n No. 1, 239 Va. 412, 415-16
(1990).
236. See id. at416.
237. See id. at414-16.
238. See CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH, VA., COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 26 (Nov.4, 1997) (retaining and
claiming rigid adherence to the Green Line as a "defense against sprawl") (on file with author); Tom
Holden, Beach Commission Approves Rezoning for Houses Below Green line, VIRGINIAN-PILOT &
LEDGER STAR (Norfolk, Va.}, May 15,1997, at AI.
239. See Holden, supra note 238; Toni Guagenti, Beach Planners Approve Golf Course, 108
Homes, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk, Va.), June 12, 1997, at Bll.
240. See Guagenti, supra note 239.

HeinOnline -- 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 965 1999-2000

966

SOUTHERN CAliFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:927

that therefore property rights do not necessarily cause escalating
development and environmental degradation.
The strength of this view depends in part on whether the distinction
between private property norms and the profit motive is real. The profit
motive has been defined by some as the desire to increase individual wealth
and by others as the seemingly insatiable desire for more.241 Because
private property rights include the power to take economic gambles
through the exercise of the rights of use, transferability, reasonable
expectation of gain, and exclusive control, it is difficult to separate the
desire to maximize individual wealth from private property norms. The
rights of use, transferability, and reasonable expectation of gain all revolve
around the desire to promote wealth maximization for the individual
property owner. Under current economic thinking, property rights are
recognized when it is efficient to do so.242 Property norms thus incorporate
and promote the profit motive, however it is defined.243
Further, to the extent that a distinction between property norms and
the profit motive exists, it does not negate all of the harms that private
property owners have caused to the environment. Even if a private
property regime is less likely to cause environmental ruin than other
regimes, that fact does not address the environmental harms that private
property owners have caused. The point is not that private property norms
are the sole or primary cause of environmental degradation, but rather that
traditional private property norms are biased against environmental quality
and ecological integrity, and therefore are part of the problem. Solving the
problem of environmental degradation thus will require some
reexamination of private property norms.
Accepting that private property norms are part of the problem of
escalating land and water use does not mean the abandonment of the
private property regime. To the contrary, less drastic solutions, like the
redefinition of private property norms, should be tried first. What the
Virginia Beach situation makes clear is that water rightholders and their
consumers-here collectively an entire city-have relied on property
241. See Mark Sagoff, Do We Consume Too Much?, in THE BUSINESS OF CONSUMPTION, .mpra
note 112, at 271, 285.
242. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 51 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS &
PRoc. 347 (1967).
243. Evidence of this incorporation can even be found in the Supreme Court's gradual shift away
from viewing property as a physical thing having only use value to recognizing property as including
"the exchange value of anything." JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 14
(1924). See also ALExANDER, supra note 42, at 259-61 (discussing property as exchange value in the
Supreme Court).
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norms to escape responsibility for escalating growth and water use even
when the growth and use exceed the capabilities of the rightholders' water
resources. Cumulative impacts of private land use on the ecosystem are
basically ignored. Private land development is allowed even in times of
mandated water restrictions. Economic development is used as the
justification for spending over $250 million on a water supply project that
will allow more growth and water use to occur.244 Little, if any,
relationship exists between water supply and water demand.245 Some sense
of accountability-even a vague sense of responsibility for ecosystem
integrity-is noticeably absent from the discussions of many developers,
property owners, and city officials, who instead promote land development
and economic growth. Property norms, in other words, have had
pathological effects on the land use preferences and decisions of many
private landowners and public officials.
These effects could be minimized or reversed if actual ecological
conditions and costs were considered in defining property rights. Instead
of raising the property rights banner to demand more water to enable
greater land use, decisionmakers could be using water supply as a "crucial
control factor'' in distributing population and growth and avoiding overuse
and excessive concentration.246 Instead of correlating water needs to
population, industrial, and urban projections, decisionmakers could be
breaking the "self-fulfilling propheey" of water allocation decisions247 by
using water supply as an ecological constraint on development and use.
Decisionmakers could prefer uses that return water or at least minimize its
use over uses that consume large quantities of water.
Importing water is not like importing food, drugs, and other goods.
Indeed, the need to import water reveals much about the ecological
conditions of the receiving area. Although water is a renewable resource, it
is not a fungible good that can be mass produced. At some point in time,
its removal will drastically alter ecological conditions in the exporting and
importing systems. The effectiveness of management programs in taking
such an ecologically conscious approach is considered next.
244. Some of the estimated costs of the project include $150 million for construction of the
pipeline, $100 million to upgrade water treatment processes, and $10 million in legal and regulatory
expenses. See Harris, supra note 190, at 11, 13.
245. See MANGUN & HENNING, supra note 98, at 133.
246. See id. at 133-34.
247. /d. at 133.
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B. THE PATHOLOGY OF INEFFECTIVE
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT OVER THE LONG TERM

While some management programs have achieved success in
managing ecosystems or watersheds over the short term, property norms
have pathologically affected management programs over the long term.
These effects have contributed to the development of less resilient
ecosystems that are more likely to become persistently degraded by
disturbances once absorbed by the ecosystem.248 Even when the
management program is comprehensive in scope, program administrators
and policymakers have tended to integrate property norms into the
management program. This integration has affected not only the setting of
goals and standards, but also the focus of management efforts, the
implementation of goals, the enforcement of standards, the subsequent
monitoring of ecological indicators, and the internal operations of the
management institutions.249 The integration of property norms into
management programs is evidenced by the widespread adoption of the
atomistic and product-oriented perspectives underlying the private property
system.250 Such perspectives typically result in the targeting of specific
ecological indicators (e.g., water, trees, or fish) to promote social objectives
(e.g., maintaining employment, promoting economic activities, or
protecting livelihoods)-all under the guise of environmental protection.251
Studies of managed ecosystems indicate that targeting an ecological
variable to minimize problems caused by fluctuation in that variable
ultimately results in lower resilience in the managed ecosystem, greater
rigidity in management institutions, and greater societal dependence on the
controlled variable.252 Management strategies that target ecological
variables admittedly have been successful in reducing the variability of the
ecological target, and even in reversing or slowing environmental
degradation over the short term. 253 Those strategies, however, have
adversely affected ecosystems over the long term, causing a reduction in
spatial heterogeniety that makes a system more vulnerable to large-scale
248. See Holling, What Barriers? What Bridges?, supra note 132, at 6-8.
249. See id. at 7-9.
250. A wide variety of ecosystem management programs have incorpomted the atomistic and
product-oriented perspectives into their management programs. Those systems include eastern North
America forests, the forests of the Siena Nevada, the savannas of South Africa, the Everglades, the
Chesapeake Bay system, the Columbia River basin, the Great Lakes, and the Baltic Sea. See id. at 7,
10-11.
251. Seeid.at6-1.
252. See id. at 6, 8.
253. See id. at 7-8.
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disturbances. 254 Further, the initial successes of the targeting strategies
have led to changes iil the management institutions and in the incentives of
people benefited or burdened by the management program; these changes
have decreased their ability or desire to respond to future ecological
crises.255
Once initial successes were achieved, the management
institutions tended to shift their focus to the efficiency of their internal
operations. Ecological monitoring programs received less financial
support, became less concerned about detecting unexpected ecological
changes in the ecosystem, and focused more on local needs.256 Success in
controlling the variability of the ecological target led to the development of
dependent industries which pressed for the continued targeting of the
ecological variable. 257 The initial success also led to changes in society;
those citizens who were not directly benefited tended to become more
passive over time, relying on the management institutions which had
achieved the initial success and which were slowly becoming more rigid.258
These pathological effects can be countered by decisionmaking
processes and management approaches that are more flexible259 and that
recognize the need to reevaluate and, if necessary, redefine underlying
norms. Greater flexibility is needed to enable managers to identify changes
in the health of ecosystems and to .ensure adaptation of the ecological and
human systems to the changes.260 Greater flexibility can be achieved, in
part, by recognizing that controlled monitoring programs produce more
rigid management institutions incapable of adapting to unexpected change.
Rather than being tied to past successes or to economically significant
ecological variables, monitoring must be experimental, looking for
unexpected ecological crises, and must allow for active intervention and
corrective responses. 261 The pathological effects of rights-based ecosystem
management can be broken by an approach that looks beyond policies and
research goals designed to control targeted ecological variables valued by
social and economic systems. Traditional property norms should not
control the setting or definition of ecosystem management goals, especially
not when the norms are defined or applied in a static way. Policymakers
and managers must recognize the need for-and the legitimacy
254.
255.
256.

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

See id. at 7-8.
See id. at 8.
See id. at 8-9.
See id. at 8.
Seeid.
See id. at 9.
Seeid.
See id. at 9, 30.
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of-redefining underlying property norms, as well as the accompanying
rights and obligations, in light of new or evolving information and
conditions. Although property norms may capture traditional political or
cultural beliefs,262 property norms do not reflect principles of ecology,
especially those principles relating to ecosystem integrity and to the spatial,
temporal, and hierarchical scales of landscape ecology .263

An examination of the Chesapeake Bay management program will
provide some insights into the pathological effects of property norms on
watershed and ecosystem management. Those insights will suggest
potential ways for breaking the pathology of rights-based ecosystem
management through more flexible, adaptive management and through
considerations of scale and integrity in decisionmaking processes.

1. The Chesapeake Bay Management Program
The Chesapeake Bay Management Program "has become a model" of
effective ecosystem management.264
A voluntary effort involving
Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, the District of Columbia, and the federal
government,265 the Bay program has, over time, evolved from a water
quality program aimed at the decline in living resources to "the integrated
ecosystem management of land, air, water, and living resources."266 The
Bay program involves what some experts have characterized as a "bestcase scenario."267 Development of the program occurred after there was
widespread recognition of the ecological problems in the Bay system,
significant scientific study and analysis of the problems, extensive
community support for protecting the Bay ecosystem, and well-coordinated
262. Scholars disagree about the degree to which property nonns reflect traditionnl politicnl
beliefs or constitutionnl vnlues. Compare, e.g., ELY, supra note 2 (assessing the role of property and
economic rights in constitutionnl history), and RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 3-18 (1985) (discussing
the politicnl tradition reflected in the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution), with William Michael
Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Proces.r, 95 COLUM. L.
REv. 782 (1995) (discussing the originnl understanding and subsequent misunderstandings of the
Takings Cause).
263. For a discussion of scale considerations, see infra Part li.B.2.
264. Ann Pesiri Swanson, Governing the Chesapeake Bay--.m~ Evolution of Ecosystem
Management, in SUSTAINABLE COASTAL WA'!EtSHED, supra note 113, at 14, 14.
265. See CHEsAPEAKE BAY COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT TO TilE GENERAL ASSEllfBUES OP
VIRGINIA, MARYLAND AND PENNSYLVANIA 1993, at 1 [hereinafter 1993 CHESAPEAKE BAY COMM'N
REPORT). The Chesapeake Bay Commission is a tri-state legislative commission which guides
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia "in cooperatively managing the Chesapeake Bay." /d. The
Commission acts as "the legislative ann of the Chesapeake Bay Program," implementing program
decisions and helping to develop policy. /d.
266. Swanson, supra note 264, at I 4.
267. Costanza & Greer, supra uote 152, at 170, 196.
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efforts by scientists, government leaders, private environmental groups, and
members of the media to highlight and deal with the Bay's problems.268
Since early European settlers arrived in Jamestown in 1607, the
Chesapeake Bay has undergone significant ecological change. The largest
single estuary in the United States, the Chesapeake Bay covers an area of
4,400 square miles and has 8,100 miles of shoreline.269 Its drainage basin
extends some 6,400 square miles into six states and the District of
Columbia.270 Once providing, acre for acre, the most productive fishing
grounds in the world,271 the Chesapeake Bay supported bountiful
populations of oysters, crab, and finfish harvest and extensive beds of
submerged aquatic vegetation-all existing in water so clear that one could
often see to the bottom.272 Oysters used to be so numerous that some
experts estimate they were capable of filtering and cleaning the equivalent
of the entire volume of water in the Bay in less than a week.273 Today this
self-cleaning function is no longer effective because of the drastic decline
in the oyster population. Increased nutrient and sediment inputs into Bay
waters have altered the chemical, physical, and ecological balance of the
waters, adversely affecting water quality and causing catastrophic declines
in the abundance of submerged aquatic vegetation. Overfishing and
disease have decimated major fisheries and, in turn, caused further changes.
Thrbidity, primary production, and the oxygen content of the Bay waters all
have been affected. 274
With a population currently totaling about 14 million and projected to
exceed 17 million by 2020,275 the Chesapeake Bay watershed is facing
even greater ecological deterioration unless its management program can
overcome some serious obstacles to effective management. The same
characteristics that make the Bay especially sensitive to stress also indicate
that the Bay's ecological problems will be difficult to address as long as
traditional property norms and rights-based thinking contro1.276 Because
the Bay is a broad, shallow estuary, it experiences constant mixing of
freshwater, seawater, and nutrients in unpredictable patterns. These
268. See id. at 170, 195-98.
269. See id. at 173.
270. Seeid.
271. See id. at 177.
272. See id. at 179; STEvEN G. DAVISON, JAY G. MERWIN, JR., JOHN CAPPER, GARRETT POWER
& FRANK R. SmVERS, JR., CHESAPEAKE WATERS 18-19,50-54,76-82 (2d ed. 1997).
273. See Costanza & Greer, supra note 152, at 180.
274. See id. at 177-81.
275. See id. at 182.
276. See id. at 170.
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interactions cause nutrients to be recycled easily, contributing both to the
Bay's productivity and sensitivity.277 When combined with the Bay's
openness and vast, habitable coastline, this productivity makes the Bay
watershed an especially attractive area for settlement and use.278 Its
complexity, productivity, and unpredictability mean not only that the Bay
system is relatively resilient,279 but also that the limits of the Bay's
resilience are hard to detect.
The management program for the Bay system evolved slowly over
several decades. In the mid-1960s to mid-1970s, government leaders,
environmentalists, and citizens became increasingly concerned about
deteriorating conditions in the Bay.280 In the late 1970s, a period of intense
scientific study began with the support of political leaders.281 Then, in
1983, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, the District of Columbia, and the
EPA initiated the period of formal ecosystem management by executing the
first Chesapeake Bay Agreement.282 At the beginning of this formal
period, the environmental agenda of the Bay program consisted primarily
of "a very loose commitment to cooperate in efforts to protect the Bay."283
For the most part, joint ventures and meetings among the participating
jurisdictions were "relatively rare;" 284 voluntary programs adopted by
individual participants made up most of the early Bay program.285 The one
key exception to this "loose commitment" was reflected in the efforts of the
Chesapeake Bay Commission, which worked to protect the Bay through
cooperative efforts.286

It was not until the execution of the Chesapeake Bay Agreement of
1987 that the participating jurisdictions agreed to work together to develop
and implement programs that produced a healthier Bay.287 The agreement
established specific goals, objectives, and commitments for living
277. See id. at 170-71.
278. See id. at 171.
279. See id. at 170-71.
280. See id. at 197-98.
281. See id. at 198-99.
282. See id. at 199-201.
283. CHEsAPEAKE BAY COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE GENERAL AsSEMBUES OF
PENNSYLVANIA, MARYLAND & VIRGINIA: 1988 AND 1989, at 1 [hereinafter 1988-1989 CHEsAPEAKE
BAYCOMM'NREPORT].
284. !d.
285. See CHEsAPEAKE BAY COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBUES OP
PENNSYLVANIA, MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA: 1986, at 7 [hereinafter 1986 CHESAPEAKE BAY COMM'N
REPORT]. For a discussion of those individual programs, see id. at 7-12.
286. !d. at 13.
287. See 1988-1989 CHEsAPEAKEBAYCOMM'NREPORT, supra note 283, at 1, app. B.
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resources, water quality, and population growth and development, among
other topics.288 Some of the more ambitious commitments in the 1987
agreement included commitments to achieve 40% reductions in the Bay's
nitrogen and phosphorus levels by 2000,289 develop a Bay-wide wetlands
protection policy,290 develop and adopt basin-wide strategies for reducing
toxins and conventional pollutants,291 and adopt resource management
strategies for important species.292 In a relatively short period of time, the
1987 agreement resulted in the implementation of special restoration
programs for certain commercially valuable and stressed fisheries,
programs to reestablish and protect submerged aquatic vegetation,
regulation of point source discharges by wastewater treatment facilities,
enforcement of sediment controls, and development of regulatory programs
for critical coastal areas. 293
Although the famed ''toes" or "sneaker'' test still cannot be met, the
Chesapeake Bay program has made some progress. Under the "toes" test,
the Bay will be far along the road to recovery when the waters of
Maryland's Patuxent River are so clear that people can wade in the River
up to their chest and see their toes.294 Scientists cannot yet see their toes,
but have observed reductions in the Bay's phosphorous levels, as well as a
gradual recovery of submerged aquatic vegetation?95 The restoration
program for striped bass also has produced positive results.296 Despite
these successes, much work remains to be done. Development and
implementation of a formal management program has revealed the "full
288. See id. app. Bat B-1.
289. See id. at 21, app. Bat B-3.
290. See id. at 20-21, app. B at B-2.
291. See id. at21-22, app. B atB-3.
292. See id. at 20, app. B at B-2.
293. See 1989 CHEsAPEAKE EXECtmVE COUNCIL PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 25, at 18-25.
294. See DAVISON ET AL., supra note 272, at 195-96; Horton, supra note 155, at 23, 26. This lay
person's test for water quality originated with Bernie Fowler, a former Maryland politician and
waterman who remembers once being able to wade into water and see his sneakers no matter how deep
he waded. By 1988, Fowler could not see his feet after wading into water just eight inches deep. By
June 1995, that distance had improved to 40 inches. See DAVISONET AL., supra note 272, at 195. See
generally Tributary teams plan June wade-ins to promote water quality awareness, BAY J., June 1999,
at 6. The wade-ins have expanded beyond the Patuxent River to include other Bay tributaries. See id.
295. See 1993 CHEsAPEAKE BAY COMM'N REPORT, supra note 265, at 1. But see DAVISON ET
AL., supra note 272, at 186 (suggesting that phosphorus concentrations appear to be rising). The Bay
watershed once had over 600,000 acres of submerged grass. By 1984 that figure had shrunk to 38,000
acres. Since then, acreage has improved to 64,000 in 1994. See id. at 190.
296. See 1993 CHEsAPEAKE BAY COMM'N REPORT, supra note 265, at 1, 42; Costanza & Greer,
supra note 152, at 178.
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extent of the bay's problems"297 and has highlighted the need for a holistic,
ecosystem-based approach. 298
One of the Bay's most serious and complex problems involves
nonpoint source pollution. Although the Bay program has reduced some
nutrient levels through regulation of industries, sewage treatment plants,
and other point sources discharging directly into waterways, the program
has experienced greater difficulty in restricting nonpoint sources that
indirectly contribute nutrients and sediment to waterways through
runoff. 299 Controlling nonpoint sources requires moving beyond the
immediate coastal area to land "far from the water's edge."300 Effective
control of nonpoint source pollution also requires an understanding and
recognition of the scales of individual land use-of the connection between
an individual user and the Bay ecosystem.
Consider the impact of farmers on the Chesapeake Bay system.
Although no one farmer is causing serious harm to the Bay, the cumulative
impact of agricultural use is both significant and serious. Farmers
represent less than 3% of the Bay's population yet use approximately 25%
of the 41 million acres in the Bay's watershed and apply almost 700 million
pounds of fertilizer annually.301 One estimate places 90% of the 8 million
acres of fertilized cropland in the Chesapeake Bay watershed beyond the
control of comprehensive management plans to restrict nitrogen and
297. Costanza & Greer, supra note 152, at 200.
298. Seeid.
299. See CHEsAPEAKE BAY COMM'N, ANNuAL REPORT TO TIIE GENERAL ASSEMBLIES OF
MARYLAND, PENNSYLVANIA & VIRGINIA: 1992, at 17-19, 25 [hereinafter 1992 CHEsAPEAKE BAY
COMM'N REPORT]; Costanza & Greer, supra note 152, at 200. See also CHESAPEAKE BAY COMM'N,
ANNuALREPORTTOTIIE GENERAL AsSEMBLIES OF MARYLAND, VIRGINIA & PENNSYLVANIA: 1996, at
49-55 [hereinafter 1996 CHEsAPEAKE BAY CoMM'N REPORT] (discussing the status of nutrient levels
and management efforts). The Bay Program recently completed a review of its decade-old goal of
reducing nutrients 40% by the year 2000. A report of that review concluded that the 40% goal would
not be met unless efforts to reduce nutrients were accelerated and that the 40% goal, in any event,
would not be enough to restore the Bay. See Kart Blankenship, Review warns 40% goal will not be
enough, BAY J., Dec. 1997, at 1. See also DAVISONET AL., supra note 272, at 215-16 (discussing the
difficulties in meeting the Bay program's nitrogen goals). See generally Special Report: Chesapeake
Bay Nutrient Report Card, BAY J., Apr. 1998 (providing a report on the nutrient loads of individual
river basins).
300. Shabman, supra note 128, at 3. See generally 1992 CHESAPEAKE BAY COMM'N REPORT,
supra note 299, at 25-33 (discussing nutrient management in the Bay region).
301. See Horton, supra note 155, at 2, 21. See also EPA: Farms Are Wor.~t Polluters, DAILY
PREss (Newport News, Va.), May 14, 1998, at C8 (noting that farming is "responsible for 70 percent of
waterway pollution"). See generally Activities of the Environmental Protection Agency Related to
livestock Feeding Operations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Forestry, Resource Conserllation, and
Research, and the Subcomm. on livestock, Dairy, and Poultry of the House Comm. on Agriculture,
105th Cong. 105-50 (1998) (discussing EPA's Draft Strategy on Animal Feeding Operations).
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phosphorous runoff into Bay waters.302 Livestock farms compound the
problem by producing large amounts of waste-on average about five tons
for each person in the United States.303 Not surprisingly, instead of seeing
a reduction in nitrogen ten years after the first Bay agreement was signed,
experts noticed about a 2% increase in nitrogen from all sources.304
Another serious problem involves the continuing decline in living
resources. Though management of striped bass probably has "averted an
irreversible decline of that species,"305 jurisdictions involved in the Bay
program generally are "well behind promised deadlines to carry out
management plans"306 for other fisheries. After decades of disease,
overfishing, and pollution, the Bay's oyster population is "in serious
decline."307 In 1993 the Chesapeake Bay Commission estimated oyster
stocks "to be one percent of their historic levels."308 This decline has had
serious ecological and economic impacts. Scientists now understand the
valuable function that oysters play in filtering water; they can remove silt,
algae, and pollutants from up to fifty gallons of water per day. 309 Today
the Bay's oyster population needs about a year to filter the same volume of
water that oysters used to be able to clean in just a few days.310 In addition,
scientists now understand the value of the habitats provided by the reefs
that oysters naturally grow; dredging and oyster harvesting have seriously
depleted those reefs.311 Once reaching from the Bay's bottom to its water
surface, oyster reefs now only "lie low and scattered across the bottom of
the bay."312 In economic terms, the drastic decline in the oyster population
has meant a significant loss of revenue. For decades, Virginia was a
leading producer of American oysters, with oyster harvests totaling eleven
302. See Horton, supra note 155, at 31.
303. See National standards sought for manure management, BAY J., Mar. 1998, at4. The waste
from the 600 million chickens produced each year on the Delmarva Peninsula exceeds 3.2 billion
pounds per year and contains "as much nitrogen as a city of almost 500,000 people." ld. The EPA
recently blamed 70% of waterway pollution on agricultural uses, which contributed more pollution to
American waterways than sewage waste treatment plants, urban storm sewers, and pollutants deposited
from the air. See EPA: Farms Are Worst Polluters, supra note 301.
304. See Horton, supra note 155, at 31.
305. Costanza & Greer, supra note 152, at 178. See also CHEsAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, U.S.
ENVTL. PROTEcnON AGENCY, THE STATE OF THE CHEsAPEAKE BAY: 1995, at 31-32 [hereinafter
STATE OF THE CHEsAPEAKE] (discussing successes of the striped bass program); Striped Bass: A
Chesapeake Treasure, BAY J., Sept. 1991, at 7 (discussing management of striped bass).
306. Costanza & Greer, supra note 152, at 178.
307. 1993 CHEsAPEAKE BAY COMM'N REPORT, supra note 265, at 39.
308. ld.
309. See id.; Horton, supra note 155, at 31.
310. See 1993 CHEsAPEAKEBAYCOMM'NREPORT,supranote265, at39.
3ll. See id.; Costanza & Greer, supra note 152, at 179.
312. Costanza & Greer, supra note 152, at 179.
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million pounds as recently as 1981; today Virginia does not even have a
sufficient oyster population to support an oyster industry.313 Other
fisheries have experienced less devastating declines.314 Despite these
declines, fisheries management has tended to favor preservation of the
watermen's livelihood over preservation of the species supporting their
livelihood.315
Loss of habitat and ecologically significant land cover also remains a
serious problem within the Bay system.316 Forests and wetlands are critical
to maintaining the resilience of the Bay ecosystem. Both types of land
cover trap pollutants, preventing them from reaching more sensitive parts
of the Bay system.317 Yet both now "cover only about half as much of the
watershed as they once did,"318 and they continue to decline in acreage.
Indeed, despite the no net loss policy in place since 1989, wetlands still are
being lost in the Bay watershed, though at a slower rate. One study
indicates that during the 1980s alone the Bay lost 3,000 acres of wetlands
313. See CHEsAPEAKE BAY COMM'N, ANNuAL REPORT TO TilE GENERAL ASSEMBLIES OF
VIRGINIA, MARYLAND & PENNSYLVANIA: 1994, at 43 [hereinafter 1994 CHEsAPEAKE BAY COMM'N
REPORT]; 1993 CHEsAPEAKE BAY COMM'N REPORT, supra note 265, at 39; Bun.ER & LIVINGSTON,
supra note 2, § 4.2, at 76. Maryland has experienced similar losses in its oyster industry. See Costanza
& Greer, supra note 152, at 177.
314. See 1996 CHEsAPEAKE BAY COMM'N REPORT, supra note 299, at 27-34; 1993 CHESAPEAKE
BAY COMM'N REPORT, supra note 265, at 41.
315. See DAVISON ET AL, supra note 272, at 190-94; Horton, supra note 155, at 31. For
examples of the pressures that regulators face, see Mark Di Vincenzo, Watennen Battling New River
Lease Law, DAILY PREss (Newport News, Va.), Apr. 1, 1993, at C1; Tina McCloud, Mathews
Watennan vs. New Bay Rules, DAILY PREss (Newport News, Va.), Oct. 27, 1992, at B1; Stephanie
Sharpe, Watennan Lobbies to Be Sure He'll Have a Tomorrow, DAILY PREss (Newport News, Va.),
Aug. 27, 1990, at B 1. See generally Kim A. McDonald, As Catch Goes Down, Arguments Well Up, 42
CHRON. OFH!GHEREDuc., Nov. 24, 1995, atA3 (discussing the debate over management of declining
fisheries nationwide).
316. A 1995 report stated that the Bay watershed was losing eight acres per day of wetlands and
had lost 300 acres per day of forest land from 1980 to 1990. See STATE OF TilE CHESAPEAKE, supra
note 305, at 3, 6. The report projected the amount of urban and suburban land to increase 35% over
1935 acreage by the year2000. See id. at5.
317. See Horton, supra note 155, at 31-32. See also CoMMITJEE ON CHARACTERIZATION OF
WETLANDS, NATIONAL REsEARCH COUNCIL, WETLANDS: CHARACTERISTICS AND BOUNDAPJES 34-41
(1995) (discussing wetlands' functions); 1993 CHEsAPEAKE BAY CoMM'N REPORT, supra note 265, at
33-35 (describing the environmental benefits of riparian forests); Forests Offer Tree-mendous Benefits,
supra note 187 (describing the many benefits provided by trees). Although forests still cover almost
60% of the lands in the Bay's watershed, the forests are only responsible for 14% of the nitrogen and
3% of the phosphorus runoff. See Bill Matuszeski, Commentary, Readiness to sacrifice forests for
sprawl is almost stumping, BAY J., Mar. 1998, at 20. Like wetlands, then, "forests represent a huge
natural pollution treatment system." /d.
313. Horton, supra note 155, at 31. See also supra notes 182-137 and accompanying text
(discussing the decline of tree cover in the Bay watershed).
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annually.319 Among other factors, the continuing loss has been attributed
to unregulated land uses, sprawling development, and regulations that
allow destruction of small wetland tracts.320 Despite the laws protecting
wetlands, the overwhelming majority of wetlands permit applications are
approved.321 In addition, suburban sprawl is now consuming almost "four
times as much open space for every new resident" as the "more compact
housing patterns" prevalent through the 1950s.322
Nontraditional management approaches and decisionmaking processes
are needed to deal with the environmental problems caused by sprawling
development, escalating land and water use, and nonpoint source pollution.
Those problems require solutions that consider the interactions between a
user and the environment, and that impose restraints on land and water use
to reflect those interactions. Because of the pathological effects of property
norms, traditional management approaches and decisionmaking processes
have not dealt effectively with these types of environmental problemsproblems that involve components interacting across a range of scales and
hierarchical levels. Property norms influence the decisions of lawmakers,
regulators, managers, and planners by funneling their decisions towards
rights-based choices and ignoring considerations of scale relating to
individual land and water use. Although these choices may make some
sense from traditional property law and political theory perspectives, they
ignore the scale-dependency of ecosystems and ecological integrity.323
The Bay program demonstrates the influence of property norms in a
number of ways. Participating jurisdictions have taken atomistic and
product-oriented approaches in setting and implementing goals. Both
Maryland and Virginia, for example, have gone to great lengths to protect
the economic interests of existing users of valuable ecological "products."
Delaying implementation of fishing limits, avoiding fishing bans, and
limiting the territorial or seasonal scope of fishing restrictions are common
319. See Directive goes beyond 'no net loss,' requires gain in Bay states' wetlands, BAY J., Dec.
1997, at 12.
320. See id.; Horton, supra note 155, at 31-34.
321. See CHEsAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION, WETLANDS PERMlTilNG PROGRAMS IN THE
CHESAPEAKE BAY AREA 4 (Oct 1994) (noting that 7% or less of individual pennit applications for Bay
area projects are denied).
322. Horton, supra note 155, at 31, 34. See generally LeeR. Epstein, Where Yards Are Wide:
Have Land Use Planning and Law Gone Astray?. 21 WM. & MARY ENVTI.. L. & POL'Y REV. 345
(1997) (discussing the problem and causes of sprawl, and proposing a new American dream). For a
discussion of the impact of land use on watersheds and estuaries, see Charles S. Hopkinson, Jr., &
Joseph J. Vallino, The Relationships Among Man's Activities in Watersheds and Estuaries: A Model of
Runoff Effects on Patterns of Estuarine Community Metabolism, 18 ESTUARIES 598 (Dec. 1995).
323. For further discussion of the concepts of scale and integrity, see infra Part II.B.2.
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tactics of management plans for Bay fisheries, even when population
declines are serious.324 In addition, despite the now well-documented link
between land use and the environment,325 the Bay program's land use
management efforts have been rather limited in scope, focusing primarily
on land use within the immediate coastal area and often providing
exemptions, variances, or generous grandfather provisions to property
owners within regulated areas. 326 Virginia laws governing land use within
the Bay watershed, for instance, have tended to include generous
grandfather provisions for regulated property owners.327
Further,
government regulators at all levels remain reluctant to adopt
comprehensive and aggressive land use management programs that would
apply throughout a watershed and control growth for environmental
purposes.328
The effect of property norms on the Chesapeake Bay management
program is most evident at the local government level where critical
decisions are made about water and sewer service and about permissible
324. For some examples of these approaches to fisheries management, see DAVIS ON ET AL., supra
note 272, at 190-94. See also Houck, supra note 30, at 946-53 (discussing the problematic approaches
to fisheries management taken by the United States). A comparison of two annual reports of the
Chesapeake Bay Commission reveals how little progress has been made in the fisheries management
area. Compare 1993 CHESAPEAKE BAY CoMM'N REPORT, supra note 265, at 39-43 (describing the
serious decline in the oyster population, the troubling decline in the crab fishezy, the encouraging
increase in juvenile striped bass, the problem of exotic species, and the need for more effective
management) with 1986 CHESAPEAKE BAY COMM'N REPORT, supra note 285, at 15-22 (discussing the
low stock levels of oysters, striped bass, herring, and perch, as well as the need for improved
management efforts). Even though the oyster population has experienced devastating reductions,
heated debate arose when the Chesapeake Bay Foundation called for a three-year moratorium on
oystering. See DAVISON ET AI-, supra note 272, at 191-92; Tom Horton, To Restore & Protect
Chesapeake Bay, in CIIESAPEAKEBAYFOUNDATION, SAVETHEBAY: 25m ANNIVERSARY 3, 16 (1992)
[hereinafter CBF 25m ANNIVERSARY].
325. See STATE OF THE CHESAPEAKE, supra note 305, at 5-9; Butler, supra note 111, at 883 &
n.226.
326. Virginia's Chesapeake Bay laws generally protect 100 feet landward of tidal waters and
wetlands from development and use, though exemptions and reductions in the protected buffer may be
granted. See Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance Bd., Revised Final Regulation VR 173-02-01,
Chesapeake Bay Preservation Area Designation and Management Regnlations, 7 Va. Regs. Reg. 3778
§§ 3.2(B)(5), 4.1(B), 4.3(B), 45, 4.6 (Aug. 26, 1991). Other Virginia laws protecting coastal resources
also contain exemptions enacted for the benefit of private property owners. See, e.g., 1988 Va. Acts.
ch. 740, amended by 1991 Va. Acts. ch. 114 (to expire July 1, 1993) (exempting landowners in the
Sandbridge Beach area from the state's Coastal Primacy Sand Dune Protection Act to allow them to
construct bulkheads or other protective structures). Mazyland generally uses a 1,000 foot buffer zone.
See MD. CODE ANN., NAT. REs. II § 8-1807 (Supp. 1999). See generally DAVISON ET AI-, supra note
272, at 201-10 (discussing the Mazyland and Virginia Chesapeake Bay acts).
327. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 111, at 910 & n.331.
328. For a discussion of failed efforts to adopt stringent land use controls within the Bay
watershed, see infra notes 334-343 and accompanying text
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land uses. Once the decision to provide water and sewer service is made,
the battle over preservation or conservation of undeveloped land is usually
lost. Local officials rarely take action to prevent sprawling land
development, not even when they could legitimately do so by refusing to
extend public water and sewer service.329 Although this failure is
undoubtedly due to a variety of political pressures exerted on government
decisionmakers,330 property owners nevertheless play a significant role in
local, state, and federal political processes.331 Further, though localities
have promoted lower density uses through their zoning laws and
comprehensive plans, those uses still result in loss of ground cover and
contribute to the problem of sprawling development.332
Overcoming the pathological effects of property norms requires a
recognition of the importance of considerations of scale and integrity to
land use decisionmaking. Private landowners, governmental units, courts,
and other parties making land use choices need to recognize that different
types of integrity are at issue. In addition to the personal integrity involved
in the concept of constitutionally protected property rights,333 land use
choices involve the integrity of the property system and the integrity of
ecosystems. Parties making land use choices need to recognize the
importance of scale to system integrity. Until land use choices reflect the
true scales of private land use, the long-term integrity of ecosystems, and
perhaps even the property system, will continue to be threatened.
329. See, e.g., supra notes 223-240 and accompanying text Current legal and economic
pressures pose serious obstacles to government action that would prevent development of a tract of
land. Recent Supreme Court decisions provide greater protection for the development and use of
private property. In a 1992 decision, for example, the Court concluded that government action that
resulted in a total deprivation of value was a taking. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1019, 1030 (1992). Although a government decision to deny the extension of water and
sewer service to a particular tract of land arguably does not diminish the value of land that already lacks
such service, the economic pressures on local officials to approve development projects are substantial.
330. A number of land use experts have commented on the messy politics of local zoning
decisions. See, e.g., RICHARD F. BABCOCK, 1HE ZONING GAME 104-11 (1966) (discussing the
judiciary's lack of confidence in local land use dccisionmaking); Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan
Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Constitutionality in Land-Use Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1, 30-32, 3639 (1992) (discussing the territorial nature and capture theory oflocal government politics).
331. See Lynda L. Butler, The Politics of Takings: Choosing the Appropriate Decisionmaker, 38
WM. & MARY L. REV. 749, 756-58 (1997). For a discussion of the influence of property norms on
state environmental programs, see Butler, supra note 111, at 838-44.
332. The environmental impacts of low-density sprawling development are substantial. See
Epstein, supra note 322, at 349 & n.15.
333. For a discussion of the importance of property to individual freedom and to the integrity of
the person, see FluEDRICH A. HAYEK, 1HE CONSTITUI10N OF LmERTY 124-27, 140-42 (1960). See
generally MARGARET J. RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY (1993) (discussing various theories of
property rights).
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Although some policymakers in the Chesapeake Bay program have
taken the ftrst step in overcoming the pathological effects of property
norms by recognizing the importance of considerations of scale in land use
management, much work remains to be done. A panel of experts,
appointed by the Chesapeake Executive Council to study the impacts of
growth and development on the watershed and called the Year 2020 Panel,
found low-density sprawl to be the most destructive pattern of development
to the Bay.334 The panel noted that undeveloped land in the Bay watershed
had been developed at a rate exceeding the rate of population growth.
Between 1950 and 1980 the population for the Chesapeake basin increased
almost 50%, while the amount of land developed for residential and
commercial purposes increased 180%.335 The panel estimated that between
1980 and 2020, 59% more land in the Bay's watershed would be developed
if land consumption continued at the same rate, and between 1990 and
2020, 2.6 million more residents would populate the watershed.336 The
report called for stringent measures to avoid the serious harm that
unchecked growth would otherwise cause. 337 The measures included
concentrating development in suitable areas and directing growth in rural
areas to existing settlements.338
The report's most controversial
recommendation was the ''usurpation of local prerogatives by a statewide
land use management scheme" that included all state lands in the
watershed.339
To date, none of the jurisdictions participating in the Chesapeake Bay
program have wholeheartedly adopted the report's recommendations. In
Maryland a coalition of farmers, developers, and property rights advocates
defeated legislative proposals that would have adopted the Year 2020
Panel's measures, including statewide land use management.340 Eventually
the Maryland legislature passed a weaker act requiring localities to add the
panel's key policies to their comprehensive plans and to implement the
334. See YEAR 2020 PANEL TO THE CHEsAPEAKE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, POPULATION GROVflll
AND DEVELOPMENTINTHECliESAPEAKEBAYWATERSHEDTO THE YEAR2020, at 1-2,28-29,36 (Dec.
1988) (on file with the author) [hereinafter 2020 PANEL REPORT}; CBF 25m ANNIVERSARY, supra note
324, at 12.
335. See 2020 PANEL REPORT, supra note 334, at 28-29.
336. See id. at 1, 27, 29; DAVISONET AL.,supra note272, at 216.
337. See 2020 PANEL REPORT, supra note 334, at 4-8; DAVISON ET AL., supra note 272, at 218.
338. See 2020 PANEL REPORT, supra note 334, at 5-6; DAVISON ET AL., supra note 272, at 218.
339. DAVISON ET AL., supra note 272, at 218. See also 2020 PANEL REPORT, supra note 334, at
4-5.
340. See DAVISONET AL., supra note272, at218.
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policies through zoning and other ordinances.341 In Virginia, a commission
appointed to consider the 2020 report proposed legislation that was
defeated. 342 The Pennsylvania governor did not even appoint a panel to
consider the 2020 proposals, calling the proposals "'draconian. "'343 These
experiences suggest that property owners and policymakers still have not
recognized the true scales of private land use or the importance of scale to
ecosystem integrity. The importance of considering scale and integrity in
land use decisionmaking is discussed next.
2. Considerations of Scale and Questions of Integrity
Property norms have influenced the landscape scales and the types of
integrity considered in land use decisionmaking. The legal system has
narrowly defined the scales of land use to exclude significant externalities
and has restricted the types of integrity considered in defining property
rights, obligations, and liabilities. The narrow definitions of scale include
ecologically irrelevant temporal and spatial scales, as well as ecologically
inconsistent scales of observation, particularly management units
controlling land use decisionmaking. For most land use choices, the
principal management unit is the individual landowner, who, as a general
matter, need only consider the spatial limits of his or her tract of land and
the temporal scales most likely to maximize net profit. In other words, the
scales of the key land use decisionmaker-the private landowner-are
generally much smaller than the actual scales of the owner's land use and,
therefore, are much smaller than the scales needed to maintain the integrity
of the ecosystem.344 Further, the types of integrity that are important to the
individual user-economic and personal integrity-tend to undermine the
integrity of ecosystems. Land use decisionmakers who need focus only on
their own economic well-being and personal freedom have little, if any,
incentive to consider the integrity of the whole ecosystem.345 A discussion
of the concepts of ecosystem, ecosystem integrity, and landscape scales
341. See MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. ll § 8-1808 (Supp. 1999); DAVISONET AL., supra note 272,
at218.
342. See DAVISONET AL., supra note272, at218.
343. SUSAN Q. STRANAHAN, SUSQUEHANNA, RiVER OF DREAMS 300 (1993). A state legislative
committee, however, considered the Year 2020 Panel's proposals and made some recommendations.
As of 1996, the recommendations had not been adopted. See DAVISON ET AL., supra note 272, at 218.
For an update on a 1999 bill proposed to revise land use practices in Pennsylvania, see Bills would
revise land practices in PA,jund open space purchases, BAY J., June 1999, at 17.
344. For further explanation of the relationship between scale of use and ecological integrity, see
infra notes 351-355 and accompanying text
345. For further explanation, see Ganett Hardin, The Tragedy ofthe Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243
(1968).
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will demonstrate how detrimental the narrow conceptions of scale and
integrity are to environmental quality.
The concept of an ecosystem includes not only its constituent
components, but also the interactions among the components and their
structure and functioning.346 In other words, an ecosystem is greater than
the sum of its parts because of the dynamic interactions occurring among
those parts and because of the structure and function of the ecosystem.347
Under this conceptual definition, an ecosystem is not limited to a particular
level of organization or hierarchy, or to particular temporal or spatial
scales; rather, it may involve a range of scales and hierarchicallevels. 348
The concept of ecosystem integrity involves the functions and
structure of a system, as well as maintenance of its components and the
interactions among them.349 No single component should be treated in
isolation from the system's functions, structure, and other components.
Ecosystem integrity, however, does not necessarily require preservation of
all components. Some changes in structure have little, if any, impact on the
functioning of an ecosystem. An ecosystem may be resilient to the loss of
even common components because of functional redundancy or
equivalence; system components may perform equivalent functions that
compensate for a change in structure. When redundancy or equivalence
does not exist, however, changes can result in significant alterations in
ecosystem function. 350
Because the concept of ecosystem integrity "implies maintenance of
some normal state" of operation, function, or structure measured over
sufficient time and space, ecosystem integrity is "scale-dependent."351 The
scale of an ecosystem may refer to its spatial and temporal dimensions, as
well as to "the observation set used to define ... [the] system and measure
ecosystem integrity."352 The spatial dimension involves the area occupied
by the ecosystem, while the temporal dimension refers to the time period
See King, supra note 30, at 25.
Ecosystem function "generally refers to the functioning or operation of the ecosystem, •••
and not the role or job of the ecosystem." !d. at 20. Ecosystem structure "commonly refers to the
distribution of matter and energy among system components." !d.
348. See id. at 23.
349. See id. at 25.
350. See id. at 25-27. Perspective does, of course, affect whether a change is viewed as a loss in
ecosystem integrity. The loss of a rare species may be considered a loss of ecosystem integrity when
viewed from a community, ethical, or aesthetic perspective, but not when viewed from an ecosystem
function perspective. See id. at 27. For further discussion of the importance of perspective, see id. at
346.
347.

26-27.
351.
352.

/d. at29.
/d. at 28.
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used to describe the system.353 The scale of the observation set may be
determined by the scale of the management unit monitoring or measuring
integrity.354 If the extent (areal expanse or length of time) of the
management unit does not match the attributes of the monitored ecosystem,
invalid measurements of ecosystem integrity loss may result. Ecosystems
require minimum spatial and temporal extents for system functions to occur
and system structure to be maintained. A loss in ecosystem integrity may
result when a management unit has a smaller spatial and temporal reach
than that of the ecosystem it is managing, or when a management unit
develops management practices for scales less than the minimum amount
required for ecosystem interactions to occur.355
Property rights in land have not traditionally been defined in light of
the spatial and temporal dimensions of land use. For years traditional
property norms have reflected a "liberal conception of ownership"356 that
includes an individualistic view of scale based on personal economic and
political freedom. 357 Proponents of this concept of ownership generally
adhere to a theory of limited government. Under this theory the primary
purpose of government is to protect individuals from violence, including
violence against an individual's property rights. Supporters of this theory
generally believe that "the only legitimate functions of government are the
protection of life, liberty, and property from external threats (the military),
internal threat (the police), and civil disputes (the courts)."358 To a
libertarian, society consists of "an aggregate of discrete, autonomous
individuals, each owning items and parcels of property, totally
encapsulated by title and well-defined boundary lines."359
Although the liberal conception of property has played a critical role
in the development of the American political structure and legal system,360
353. See id.
354. Seeid.
355. See id. at 28-29.
356. CHRISTMAN, supra note 21, at 3.
357. See id. at 29-31; AlExANDER, supra note 42, at 1, 3-7; ELY, supra note 2, at 153. For
further discussion of the relationship between liberty and liberal ownership, see CHRISTMAN, supra note
21, at 67-83.
358. Partridge, supra note 112, at 264. For a discussion of a more modem, libertarian view of
property, see Eric T. Freyfogle, Owning the Land: Four Contemporary Narratives, 13 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 279,286-92 (1998) (discussing Richard Epstein's revised version of the libertarian concept
of property).
359. Partridge, supra note 112, at 264.
360. See ELY, supra note 2, at 26-58 (discussing the role of private property rights in establishing
the new constitutional order in America). But see CHRISTMAN, supra note 21, at 67-83 (critiquing
defenses of liberal ownership based on considerations of liberty); William J. Novak, Common
Regulntion: Legal Origins ofState Power in America, 45 HAsTINGS LJ. 1061 (1994) (arguing that the
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the liberal view is not the only conception of property that has been
important to American legal thought. The conception of property as "the
private basis for the public good" also has had a long tmdition.361 In
Commodity and Propriety, Professor Gregory Alexander explains that this
alternate vision of property reflects the notion that the individual human is
an "inherently social being, inevitably dependent on others not only to
thrive but even just to survive. This irreducible interdependency means
that individuals owe one another obligations, not by virtue of consent alone
but as an inherent incident of the human condition."362 The public good
view of property recognizes that property is central to social stability,
"anchor[ing] the citizen to his ... rightful place" and providing a basis for
imposing social obligations for the good of the community.363 This vision
thus prefers to view property as providing a basis for social stability and
participation mther than a basis for personal gain, commodification, and
speculation.364
Further, even if the liberal conception of property controlled the
development of American political and legal thought, that conception still
needs to be reexamined in light of modem ecological problems and
conditions. Such an evaluation would reveal that the liberal conception of
property fails to consider concepts and principles that are critical to
ecological integrity. Omitted from the liberal conception of property is a
sense of responsibility for externalities imposed by property owners on
important common resources and on the components, structure, and
functioning of ecosystems. Under tmditional property law, a landowner
''has no direct incentive (in the absence of negotiations)" to consider costs
that he imposes on other resources, whether privately or publicly owned.365
He only has the incentive to consider costs and "economize on the use of
those resources from which he has the right to exclude others."366 Also
liberal theory of ownership and government was not the single or even dominant theory in the early
republic).
361. ALEXANDER, supra note 42, at 1. See also David Schultz, Political Theory and Legal
History: Conflicting Depictions of Property in the American Political Founding, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HJST.
464 (1993) (discussing two sometimes contradictory approaches to analyzing American political theory
and their impact on depictions of property: a rhetorical approach focusing on the expressed views of the
founders and an institutional approach looking at how the law treated property).
362. ALEXANDER, supra note 42, at 1-2.
363. /d. at 2, 4. For a discussion of four views of property now affecting legal discourse, see
Freyfogle, supra note 358, at 286-303 (discussing the libertarian ideal of individual autonomy, the
more traditional narrative of property that focused on economic opportunity, a community-centered
narrative of property, and a bio-centric narrative of property).
364. See ALEXANDER, supra note 42, at 40.
365. Demsetz, supra note 242, at 356.
366. Id.
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omitted from the liberal conception of property is any recognition of the
carrying capacity of land or the finiteness of natural resources. One of the
implicit assumptions of liberalism is the "infinite availability of the natural
resources necessary" for the "pursuit of material comforts."367 The
traditional, geometric-based approach to allocating land rights has, for the
most part, reinforced the limited externality perspective and the assumption
of infinite availability underlying the liberal conception of property. This
reinforcement has occurred through the traditional approach's focus on
discrete, unitary tracts of land and its failure to consider the interactions
and interdependencies existing between landowners and the foundation
ecosystem.368 Traditional property law thus fails to include the principles
of ecological connectedness and carrying capacity in the definition of
property norms, rights, and obligations.
Because land is a critical part of the ecosystem, property rights in land
should, as a matter of ethics and ecology, reflect the ecological and
landscape dimensions of land use, not just the individual user's economic
considerations. A property system that defines land rights primarily in the
context of a society's individual rights-based approach to political or
economic systems is ignoring the physical, chemical, and biological
processes linking individual tracts of land to the ecosystem. In addition to
being viewed as the subject of individual ownership, appropriation, and
commodification, rights in land must be defined in light of land's role as
"one of the key constituents of life on earth."369 Scale should become a
"fundamental determinant" in defining the moral and legal obligation of
landowners when the consequences of failing to consider appropriate scales
could result in serious damage or avoidable, catastrophic losses.370
367. Susan M. Leeson, Philosophic Implications of the Ecological Crisis: The Authoritarian
Challenge to I.iheralism, 11 POUTY 304, 305 (1979). For arguments that resources remain abundant,
see Sagoff, supra note 241; Julian L. Simon, Scarcity or Abundance?, in nm BUSINESS OF
CoNSUMPTION, supra note 112, at 237-45.
368. See Sterk, supra note 21, at 90, 93-95.
369. PI.Arr, supra note 171, at 4. Platt maintains that land also needs to be defined in light of
cultural and other noneconomic values that people attach to land as a sense of place. See id. at 5-6. For

a general discussion ofland's critical importance to humans and of the need for improved management
ofland's resources, see ANrnONY YOUNG, LAND REsOURCES (1998).
370. K.S. Shrader-Frechette & E.D. McCoy, Statistics, Costs and Rationality in Ecological
Inference, 7 TRENDs IN EcOLOGY & EVOLUTION 96, 98 (1992). The inherent complexity of natural
systems means that many different models or characterizations of the systems are possible. See Bryan
G. Norton, Improving Ecological Communication: The Role of Ecologists in Environmental Policy
Formation, 8 EcOLOG!CALAPPUCATIONS 350,358 (1998). Because of the numerous models available,
the choiee of scale often reflects a choice of values; the modeler chooses to model a subset of the
system's "actual dynamics.... Those choices express evaluations of ecological and social
significance." /d. at 359. While scientists often prefer scales with ecological significance, lawmakers
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Indicators of system integrity are necessarily greater than social parameters
when the system involves natural resources that are critical to ecological as
well as social systems. Maintaining the integrity of ecological systems
requires consideration of scales that are greater than individual landowners
or individual tracts of land. The scales of space, time, and observation help
to capture the interactions among the system components, as well as the
structure and functions of the system. Incorporating considerations of scale
into the definition of property rights, powers, and obligations, in other
words, would capture the connections between individual rights, property
system integrity, and ecosystem integrity. Such incorporation would help
to ensure the inclusion of important ecological interests in the concept of
landed property in ways that are tailored to individual users.
The massive Chapman's Landing development project proposed for
southern Maryland demonstrates the importance of considering
ecologically relevant scales of private land use. The project proposed the
residential and commercial development of approximately 2,250 acres
covering about 2.25 miles of the Potomac River shoreline in Maryland.371
The master plan for Chapman's Landing called for the creation of a city
comparable in size to Annapolis. The development would have included
4,600 dwelling units, 2.26 million square feet of commercial space, a
marina, and a 200-acre golf course-all on a tract of land that is about 90%
forested, much of it old growth.372
The development plan called for the destruction of significant
historical and ecological resources. The site contains historical resources
from the colonial and early statehood periods, as well as important
archaeological resources dating back to prehistoric times.373 Chapman's
Landing has an unusually broad range of habitats that support a unique
assemblage of flora and fauna, including many rare, threatened, and
endangered species.374 The site is rich in amphibians, reptiles, birds,
defining property rights have, in the past, chosen scales with social-that is, political-significance.
Effective ecosystem management requires greater sensitivity to the value choices underlying the
definition of scale. This sensitivity is especially needed when serious but avoidable losses are possible.
371. See Friends of Mount Aventine, Help Protect Chapman Forest on the Potomac River
South of Washington, D.C. (visited Jan. 1998) <http://www.radix.net/-foma/fomnhpfucts.html
[hereinafter FOMA, Facts]; Friends of Mount Aventine, Main Issues (visited Feb. 4, 1998)
<http://www.radix.net/-foma/topics.html#TOP> [hereinafter FOMA, Main Lvsues]; Friends of Mount
Aventine, The Keystone Report: Establish the Potomac River Heritage Reserve (visited July 6, 1998)
<http://www.radix.net/-fomalkeystone.htm> [hereinafter The Keystone Report].
372. See FOMA, Facts, supra note 371; FOMA, Main Issues, supra note 371; The Keystone
Report, supra note 371.
373. See The Keystone Report, supra note 371.
374. Seeid.
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mammals, fish, rare butterflies, and plants,375 and includes a tributary of the
Potomac River having exceptional water quality and fish habitats.376
In assessing the environmental effects of the project, the Army Corps
of Engineers and the Maryland state and local governments generally
examined direct impacts only, ignoring important considerations of scale
involving indirect and cumulative impacts of the project on the surrounding
environment.377 According to one scientist, instead of trying to provide
meaningful protection to wildlife, the developer proposed to protect a
"quarter-mile no-build zone around a bald eagle nest and a ravine wetland
filled with very rare ferns!t37 8 Instead of trying to protect an exceptional,
continuous habitat of old growth and mature forest, the developer proposed
the largest single loss of forest habitat since the passage of the Chesapeake
Bay legislation.379 The geographical context of the tract suggests the
magnitude of this loss. Located on important waterways and surrounded
by other undeveloped lands, Chapman•s Landing forms an intricate part of
a relatively large area of continuous forest habitat. Due to its steep ravines,
the tract has remained "essentially intact.••380 Development of the tract
would seriously fragment the forest habitat and decimate critical interior
forests. 381 Rather than examining the impact of the development on
transportation, schools, and other infrastructure needs, or on the species
dependent on the continuous habitat, the local government made some
changes in its land use laws to allow increases in the development's
Seeid.
See Andrew H. Macdonald, Good Engineering Will Not Protect the Bay from Chapman's
Landing, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 1, 1997, at 15A; FOMA, Facts, supra note 371; The Keystone Report,
supra note 371. For a discussion of the serious threat to fisheries that development of Chapman's
Landing poses, see James P. Long, Threat to Anadromous and Semi·Anadromous Fish by Development
Plans for the Chapman Forest (visited July 6, 1998) <http://www.radix.net/-foma!LongAnad.htm>.
377. See Macdonald, supra note 376; Letter from W. Michael McCabe, Regional Administrator,
375.
376.

U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, to Colonel Bruce Berwick, Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Baltimore Dist. (Oct. 10, 1997) (visited Apr. 20, 2000) <http://www.radix.net/-fomal
epa2corpsl097WEB.html>. The Chapman's Landing developer met with the Army Corps of Engineers
to discuss preparation of a wetlands permit application under a joint state/federal permitting process.
The public was not invited to any of these meetings. See Friends of Mount Aventine, Maryland
Regulatory Process on Chapman's Landing (visited July 6, 1998) <http://www.radix.net/-fomal
MruylandRegulatoryStatus.htm>.
378. Macdonald, supra note 376, at 15A.
379. See Charles County Weighs Development Many Fear the Impact of /2,000-Resident Housing
Project, DAILY REcoRD (Baltimore, Md.), July 21, 1995, at 5; FOMA, Facts, supra note 371; The
Keystone Report, supra note 371.
380. See The Keystone Report, supra note 371.
381. See generally id. (discussing the serious effects of fragmentation on ecological resources in
the Chapman's Landing tract).
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density.382 Instead of examining the water supply needs of the entire
proposed development or the impact of increased water use on other areas,
Maryland issued a water appropriation permit for up to 390,000 gallons per
day, only enough for the first 600 homes.383
Eventually the Governor of Maryland and environmentally active
groups worked together to preserve Chapman's Landing. Early on, those
efforts had no impact. By mid-March 1998, the developer had begun to
clear the land despite ongoing negotiations with the state and a private
conservation group interested in buying the property.384 This action caused
the Governor of Maryland to announce that the state would use its power of
eminent domain to protect at least part of the site.385 The announcement
failed to halt the clearing operations; by the end of June 25, 1998, the
developer had cleared approximately 80 acres. 386 Finally, on October 28,
1998, the Governor of Maryland announced that the Mellon Foundation
purchased the remaining portion of Chapman's Landing to spare it from
development.387
Although some may question whether the Chapman's Landing dispute
demonstrates the pathology of property norms, given the ultimate
resolution of the dispute, it is not the final result that is critical to evaluating
the pathology of property nonns, but rather the rights, obligations, and
nonns affecting the private landowner. The developer in Chapman's
Landing had the right to develop the tract, assuming compliance with
traditional permit and zoning requirements, and owed no obligation to
account for ecological costs not reflected in those requirements. Indeed,
the developer did not even have to account fully for increased demands on
infrastructure or water resources. 388 Had it not been for the activities of
concerned citizens and the persistence of the Maryland Governor and a
private foundation, the development would have proceeded. Further, for
every land development dispute like Chapman's Landing, many more are
not resolved in such an environmentally friendly manner. The Chapman's
382. See FOMA, Main Issues, supra note 371.
383. See Macdonald, supra note 376.
384. See Heather Dewar, Chapman's Landing Work Begins Despite State Talks: Developer Says
He's 'Open to Proposals' for Land, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 27, 1998, at 2B.
385. See Michael Dresser, State to Acquire Frostburg Depot for $600,000: Board Abo Gives OK
to Seek Condemnation of Chapman's Landing, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 16, 1998, at 1B; Friends of
Mount Aventine, Dramatic Events in Campaign to Preserve Chapman Forest (visited July 6, 1998)
<http://www.radix.net/-foma/fomanews0498.htm> [hereinafter FOMA, News].
386. See FOMA, News, supra note 385.
387. See Md. Governor's Press Office, Chapman's Landing Preserved in Entirety (visited June
17, 1999) <http://www.gov.state.md.us/gov/press/1998/oct/html/chnplast.html>.
388. See supra notes 382-383 and accompanying text.
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Landing tract happened to get everyone's attention; it had the right
combination of ecological, historical, and social conditions working in its
favor. Most other tracts of undeveloped land are not as appealing targets
for government or private foundation acquisition, though the costs of land
development may be just as significant.
Incorporating considerations of scale into definitions of property
rights and obligations would not mean the end of private property rights in
land. What would change is that the scale of individual land use would be
reflected in the evaluation of the rights, obligations, and the expectations of
property owners, as well .as the importance of the government interest.
Instead of using traditionally limiting property norms and rules to
determine the benefits and burdens of government action and the
reasonableness of private owners' expectations, lawmakers and
policymakers would use a more integrated concept of property that
included the ecological costs of land use. Individual landowners would
continue to have the power to make use decisions, take economic gambles,
and exclude others, but would bear responsibility for the scales of those
decisions. The integrity of the person still would be protected through the
concept of property. This protective function, however, would not be
performed in a void, without consideration of the impact of property rights
on the integrity of the ecosystem. Rather ecological concepts of scale and
integrity would be used to evaluate whether a private land use is adversely
affecting common environmental resources that are part of the public stock
and upon which we all depend. Private property rights would be defined in
light of the impact of private use on resources that perform important
ecological services critical to system integrity. After all, the nature and
desirability of a free society would change considerably if the exercise of
private rights so depleted natural resources and degraded the environment
that the health or survival of humans was seriously threatened.
Accounting for the true scales of land use will require a systemic
approach that reflects an integrated or holistic concept of integrity.
Although traditional property norms protect the personal integrity of an
individual owner in both an economic and political sense, they fail to
consider ecological or system integrity. Because of its focus on personal
integrity, the liberal conception of property discounts the importance of
system counectedness and integrity and of sustaining the resource base of
the foundation ecosystem. In determining the benefits and burdens of
government action affecting land use and the legitimacy of private
expectations, lawmakers need to consider the true costs of private land
use-not only to other rightholders but also to the ecosystem. Concepts of
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scale and ecological integrity would help to detennine those costs.
Government action that forces internalization of private land use costs by
restricting land use or imposing some sort of stewardship obligation on
property owners would represent an important step toward a more holistic
concept of integrity.
The concept of integrity used to define property rights thus must itself
become integrated. It must involve not only personal integrity, but also
system integrity. Although an exploration of the meaning of system
integrity is beyond the scope of this work, several scholars have begun the
task of defining a principle of integrity which can produce a much needed
"changed consciousness" in western societies.389 Necessitated by the
magnitude of environmental problems, this changed consciousness would
require an ''understanding of the self not as primarily individualistic, but as
relational in line with the primacy of ecosystemic wholes."390 Such an
understanding would provide a better basis for justifying the imposition of
an environmental obligation on landowners391-that is, for developing the
concept of a "citizen landowner." Ultimately adherence to· the holistic or
integrated principle of integrity would help to restore harmony to
ecological systems.392

An important cause of the individualistic perspectives now controlling
American legal and economic systems is the pathology of property norms.
To alter the present pattern of escalating land and water use, and of
ineffective ecosystem management over the long term, the legal system
must wholeheartedly embrace the concept of ecological integrity. That
embrace must include the limits that ecological integrity places on
individual action; those limits are "the limits of humankind as a species."393
Considerations of scale would help to recognize these limits.
One example of how a systemic approach to scale would shift
property norms from a personal to an integrated concept of integrity
involves the debate over the appropriate property benchmark to be used in
defining constitutionally protected property and measuring the economic
impact of government action on property rights. A majority of the
389. See LAURA WESTRA, AN ENVIRONMENTAL PROPOSAL FOR Ennes: TilE PRINCIPLB OF
INrEGRITY 8 (1994). See also Christopher B. Barrett & Raymond E. Grizzle, A HolLftic Approach to
Sustainability Based on Pluralism Stewardship, 21 ENVTL. ETHICS 23 (1999) (advancing a holistic
approach to environmental policymaking based upon the principle of pluralistic stewardship).
390. WESTRA, supra note 389, at 9.
391. See id. at 17.
392. See id. at 14-15.
393. Id. at 12.
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Supreme Court has clarified that government action that deprives a
property owner of all economically beneficial use is a per se taking.3 94
Supreme Court justices, however, have disagreed about the appropriate
property benchmark. Some justices have focused on the regulated
portion-the property directly affected-in measuring the economic
impact.395 Others have examined the property as a whole in deciding
whether the government action constitutes a taking, and refuse to divide the
property into discrete segments.396 An approach that isolates the discrete,
regulated portion ignores the scales of private land use choices and
recognizes only the economic incentives of the modern real estate market.
Today the market provides significant monetary rewards for the
subdivision of land. A landowner's power to subdivide has become a
highly refined tool for maximizing profit, and will only increase in value
and importance as the quantity of undeveloped land declines. This
valuable power and right to subdivide has contributed to the shift from
more compact urban settlement patterns to sprawling development. Use of
the discrete, regulated portion benchmark would allow the property owner
to manipulate the dimensions of the protected property to maximize the
amount of economic loss. As Justice Stevens noted in a dissenting opinion,
the "smaller the estate, the more likely that a regulatory change will effect a
total taking."397 Under a systemic approach to scale, the discrete, regulated
portion would not be isolated from the whole in evaluating rights,
obligations, and expectations of the property owner.
Another example of how systemic consideration of scale would alter
property norms concerns the validity of time-specific moratoria on
development. Because government action that prohibits the development
of undeveloped land for a set period of time prevents the landowner from
making an economically viable use during that period, some have argued
that such action constitutes a taking.398 Others have disagreed, reasoning
394. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
395. See, e.g., id. at 1016 n.7 (suggesting that a court examine the degree to which state law has
"accorded legal recognition and protection to the particular interest in land with respect to which the
takings claimant alleges a diminution in (or elimination of) value"); Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922) (focusing on the regulated portion).
396. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497-502 (1987)
Oooking at the propeey as a whole); Penn Cent Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31
(1978) (focusing on "rights in the parcel as a whole").
397. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1065 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
398. See ]UUAN C. JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND
CONTROL LAW §§ 9.5, 10.8.B., 10.9.C (1998) (explaining and criticizing this temporal segmentation
approach to takings).
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that moratoria are temporary and only prevent immediate development.399
Under a systemic approach to scale, economically viable use would be
defined in light of long-range, as well as immediate, time scales. Future
development opportunities would be considered in deciding whether an
economically viable use remained.
A final example of how systemic consideration of scale would alter
property norms concerns the question of how the calculus of takings would
be affected by the existence of a power to transfer development rights to
another tract of land located in an ecologically less sensitive or critical area.
Some have maintained that giving transfer development rights to regulated
landowners does not negate the existence of a taking, and may not even
reflect the amount of just compensation due.400 Others argue that transfer
development rights speak to the economic impact of the government action
on the property owner and therefore should be considered in deciding
whether a taking exists.401 Under a systemic approach, the scope and
nature of property rights would be defined in light of ecological concepts
like connectivity, continuity, and scale of habitat. Because transfer
development rights provide a way to exercise property rights in land
located in ecologically fragile areas without seriously damaging the areas, a
systemic approach would favor the inclusion of such rights in the
landowner's bundle of rights in evaluating the existence of a taking. The
transfer development rights concept allows property rights in land to be
exercised in ways that reflect ecological scales of use, minimizing habitat
fragmentation and destruction in ecologically sensitive areas.
Fulfilling the obligation to consider the scales of land use often will
involve relatively minor changes in the way land uses are conducted. In a
voluntary program in Pennsylvania, for example, farmers are considering
the scales of their land use by achieving ''nutrient balance," limiting the
amount of nutrients that are released to the amount that the farmer uses.402
One farmer has worked with an agronomy professor from Pennsylvania
State to limit excessive use of nutrients. In addition to weighing "every
pig, every bag of feed and fertilizer, every truckload of hay, livestock
bedding, and manure leaving and entering his operation,"403 the farmer
used government funds to build storage pits to hold manure until it could be
399. See id. § 10.9.C (concluding that moratoria are not per se takings).
400. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'! Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 745, 746-48 (1997) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 138, 150-52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See also
JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 398, § 9.9.
401. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 137-38; JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 398, § 9.9.
402. See Horton, supra note 155, at 21-22.
403. /d. at21.
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removed by a neighbor who needed fertilizer. The use of the storage pits
reduced runoff from the farm and decreased the neighbor's use of
commercial fertilizer by 30%.404
The complexities of the temporal and spatial scales of private land use
admittedly obfuscate the connections between individual land use and
ecosystem integrity. Incorporation of temporal scales is difficult to achieve
when the impacts of uses and the solutions for minimizing those impacts
take longer than the lives of those who remember pristine conditions. The
passion for cleaning up the Chesapeake Bay may ebb with the death of the
generation who can remember clear waters, abundant oyster reefs, fourteen
foot sturgeon, and submerged aquatic grasses so extensive and rich with
life that forest ecosystems paled in comparison.405 Incorporation of spatial
scales also is difficult to achieve when the affected area is as expansive as
the Chesapeake Bay watershed. Questions of jurisdiction and complex
biological, chemical, and physical interactions all add uncertainty to the
task. Even if all of the interactions are not understood, though, land use
decisions that reflect some of the scales of land use are more likely to
produce a resilient ecosystem than management efforts based on the
individual focus of traditional norms.406 Unless the individual managerthe property owner-begins to consider the temporal and spatial scales of
private land use, the threat to ecosystem integrity and ultimately to property
system integrity \vill grow.

ill. BREAKING THE PATHOLOGICAL EFFECTS
OF PROPERTY NORMS
Innovative solutions are needed to break the pathological effects of
property norms on ecosystem integrity. First and foremost, lawmakers and
policymakers must confront and reexamine the property norms driving
resource use and affecting management decisions. Until the impact of
these norms on ecosystem integrity is better understood, future
management efforts are, at best, likely to produce the same short-term
success and long-term dangers that already have been observed in managed
ecosystems. To the extent possible, management goals must be translated
404. See id. at22.
405. See id. at 22-23, 26.
406. One argument sometimes made in response to proposals to promote ecological integrity
relies on the scientific uncertainty of the ecological integrity concept. Understanding all of the
intricacies of the concept, however, is not a necessary condition to achieving more resilient ecosystems.
After all, "scientific uncertainty accompanies all human intervention ...." WESTRA, supra note 389, at

so.
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into behavioral incentives that encourage policymakers and landowners to
avoid the property norms "trap"407-the individual-rights-based thinking
that diverts attention from the scales of private land use and decouples
human and ecological systems. Some fundamental changes in property
norms-or at least the interpretation or application of those norms-must
occur if environmental quality is to be achieved within the current political
framework. 408
The sources, bases, and assumptions of those norms need to be
reevaluated in light of tlte historical development of the property concept
and in light of the economic, political, and ecological conditions of modem
life. 409 Such a reevaluation must keep in mind the inherent adaptability of
the property concept,410 distinguishing between the core essence of
property that should remain unchanged and the remaining portion that is
free to adapt to change.411 Such a reevaluation also must keep in mind the
civic nature of property ownersltip-tltat is, the notion that property
ownership is intimately connected to civic virtue, providing a basis for
leaders to become sufficiently independent from self-interest and therefore
capable of acting in the interest of the greater public good.412 The
407. See Costanza & Greer, supra note 152, at 203-06 (discussing the "social traps" that lead to
mismanagement of ecosystems). As these scholars explain, human institutions provide "incentive
structures [that] often lead to behavior that is directly counter to the long-term health of the whole
system." Id. at 203. Decisionmakers become trapped by local conditions and cultural values. See id.
408. For further discussion of the relationship between property rights and political values, see
infra notes 421-429 and accompanying text For a pessimistic view of the relationship between
environmental quality and democratic values, see generally WILLIAM OPHULS, EcoLOGY AND THE
POLITICS OF SCARCITY (1977) (discussing how American political values are unsuitable for dealing
with growing ecological problems); WILLIAM OPHULS, EcOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY
REviSITED (1992) (continuing his discussion of how American political processes are ill-equipped to
deal with the worsening environmental situation).
409. Some scholars have already begun this reevaluation process. Commentators, for example,
have reexamined the role of property in American legal thought and the relationship between property
and fundamental political values. See, e.g.. ALExANDER, supra note 42 (discussing different
conceptions of property). See also John D. Echeverria, 1he Politics of Property Rights, 50 OKLA. L.
REv. 351, 374 (1997) (arguing that the role of property in promoting liberty is less important now);
CHruSTMAN, supra note 21, at 3 (arguing that the traditional liberal conception of property is "truly a
myth that ought to be exposed and abandoned"). Commentators also have begun to define a green
theory of property. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Green Property, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 239 (1990).
410. For a discussion of the adaptive nature of American property law, see Butler, supra note 33.
For a similar discussion of the flexibility of German property law, see RUDOLF Doi.ZER, PROPERTY
AND ENVIRONMENT: THE SOCIAL OBUGATION INHERENr IN OWNERSHIP (International Union for
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 12, 1976).
411. For an example of the results of a similar reevaluation under German law, see DOI.ZER, supra
note 410, at 57 (identifying the power of disposition and the power to exclude as part of the
unchangeable portion of property under German law).
412. See ALExANDER, supra note 42, at 1-2, 12-13, 22-23, 40-41. For discussions of the social
or civic view of property, see id. at 26-42; Jeny L. Anderson, Takings and Expectations: Toward a
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libertarian view of property defmes "in material terms the legal and
political sphere within which individuals are free to pursue their own
private agendas and satisfy their own preferences, free from governmental
coercion or other forms of external interference";413 this individual-rightsbased view generally ignores the tradition of the civic conception of
property present in American legal thought.414 Over the years property
rights advocates have tended to focus on the unchangeable portion of the
property concept, allowing that portion to control the entire property
concept. Lost in that focus have been the inherent adaptability and the
civic nature of property. Finally, a reevaluation of property norms must
consider the limiting effect of property-rights-based thinking on the
development of market models and economic concepts, especially
economic thinking about externalities and obligations to ecosystems.415
Traditional property-rights-based thinking has produced a market model
that reflects social preferences for individualism and autonomy; discrete
packages of rights and narrow definitions of externalities focusing on
relations between insular individuals are natural consequences of
traditional thinking. Educational, legal, and political efforts are needed to
overcome traditional thinking and help instill a sense of civic and
ecological responsibility in the property concept.416
Second, in addition to the internal reevaluation of property norms,
lawmakers and policymakers should adopt an external solution that will
maintain pressure on the property system to account for ecological costs.
Lawmakers and policymakers could accomplish this goal by adopting an
adaptive, ecologically based approach to ecosystem management that
consistently ties management efforts to ecological integrity and forces
resource users to consider and respond to ecological conditions in making
use decisions. An adaptive approach recognizes the spatial and temporal
scales of human uses, and varies its response according to differences in the
scales of land uses and to successional changes in ecosystems. Such an
approach also understands the need to separate the ecosystem management
unit from the individual user.417
"Broader Vision" of Property Rights, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 529 (1989); Stanley N. Katz, Thomas
Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary America, 19 J. L. & ECON. 467 (1976); Schultz,
supra note 361.
413. ALEXANDER, supra note 42, at 1.
414. See id. at 1-2.
415. For a discussion of traditional economic models and theory in the environmental context, see
HACKEIT, supra note 33, at 17-59.
416. For further discussion, see infra Part lli.A.
417. For further discussion, see infra Part lli.B.
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Finally, lawmakers and policymakers need to adopt an informationgathering solution to ensure that fair and effective changes are made in
property norms and ecosystem management practices. Lawmakers and
policymakers could accomplish this goal by recognizing the importance of
comprehensive monitoring not only to ecological integrity but also to
distributive justice and individual fairness. An effective monitoring
program allows scientists to gauge the health of ecosystems and identify
causes of continuing pollution. Equally as important, it allows scientists to
measure the scales of private land use and therefore helps to ensure the
proportionality of use restrictions to the scales of a particular land use.418
Through comprehensive and experimental monitoring, policymakers can
learn about the spatial and temporal extent of land uses, the impact of
different land uses on ecosystem integrity, and the effectiveness of current
solutions.419 Each of these types of solutions will now be introduced.
A. AVOIDING THE PROPERTY NORMS TRAP:
REDEFINING PROPERTY RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

Breaking the pathological effects of property norms on ecosystem
integrity will require a reexamination of the nonns shaping the behavioral
incentives of land use decisionmakers. The norms need to be redefined in
light of the spatial and temporal dimensions of land use. A resource
allocation system that allows users to ignore significant scales of use
eventually will self-destruct. As a general matter, the common law system
of property only requires property rightholders to account for costs
imposed on the interests of other rightholders and virtually ignores the
costs imposed on ecological resources and non-rightholders. At the very
least, property owners should bear an obligation to consider fully the costs
of their land use choices over time and to account for those costs in an
appropriate manner. The power to make use decisions should not be
divorced from the obligation to consider and account for the costs of land
use decisions on human and ecological systems.420
418. Hopefully such proportionality will help the government to defend land use regulations
against takings challenges. In Dolan v. City of Tigard, the Supreme Court required the government to
show rough proportionality between a land use exaction and the projected impact of the proposed use.
512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). The exaction conditioned approval of development on the dedication of
property to public use. See id. In City ofMonterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., a unanimous
Supreme Court clarified that the rough proportionality test of Dolan had not been extended "beyond the
special context of exactions." 526 U.S. 687,702 (1999).
419. For further discussion, see infra Part III.C.
420. Urban economists have stressed the importance of forcing users to take into account the
marginal costs .of their uses-that is, the costs attributed to the last unit of production, ns opposed to the
costs that have been averaged out across nll users in the defined set. See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban
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1. Reexamining the Bases for Property Norms
The sources or bases for traditional property nonns first need to be
examined in light of the historical development of the property concept and
in light of current political, economic, and ecological conditions. Modem
interpretations of property nonns primarily focus on the relationship
between property and political and economic freedom, justifying property
rights because of their importance to individual liberty. Some scholars
have questioned whether this singular focus makes sense now given the
development of American law and society in ways the framers did not
anticipate. 421 Such developments include changes in the role that land
plays in our political and economic systems. Because land is no longer the
primary source of wealth, land rights are not as critical as they once were to
promoting economic freedom. Further, the political functions served by
land ownership have changed as other protections for individual freedoms
have developed. Although land ownership still is important in providing
individuals with a zone of privacy insulated from most government control,
land ownership no longer is critical to the existence of an individual's
political and economic freedom. Land's role in maintaining ecological
integrity, in contrast, remains essential, and indeed is probably becoming
more critical as supplies of undisturbed and undeveloped land dwindle.
Property nonns should respond to these key changes in the role of land in
our political, economic, and ecological systems.
For example, traditional property norms reflect an economic view of
the role of government that tends to ignore externalities extending beyond
the interests of individual rightholders. Under that view the purpose of
government is primarily to define the sphere of property: to define the legal
and political realm within which individuals are free to satisfy their own
preferences and pursue their own vision of what is good.422 Proponents of
Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE LJ. 385, 441-43 (1977) (discussing and
critiquing this position).

421. See, e.g., CHRISTMAN, supra note 21, at 125-39, 161-84 (arguing for the abandonment of the
traditional, liberal conception of property in favor of a model that is distribution-sensitive); JENNIFER
NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND Tim LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTinmONAUSM (1990) (arguing
that private property is inappropriately insulated from democratic debate and bas distorted American
constitutionalism away from egalitarian principles). See also William H. Simon, Social-Republican
Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335 (1991) (offering social-republican property as an alternative to
classical liberal property and classical socialism).
422. See AlExANDER, supra note 42, at 1-2, 379, 382-83. Under Richard Epstein's interpretation
of Locke's theocy of civil government, individuals surrender their right to use force to the sovereign in
exchange for "a superior form of public protection." EPSTEIN, supra note 262, at 15. "The private
rights of individual relationships are ... preserved as much as possible even after the formation of civil
society." !d. at 12-13. The task of government thus is "to ensure that all of the surplus [created by the

HeinOnline -- 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 997 1999-2000

998

SOUTHERN CAliFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:927

this view recognize the social good in protecting individual rightholders
from externalities but ignore or reject the social good in protecting common
environmental resources from externalities.423 The focus on externalities
imposed on insular individuals has proven insufficient to restrain rightsbased thinking in ways that adequately promote ecosystem integrity.424 By
focusing almost exclusively on externalities imposed on insular individuals,
particularly rightholders, proponents have ignored the broader scales of
private land use.
The preference-satisfying, economic view of property that currently
controls the interpretation of property norms also ignores the public or civic
dimension of property that has long been part of American legal thought.
Under the civic conception of property, "the core purpose of property is not
to satisfy individual preferences or to increase wealth but to fulfill some
prior normative vision of how society and the polity that governs it should
be structured."425 This conception has a much broader focus than exchange
value or individual marketplace preferences, intentionally including
noneconomic interests and values not reflected in marketplace
transactions.426 Until the law and economics movement succeeded in
changing the rhetoric of property to an instrumental, market-oriented
rhetoric, noneconomic values like the right to life, liberty, and personal
security were regularly part of the property dialogue.427 Property norms, in
other words, did not focus primarily on exchange value and satisfaction of
personal preferences through marketplace transactions. Noneconomic
values were very much a part of the property dialogue. Returning to some
version of this tradition of civic property would allow ecological interests
to be reflected in property norms.
fonnation of a civil society], save that necessary to govern the state, is retained by the individunl
members of the union." !d. at 10. Private property plays a criticnl role in this overall scheme of
government, representing the "sum of the goods that the individunl gets to keep outside of the control of
the state." /d. at 13.
423. This view of government is frequently reflected in statements attacking various
environmental laws as unfairly singling out private property owners to bear the public costs of
environmental protection. No mention is made of the costs imposed by private land use on ecosystems.
A private landowner's degradation of natural resources or ecologicnl systems apparently is not
considered a cost of conducting the land use. See, e.g., Private Property Rights and Environmental
lAws: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Env'tand Pub. Works,104th Cong.181 (1995) (statement
of Jonathan H. Adler, Director ofEnvironmental Studies for the Competitive Enterprise Institute).
424. See HACKETT, supra note 33. See also Kenneth J. Arrow, Foreward to RIGHTS TO NATURE,
supra note 1, at xiv (noting that "traditionnl economic annlysis of production ••• fails to be rich enough
to encompass the actunllinks observed in the use of natural living systems as resources").
425. ALEXANDER, supra note 42, at 2.
426. Seeid.at379-81.
427. See id. at 380.
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The reevaluation of property norms thus need not result in the
abandonment of the private property system and the development of an
alternative, environmentally friendly approach to defming relationships
among individuals, government, the public, and natural resources.
Although such an alternative approach might be especially appropriate for
certain types of common pool resources,428 it could, if taken too far, ignore
the fundamental building block role that private property has played in
American economic and political systems. Though private property now
may have certain functional equivalents that are performing some of
property's political functions, private property still remains an important
part of American political and economic systems.429 Any effort to break
the pathological effects of property norms on ecological integrity therefore
should recognize that the core essence of the private property concept must
remain. If a redefinition of traditional property norms can correct the
environmentally destructive path now taken by property norms, it is
imperative that such a reexamination be conducted before more drastic
alternatives are taken.

2. General Redefinition of Property Norms
Although specific recommendations about the redefmition of property
norms must await a careful reevaluation of those norms, some general
observations can be made at this time. First, it is clear that property norms
must impose a greater degree of responsibility for the environment on
property owners. Ecological integrity must be promoted at the individual
as well as the societal level. Lawmakers must recognize the dual nature of
property ownership: In addition to giving the holder rights and powers,
private property obligates the holder to act as a responsible member of
social and ecological systems. The political and legal systems that define
the relationship of individual citizens and government to resources now
must formally recognize the ecological connectedness of all natural
resources, whether owned privately or held in common. Property rights
must be interpreted in light of the need to maintain ecological processes
and sustain species and ecosystems.
This directive admittedly does not answer some of the "big picture"
questions raised by the call for a reevaluation of property norms. It does
not, for example, tell us how much ecological integrity is necessary. Nor
does it tell us what morals should be used to develop a stewardship
428.
429.

For a discussion of some alternative approaches, see RIGIITS TO NA1URE, supra note 1.
See ELY, supra note 2, at 153-56 (discussing the continued importance of property).
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obligation or an adaptive or sustainable property concept.430 It does,
however, lay down an important principle: that the private property concept
must move towards sustainability and a process of adaptive definition.
Possible ways to achieve this principle now being explored by scholars
include developing new priority principles that do not prefer human
interests;431 calculating the economic value of ecological services;432
modifying economic systems to reflect various sustainability concepts;433
and considering greater use of a variety of property and social control
arrangements.434
Moving land ownership norms toward a sustainable and adaptive
property concept will require basing those norms not only on the economic
and political functions of property but also on the ecological services
provided by land. The individualistic, "island view" of property that
developed under traditional American law reveals much about us as
citizens and people. In addition to showing the importance that we attach
to individualism, it reveals that we do not believe landowners owe a legal
obligation to social and ecological systems. This belief is hostile, in some
fundamental ways, to modern notions of responsible citizenship. Though
landed property traditionally was tied to good citizenship, this relationship
was individually based; wealthy landowners tended to participate more in
government. As social and ecological conditions change, the concept of
the citizen owner also must change. It is no longer enough for citizen
landowners to participate actively in government; citizen landowners also
must think ecologically beyond their property boundaries.

3. Judicial Redefinition of Property Norms
One key step in moving toward sustainable and adaptive property is
judicial recognition of the spatial and temporal dimensions of private land
use in resolving property conflicts and defining property rights. Because of
the external and cumulative effects of individual land use and because of
430. For a thoughtful critique of the concept of ecological integrity as the basis of a set of morals
that would collectively form an environmental ethic, see WESTRA, supra note 389. For an argument
that a holistic approach based on pluralistic stewardship is needed, see Barrett & Grizzle, supra note
389.
431. See, e.g., PAUL W. TAYLOR, RESPEC'fFORNATIJRE: A THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL Ennes
(1986).
432. See, e.g., Costanza eta!., supra note 33.
433. See, e.g., HACKETT, supra note 33, at 249-305 (discussing sustainable development,
production, and consumption); James Salzman, Sustainable Consumption and the Law, 27 ENV1L. L.
1243 (1997) (discussing sustainable consumption from a legal perspective).
434. See RJGHIS TO NATIJRE, supra note 1; Sterk, supra note 21.
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the relationship between scale and integrity,435 courts need to capture scale
dimensions in defining the rights, powers, obligations, and liabilities of
property owners. It is time for courts to recognize the legitimacy of
imposing an obligation on property owners to account for the ecological
costs of land use choices determined in light of appropriate considerations
of scale. It is also time for courts to recognize that the liberal, economic
view of property has skewed the definition and evolution of property rights.
For the most part, changes in the common law of property do not occur
under the economic view unless the desires of interacting persons to adjust
to changes in costs and benefits have produced some corresponding new
private property right in someone.436 Court decisions involving property
rights generally do not recognize the scale of land use. When a property
conflict involves two private property owners, the dispute tends to be
framed in the context of the conflicting private interests. When the
property conflict involves a private landowner and a governmental unit, the
broader public interest admittedly may help to establish the basic
constitutional legitimacy of the government's exercise of power or explain
why the private use is harmful or illegal. In evaluating the constitutionality
of the economic impact of the government action on the property owner,
however, the public interest apparently is not even to be considered.437
This refusal to consider the public interest in determining the legitimacy of
the economic impact on the property owner reflects a failure to recognize
the temporal and spatial scales of private land use.
Recognition of the temporal and spatial scales of land use is especially
important to a determination of the fairness of the government restriction to
the individual. Before a court can determine whether government action
unfairly singles out a private landowner, the court needs to have an
accurate understanding of the scales of the regulated conduct. Considering
the consequences of land use over spatially and temporally relevant scales
will help to ensure that fairness is defmed in light of the individual
landowner's impact on future generations, the public interest, and
ecological integrity over the short and long term. Current landowners
435. See supra notes 351-355 and accompanying text
436. See Al..EXANDER, supra note 42, at 379-82; Demsetz, supra note 242, at 348-53.
437. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16 (1992) (adopting
a per se taking rule for total deprivations of value that does not normally allow for "case-specific
inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint''); Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393,413 (1922) (noting that "usually in ordinazy private affairs the public interest does not warrant
much" government interference with property rights). The phrase "public interest'' is being used
broadly here to include the interests of non-rightholders and the promotion of ecological integrity.
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should not have monopoly power over the use of a scarce or irreplaceable
resource like land when that resource is vital to everyone's survival.438
The common law of property provides sufficient basis for
reinterpreting or redefining property norms to reflect considerations of
scale and impose an ecological obligation on property owners. Under the
common law, property rights change over time as circumstances and
conditions change.439 In the nineteenth century, courts began to recognize
the dynamic, evolving nature of common law property and moved away
from a static approach.440 Under the dynamic view, common law property
rights are relative, varying in meaning and strength even at the same point
in time according to the nature of the conflicting interests.441 The inherent
flexibility of property, long recognized by the common law, provides the
means for developing an adaptive property concept that is sufficiently
experimental to allow the concept to react to new scientific data about the
scales and impacts of land use. The challenge for modem courts
formulating the adaptive property concept is to identify its core essence
which should remain unchanged. Recognizing the existence of an
unchangeable core is not, however, tantamonnt to denying the adaptability
of property. Nor is it tantamount to conclnding that private property rights
are absolute and generally free from government restraint.442
The common law of property is inherently adaptable and evolving in
large part because it is not controlled by a single theory or conception of
property. Rather property law has been defined through a dialectic
involving conflicting conceptions of the dominant role and purpose of
438. In the nineteenth centwy, courts began to recognize that an absolutist conception of property
stressing dominion, priority in time, and a broad power to exclude created monopoly power in protected
property rights. To encourage competitive economic development, the courts gradually freed property
from these absolutist, exclusionary biases "by enlarging the range of noncompensable injuries.''
HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 40. See generally id. at 31-62 (discussing the transfonnation of the
conception of property from the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries).
439. See Butler, supra note 33, at 660-61; Carol M. Rose, Property Rights and Responsibilities, in
'DUNKING EcOLOGICAU.Y: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POUCY 49, 50 (1997). See
also Demsetz, supra note 242, at 350 (recognizing that adjustments in property rights occur in response
to gradual changes in social mores, technology, and people's desires to respond to new cost-benefit
possibilities).
440. See HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 1-4,31-34.
441. See ALExANDER, supra note 42, at 319-23,325-29, 381 (recognizing contributions ortega!
realists such as Hohfeld and Ely in defining social and relational aspects of property ownership); Butler,
supra note 33, at 658-59.
442. Indeed, there is ample historical evidence that private property was not meant to be absolute,
but rather subject to the public good. See AIJ;XANDER, supra note 42; Anderson, supra note 412;
Echeverria, supra note 409.
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property.443 One conception, the vision of civic property, affected the early
formation of property theory, while a second, the commodification or
economic view, has controlled property law more recently.444 That one
conception now dominates the legal and scholarly discourse does not
signify the end of the dialectic. It simply means that negative reaction to a
now subordinate conception led to the dominance of another vision.
Nothing in the ongoing dialogue about property suggests that future shifts
in property theory will not occur.445 To the contrary, the history of the
common law of property suggests that it has used the dialectic "to correct
itself in ways that improve American society.'>«6 This corrective function
has, for hundreds of years, served an invaluable role in making property a
stable American institution and should be allowed to continue. Now the
dialectic needs to be allowed to readjust the relationship between property
norms and ecology, and resolve the problems of scale and integrity caused
by current property norms.
The common law of property also has recognized the legitimacy of
restricting private land uses in light of their cumulative effects on natural
systems.447 Although this recognition has occurred primarily in situations
involving traditionally recognized public rights or nuisances, it nonetheless
provides reluctant courts with a basis for expanding consideration of
cumulative effects to include private property's "piggyback" use of
common environmental resources. 448 Further, through its efficiency norm,
the common law of property provides a basis for imposing an obligation to
internalize the ecological costs of land use. While such internalization may
not have been necessary when natural resources were more abundant and
ecological systems were better able to absorb the adverse effects of land
use, the decline in the quantity and health of ecological resources is now
well documented.449
To counter argnments for greater accountability and restriction of
landowners, proponents of a liberal conception of property sometimes
443. See ALExANDER, supra note 42, at 384-85.
444. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 42 (discussing the conflicting conceptions).
445. See id. at 384.
446. /d. at 386.
447. See Rose, supra note 439, at 52.
448. See id. at 51. As support, Professor Rose points to traditionally recognized public rights like
fishing and traditionally accepted nuisances like noise, smoke, and odors that involve tangible physical
invasions. See id. at 52 & n.7.
449. See, e.g., COUNCil. ON ENVIRONMENrAL QUAUTY, supra note 127; U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, CHESAPEAKE BAY: A FRAMEwORK FOR ACilON (1983).

HeinOnline -- 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1003 1999-2000

1004

SOUTHERN CAliFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:927

argue that property owners traditionally have practiced stewardship.450 As
evidence, they point to private landowners like the Nature Conservancy
that have protected hundreds of acres of environmentally sensitive lands.
Advocates of this position stress that private property laws are neutral and
that what matters most is who owns the land. While one landowner might
be motivated by profit, another could be influenced by conservation.
Private property laws allow both motives to impact land use.
That some property owners are guided by the conservation motive
does not mean that property norms do not have pathological effects on
ecological systems. Not all property ownership must lead to environmental
degradation for a problem to exist.
Landowners like the Nature
Conservancy are the exception rather than the rule. The bias of the
property system towards economically valuable use and consumption
means that most ordinary landowners cannot afford to conserve their land
in a natural state. The ordinary landowner, even an environmentally
friendly one, cannot afford to choose stewardship over profit; his resources
simply are too limited for him to have the ability to ignore the normal
market incentives promoted by property norms.
Further, even assuming that the stewardship ethic was once the norm,
it clearly is not the norm today. Not enough private landowners are
voluntarily preserving enough acres of land to make voluntary stewardship
the key to protecting ecological integrity. Land settlement patterns have
changed siguiflcantly since the colonial and early statehood periods when
land was the main source of wealth and more compact urban settlements
and large landholdings were commonplace.451 More importantly, the
economic value of a landowner's power to subdivide has become too
siguificant for landowners to ignore. Just as the nature of the landowner's
power to subdivide has changed in response to market conditions, so must
the judiciary's definition of property rights and obligations change m
response to ecological conditions.
450. See 10 RICHARD R. POWElL, POWElL ON REAL PROPERTY§ 69.02, at 69-4 (Patrick J. Rohnn
ed., 1998) (the "law of land in England and in America ... [reflects] a change from the viewpoint that
he who owns may do as he pleases with what he owns, to a position which hesitatingly embodies an
ingredient of stewardship"). This view has, at times, controlled resource management decisions. For
example, the ideal that farmers had a "'love of land [that] bonded ••. [them] to the rigorous observance
of rules"' designed to protect the earth was once a key premise of the management program for the
Florida Everglades. Stephen S. Light, Lance H. Gunderson, & C.S. Holling, The Everglades: Evolution
of Management in a Turbulent Ecosystem, in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES, supra note 9,~t 103, 124-25
(quoting J.E. DoveU, A History of the Everglades in Florida (1947) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill)).
451. See Butler, supra note 33, at637; Shabmnn,supra note 128, at 3-4;supra notes 176-178 and
accompanying text.
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4. Legislative and Administrative Redefinition of Property Norms
In addition to judicial consideration of scale in defming property
rights, legislative and administrative branches must incorporate the
temporal and spatial dimensions of land use into laws governing
development and growth. Innovative and bold approaches to land use
management are becoming increasingly necessary. While it is important
that the courts redefine property norms to reflect the scales of land use, this
process of change will necessarily be gradual and ad hoc. Legislatures, on
the other hand, can address issues of scale comprehensively and
systematically through a number of devices designed to alter the behavioral
incentives of land users.452 These devices will not be effective, however,
unless they are followed by timely implementation and persistent
enforcement. Only through the combined efforts of all branches of
government can a redefinition of property norms occur.
One way to incorporate ecologically relevant considerations of scale
into land use choices is to mandate that local governments consider off-site,
as well as on-site, impacts of proposed projects. Unless statutes authorize
such consideration, many courts tend to defme strictly the scope of a
locality's power to review land development projects.453 Statutory
authorization and direction to consider off-site impacts would recognize the
need to incorporate the scales of private land use into land use
decisionmaking.
In addition to mandating consideration of scale by land use
decisionmakers, legislatures could impose an affirmative obligation on
property owners to consider scale by requiring property owners who are
proposing development projects of a certain size or density to conduct more
effective impact analysis for manmade and natural infrastructures and
systems.454 This analysis would include an evaluation of the impact of the
proposed development on the transportation infrastructure, the ground and
surface water supply, drainage and sewerage systems, schools, ecological
systems, and other shared resources. If the proposed development would
impose new demands on the water supply, for example, the landowner
would be required to demonstrate how those demands could be met using
available resources. If the proposed development would eliminate
452. In dealing with the problem of nutrient runoff, for example, a legislature can, with the
passage of a single act, impose fines on farmers to force them to reduce nutrient runoff. See, e.g.,
Maryland Senate OKs Farm RunoffFines, DAILY PREss (Newport News, Va.), Feb. 25, 1998, at CS.
453. See DANIELR. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW§ 9.09 (4th ed. 1997).
454. Some states have already adopted statewide land use planning programs that incorporate
growth controls. See generally id. at421-35 (discussing growth control programs).
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wetlands or other critical environmental resources, the landowner would
have to explain the impact of the loss on the watershed from the
perspectives of ecosystem functions and integrity, focusing not only on the
loss to the developed tract but also on the cumulative impact of the loss to
the watershed as a whole. If the development would result in a loss of land
cover or cause erosion and runoff, the landowner would have to document
the amount and type of land cover lost455 or ground eroded, assess the
ecological and physical effects of the lost land cover or increased erosion
and runoff on the watershed, and explain how those effects could be
minimized, mitigated, or reversed. Such explanations should consider the
spatial and temporal dimensions of the impacts given conditions within the
watershed.
Although these infrastructure impact studies admittedly would
increase the costs of development, internalization of the costs of private
land use is needed to control growth and effectively protect ecosystems.
All too often, developers either are not required to conduct ecosystem or
watershed based infrastructure studies, or are able to avoid them through
private agreements or court challenges.456 When the demands of
development on natural and manmade infrastructures are not adequately
addressed, the results can be serious. Just consider the plight of New
Zealand's largest city, which experienced a blackout blamed on rapid
growth. The last of four aging power cables failed on February 20, 1998,
sending the city of one million into darkness for weeks. In addition to
economic losses resulting from closed shops and businesses, the city
experienced fires, spoiled food, and other health and safety problems.457
455. The Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County, Virginia, voted in March 1999 to require
developers to document the location, type, and condition of all trees, shrubs, and other plants before
developers cut them down. Although the County cannot require developers to save trees, it hopes that
the documentation requirement will encourage voluntary efforts to minimize the loss of vegetation. See
VA to require developers to document vegetation, BAY J. (May 1999), at 16. A legislatively imposed
obligation to minimize loss of ground cover is needed to deal with the growing problem of lost
vegetative land cover.
456. In the Chapman's Landing project discussed earlier, the developer apparently tried to divide
the project into smaller parts, possibly to avoid comprehensive review. The developer also met in
private with the Army Corps of Engineers, Maryland's Department of Natural Resources, and other
federal and state agencies to discuss the application that the developer eventually would file. See supra
notes 371-388 and accompanying text.
457. See New Zealand Blackout Blamed on Rapid Growth, DAILY PREss (Newport News, Va.),
Feb. 26, 1998, at All. Another power failure also occurred in May 1998. See Power Outage Again
Hits New Zealand, DAILY PREss (Newport News, Va.), May II, 1998, at Al2. Although a subsequent
study faulted the utility, see Utility Faulted for Five-week Blackout in New Zealand, DAILY PRESS
(Newport News, Va.), July 22, 1998, at AS, earHer news accounts suggest that rapid growth played a
major role. See New Zealand Blackout Blamed on Rapid Growth, supra.
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Land development is not simply a matter of whether a structure can be built
on a particular site; it also raises important questions about the ability of
manmade and natural infrastructures to absorb the impacts of development
and sustain ecosystems.
Furthermore, the infrastructure and system impact studies must
become the responsibility of all landowners proposing a development or
use of an ecologically significant size, density, or scale of use. The studies
should not be imposed only on owners of land in critical or buffer areas;
uses in the interior portions of a watershed also can seriously degrade the
ecosystem. Ecological problems are caused by land uses occurring
throughout a watershed, not just those in the coastal area. The scales of
land use extend well beyond the temporal and physical constraints of the
individual user. Land uses not only affect ecological resources located
miles away; they also interact and combine with other uses, causing more
serious consequences. It is time for landowners to recognize and account
for their interference with the "life-support services" provided by
ecological systems.458
The infrastructure impact studies must also be required early enough
in the decisionmaking process to make a difference.
Preliminary
government decisions that make development possible must be recognized
as critical decisions. Once a local governmental unit decides to allow the
extension of water and sewer service to a particular area, development
eventually will follow unless preexisting rights or interests prevent
development.459 Those types of decisions must be made only after
meaningful consideration of the impact on available natural resources and
ecological systems. At present, the key to growth control is effective
management of water and sewerage services. The importance of such
services would change, of course, if technologically advanced septic
systems gain widespread acceptance. Those systems use technology that
allows land not previously suitable for development to be developed.460
458. See Jane Lubchenco, Entering the Century of the Environment: A New Social Contract for
Science, 279 SCIENCE 491, 492 (1998).
459. A local government, for example, may seek to acquire conservation easements restricting
development on agricultural land. See Stephen C. Fehr, Montgomery's line of Defense Against the
Suburban Invasion, County Preserves Open Space, Allows Dense Development Elsewhere, WASH.

POST, Mar. 25, 1997, at Al.
460. See Judith Haynes, New Septic Systems Could Open Land for Development, DAILY PREss
(Newport News, Va.), Mar. 9, 1998, at B2 [hereinafter New Septic Systems]. See also Judith Haynes,
Va. Tests Septic Options, DAILY PREss (Newport News, Va.), Mar. 9, 1998, at Bl (discussing use of
new septic system technology in Virginia). See generally SITE CHARACTERIZATION AND DESIGN OF
ON-SITE SEPTIC SYSTEMS (M.S. Bedinger et al. eds., 1997) (discussing dramatic changes in on-site
septic system technology).
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Poor percolation of land traditionally has been an important constraint on
development. A locality which adopts the new technology no longer will
be able to control growth simply by relying on the fact that the soil will not
percolate sufficiently to support a conventional septic system.461
Although some jurisdictions have adopted innovative growth
management programs that consider scale through infrastructure impact
reviews,462 significant differences exist between these programs and the
suggested approach. First, the programs do not redefine the norms
underlying property rights to impose an ecological obligation on property
owners, recognize sustainable or adaptive property concepts, or capture
ecologically relevant spatial and temporal scales. Under an ecologically
based approach to land use management, a decisionmaker evaluating a
proposed or current land use or defining authorized land uses would
consider, among other factors, whether individual tracts of land performed
critical ecological functions, played an important role in sustaining
ecosystem structure, or promoted ecosystem resilience.463 If so, the land
use decisionmaker then would consider the type of obligation that should
be imposed on the landowner to protect ecosystem functions, structure, and
integrity.464 Such an ecologically based view of land is not generally
reflected in the innovative land management programs in effect today;465
ecological concepts are not typically used as guiding principles in land use
decisionmaking. Nor do current growth management programs necessarily
force landowners to bear the marginal costs of their land use.466 Rather the
programs tend to assume the continuing existence of traditional property
rights and norms, and view growth management primarily as the control of
461. See New Septic Systems, supra note 460, at B2.
462. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.06 (West Supp. 1999) (regulating developments with
regional impacts); MD. CoDE ANN., ENVIR. § 9-512(b)(l) (1996) (linking building permits to adequate
water and sewerage systems); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 195.020(3}-(4), 195.060, 195.065, 195.070, 195.075,
195.145, 197.295, 197.296, 197.298, 197.303, 197.307 (1991 & Supp. pt. 3 1998) & 268.390 (Supp. pt.
4, 1998) (providing for the creation of urban growth boundaries, urban service agreements, and urban
reserve areas to control growth); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6086(a)(9)(A), (G), (H), (J), (L) (1997)
(requiring state officials reviewing development permit applications to consider the impnct of growth,
utility services, the costs of scattered development, and rural growth areas, among other factors).
463. See Keiter, supra note 48, at 336; Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of
Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1442-46
(1993).
464. See Keiter, supra note 48, at 336.
465. Nor is this view widely shared by state legislatures or courts. See id.
466. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3180(7) (West Supp. 1999) (allowing averaging In
calculating the level of transportation service in compact geographic areas). For a discussion of the
impact of considering average costs instead of marginal costs in making use decisions, see Ellickson,
supra note420, at441-43.
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the characteristics of growth (e.g., rate, type, amount, location, and
quality). While the negative impact of growth on manmade and natural
infrastructures is a concern of the programs, this concern is reflected in
strategies to control input features of growth, not in a redefinition of
property rights and obligations.467
Further, even when land use programs require consideration of the
impact of proposed development on the infrastructure, they tend to discount
the importance of the ecological infrastructure. In Maryland, for example,
state and local governments must, before issuing a building permit,
consider existing and approved developments in the relevant service area to
determine if the water supply, sewerage, or solid waste systems would
adequately serve the proposed development.468 Florida goes a step further,
requiring certain necessary public facilities and services to be available
when development is approved.469 Those necessary facilities include
roads, potable water, sanitary sewer, solid waste, drainage facilities, parks
and recreation, and mass transit.470 Noticeably absent from the lists of
infrastructure services are ecological services. Although ecological
considerations admittedly appear in other parts of the states' environmental
or land use laws,471 their absence from the provisions governing the
regional impact of development on infrastructure suggests that the life"
support services provided by the ecological infrastructure are taken for
granted.
Protecting the important ecological services provided by land and
other natural resources will require changes in private property nonns to
incorporate principles of ecology. It also will require changes in ecosystem
management approaches to reflect the latest ecological concepts and
infonnation. Through the adoption of an adaptive approach to ecosystem
management, external pressure can be imposed on the property system to
take into account ecological principles and data.
467. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, & JOHN M. PAYNE, PLANNING AND
CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 653-59 (4th ed. 1995) (comparing growth management programs to
traditional zoning). See also MANDELKER, supra note 453, §§ 10.01-10.12 (discussing legal issues
raised by growth management programs).
468. See MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 9-512(b)(l) (1996).
469. See FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 163.3180(1) (West Supp. 1999).
470. See id. § 163.3180(1). Florida requires the public facilities and services "needed to
support development" to be available "concurrent with the impacts of such development" /d.
§ 163.3177(10)(h}.
471. See, e.g., 1 FLoRIDA BAR, FLA. ENVI1... AND LAND USE LAW, (1986, 1988, 1991 & 1993)
(discussing environmental provisions in the Florida Code); 2 FLORIDA BAR, supra, (2d ed. 1994 &
1996) (again discussing environmental provisions in the Florida Code).
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B. ADAPTIVE ECOSYS1EM MANAGEMENT

Effective ecosystem management requires a flexible, adaptive, and
ecologically based approach to management. Instead of striving to tame
the environment in order to promote social objectives, adaptive
management tries to manage the environment in a way that responds to the
variations, rhythms, and cycles of nature.472 Rooted in ecology, adaptive
management links management policies to biological time scales and to
ecosystem integrity. Concepts like resilience, cycles of ecosystem
succession, functional equivalence, and population fluctuation play an
important role in adaptive management policies.473 Under the adaptive
management concept, human interactions with nature are viewed as
experiments that provide opportunities for learning. Eventually, once the
lessons are learned, adaptive management policies are changed to reflect
the new understandings and knowledge.474 Surprise and uncertainty, in
other words, are "integral" parts of adaptive management.475 Crises and
unpredictable interactions are viewed as inevitabilities requiring adaptation
of appropriate policies.476
For years humans have responded to the dynamic nature of the
environment by attempting to control-or as some would say manipulatethe variability of different components of natural systems. Fish populations
have been controlled through fishing restrictions and manmade fish
ladders, pests in forest ecosystems through spraying, and grass on public
rangelands through the selection of drought-resistant species. Although
these strategies may work in the short term, they also have contributed to a
loss of resilience in the foundation ecosystem.477 Because of this and other
long-term, adverse consequences, some scientists have begun urging
management institutions to recognize the need for adaptive management.
Instead of using technology and engineering to control the variability of
change in' the environment, these scientists stress the need to adapt to
change. Instead of managing the environment primarily or solely for social
472. See Frances Westley, Governing Design: The Management ofSocial System~ and Ecosystems
Management, in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES, supra note 9, at 391, 394.
473. See Holling, What Barriers? What Bridges?, supra note 132, at 20-23; Kui N. Lee,
Deliberately Seeking Sustainability in the Columbia River Basin, in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES, supra
note 9, at 214, 229; R.E. Munn, Monitoring for Ecosystem Integrity, in EcOLOGICAL INTEGRITY, supra
note 30, at 105, 105-06.
474. See Lee, supra note 473, at 227, 229.
475. See Holling, What Barriers? What Bridges?, supra note 132, at 12-13.
476. See Gunderson et al., supra note 133, at 490-92.
477. See Holling, What Barriers? What Bridges?, supra note 132, at 6-9.
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objectives, the scientists identify sustainability as their goal.478 Instead of
allowing private property rights to control ecosystem management,
proponents of adaptive management treat "economic uses of nature as
experiments" that might require new management policies and rules to deal
with adverse impacts.479
An adaptive ecosystem management approach will help to ensure that
the ecological dimensions of property use are considered-that is, that
ecologically sustainable scales are defmed and incorporated into property
rights. Under mainstream economic thinking, economic growth provides a
solution to, or at least a justification for ignoring, the problems of
inequitable income distribution and maintenance of economic scale within
sustainable limits.480 Increases in productivity theoretically mean more
wealth is available for everyone.481 Further, because a growth-oriented
policy provides real benefits, making many better off without directly
making anyone worse off, "bigger'' is presumed to be the optimal scale.
One key problem with this reasoning is that it only addresses economic
scales at a microeconomic level. Adaptive ecosystem management would
serve as a check on microeconomic analysis, ensuring that ecological
scales are considered at the management level in solving ecological
problems.482
An adaptive management approach to ecosystem management may
require greater caution in making land use decisions. Because of the
unpredictable and ever-changing nature of ecosystems, many land use
decisions are made under uncertainty. Some scientists have urged the
adoption of a policy of prudence or caution to minimize the possible
adverse ecological consequences of decisions made under uncertainty.483
Under a policy of prudence, decisionmakers facing uncertainty would
"have an ethical obligation to risk erring on the side of preservation" of the
natural environment.484 To justify this approach, scholars explain that
ethics require decisionmakers to minimize avoidable catastrophic
478.
479.
480.

See Lee, supra note 473, at 234.
!d. at227.
See HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH: THE EcONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT 48-52 (1996) (discussing allocation, income distribution, and scale under economic

thinking).
481. See id. at 51.
482. In recent years a group of scholars has begun to use principles of biology, ecology, and
environmental science to reform assumptions of macroeconomics. For an introduction to some of the
thinking of these ecological economists, see EcOLOGICAL EcONOMICS: THE SCIENCE AND
MANAGEMENT OF SUSTAINABll.ITY (Robert Costanza ed., 1991).
483. See, e.g., Noss, supra note 107, at 896-97.
484. /d. at 897.

HeinOnline -- 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1011 1999-2000

1012

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:927

consequences.485 Many ecosystem management decisions would fall into
this situation.486
Altering decisionmaking preferences will, in tum, require a rethinking
of property norms. The rights-based focus of traditional property norms
can lead to the view that economic expectations and uses generally deserve
constitutional protection from government interference. Under this view
government should compensate property owners adversely affected by
regulation benefiting the public regardless of its negative externalities to
ecological systems or common environmental resources. The more
absolute this view becomes, the more it limits the effectiveness of the
adaptive management concept. Incorporating an expectation of the
unexpected into property rights will require a change in thinking about the
nature of constitutionally protected property. Although constitutional
protection of property would remain a fundamental part of our political
values and structure, such protection could not entail the same sense of
constancy that now prevails among many courts, legislators, academics,
and property owners. The scope of constitutionally protected property
rights should no longer be determined at the time of the initial investment
or purchase of the property. The nature of a landowner's power and right
to control use of her land should no longer ignore the negative externalities
to ecosystems. Property rights should not be defined without sufficient
regard for the foundation ecosystem. Ecological integrity will require a
more informed view of the relationship between property rights and
ecological resources-one that recognizes the importance and necessity of
an adaptive property concept that complements the adaptive management
approach.
Once more flexible approaches to defining property rights and
managing ecosystems are taken, a system for ensuring fair, accurate
changes in property rights and management techniques will be needed. A
comprehensive monitoring system can help to meet this need.
C. THE IMPORTANCE OF MONITORING FOR SURPRISE

Comprehensive monitoring of ecosystems is important not only to the
health of the systems but also to the landowners who use the resources
within the ecosystem. Studies of managed ecosystems indicate that
management institutions have tended to ease up on monitoring over time as
initial management goals are reached and short-term successes are
485.
486.

See id. at 896-97; Shrader-Frechette & McCoy, supra note 370.
See Noss, supra note 107, at 896-97; Shrader-Frechette & McCoy, supra note 370.
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achieved. Instead of continuing to monitor the ecosystem for "surprises,"
the management institutions typically have shifted resources to operational
objectives.487 Funds once used for experimental monitoring are instead
used for improving operational efficiency. What monitoring efforts that
remain tend to focus on the targeted ecological product. The managed
ecosystem's gradual loss of resilience and gradual increase in vulnerability
often goes unnoticed.488
These studies provide compelling evidence of the importance of a
comprehensive and experimental monitoring program to ecological
integrity. A management program that monitors for surprise ensures that
the indicators of ecological integrity are constantly and objectively
measured, and that the measurements are reproducible.489 Because of the
complexity of monitoring for ecological integrity, however, management
institutions need to set monitoring priorities. Factors and questions
developed by researchers can be used to set those priorities.490
Comprehensive and experimental monitoring recognizes that
ecosystems do not follow predictable linear paths of succession. Change in
ecosystems can be unpredictable and chaotic; insignificant or noncritical
attributes are not necessarily the first to be affected. By monitoring for
surprise, a management program ensures that changes in critical attributes
are identified relatively quickly. An adaptive ecosystem management
program cannot succeed without an effective monitoring plan for
identifying changes in conditions on a continuous basis. Although some
changes may be irreversible, many others will occur at the margin or will
be symptomatic, providing evidence of ecosystem health. Identifying those
more marginal or symptomatic changes through monitoring will allow the
management program to respond before the changes affect the ecosystem
in its entirety.
487. See Holling, What Barriers? What Bridges?, supra note 132, at 8.
488. Seeid.
489. See Munn, supra note 473, at 105, 108.
490. One scientist suggested consideration of the following factors in setting monitoring priorities:
critical limiting factors for sustainability; current threats to ecosystem integrity; the existence of
irreversible trends; interactions between various societal interests; surprises or discontinuities that mig!tt
occur within the next thirty to fifty years; and the types of questions that the monitoring system would
be expected to answer. See id. at 110. The abundant literature on ecological integrity provides a strong
foundation for developing more specific monitoring programs. See id. at 112. See generally Andrew
Robertson, Paul Orlando, & Donna Turgeon, Monitoring the Coastal Environment (visited May 25,
1999) <http://state_of_coastnoaa.gov/bulletinslhtrnYmcwq_12/mcwq.html> (discussing the importance
of monitoring coastal areas and the need for new approaches to environmental monitoring).
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Comprehensive and experimental monitoring of ecosystems also can
help to produce data needed to measure and understand the scales of land
use. Besides providing property owners with scientific evidence of the
temporal and spatial scales of their land use, the monitoring data can
provide a rational basis for defining criteria and standards to govern land
use and development. This function is especially important given the
general "concerns for proportionality [that] animate the Takings Clause."491
Further, although the Supreme Court has not extended the more specific
"rough proportionality" test developed in Dolan v. City of Tigard beyond
the exactions context, the Dolan decision clearly establishes a more
demanding standard of judicial review for some land use restrictions.492
Some scholars have argued that fairness and equity require treating the
first land user in an area the same as the last similar user. The apparent
thinking is that the behavior of the users is equivalent and that the first
contributes as much to the congestion as the last.493 This position seems
persuasive when fairness is defmed in the present and focuses only on the
status of being a land user; hindsight tells us that all users are part of the
problem. The argument loses persuasiveness, however, when other
temporal and spatial dimensions are considered. The timing of a use, for
example, can affect the ecological impact of the use. Uses conducted at a
time wheu ecosystems are resilient will have a different impact than similar
uses conducted at a time when ecosystems are stressed and more
vulnerable. The cumulative effects of piggybacking onto common
resources also are likely to differ for earlier and later uses. Temporal and
spatial scales, in other words, do matter in measuring the ecological
consequences of development and use. Comprehensive monitoring can
help to ensure that land use restrictions roughly reflect the scales of
particular uses.
CONCLUSION
Modem society faces increasingly serious problems of escalating land
and water use and of ineffective watershed and ecosystem management
over the long term. Although some progress has been made in recognizing
and correcting the ineffectiveness of traditional management systems in
dealing with those problems, the steps taken generally do not recognize the
role of traditional property norms in contributing to those problems. The
491.

City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999). See

supra note 418 and accompanying text
492 See supra note 418 and accompanying text.
493. See Ellickson, supra note 420, at 447-48.
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traditional norms' focus on the relationship between property and
individual freedom leads to land use and ecosystem management practices
that ignore the pathological effects of property use on environmental and
other common resources. Although the fundamental building block role
played by private property in the American economic and political systems
suggests that the core essence of private property must remain intact, the
increasingly stressed conditions of modem ecosystems require private
property law to move toward a more adaptive conception of property. Such
an adaptive approach would take into account the impact of property use on
ecological and other common systems. Such an approach also would
recognize the legitimacy of imposing a greater degree of responsibility for
the environment on property owners through judicial, legislative, and
administrative action. One key way private property law could not only
become more adaptive but also impose greater responsibility is to
incorporate the scales of land use into the definition of property rights,
powers, duties, and liabilities.
In addition to solutions that work within the private property system,
external solutions also are needed to impose pressure on the property
system to respond to modem ecological conditions. One external solution
that would parallel the adaptive conception of property is the adoption of
an adaptive approach to ecosystem management. Under such an approach,
interactions between property owners and nature would provide
opportunities for assessing impacts and fine-tuning or changing
managemeut policies. Although constitutionally protected property rights
would remain a fundamental part of our legal and political structure, the
scope of those rights would no longer be defined solely or primarily from
the economic view of property.

Finally, a comprehensive monitoring system is needed to ensure that
fair, accurate changes in management policies and property rights are
made. A monitoring program that monitors an ecosystem for surprise
provides valuable information about the health of the ecosystem. Equally
as important, such a monitoring program produces data needed to measure
the scales of private land use, and thus helps to ensure that land use
restrictions are generally proportional to the scales of particular land uses.
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